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ABSTRACT 
STILL DIRTY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS:  
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCIALIZATION AND 
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA  
 
MAY 2014 
INKYOUNG KIM, B.A., SUNGKYUNKWAN UNIVERSITY 
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas 
This dissertation examines the microprocesses of regime creation in Northeast 
Asia regarding transboundary environmental problems. Despite the growing need for 
international environmental cooperation and policy coordination at the regional and 
global levels, Northeast Asia has not yet succeeded in reaching any binding regional 
agreement on any environmental issue, even though it has developed various 
environmental cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary pollution. Rather than 
characterizing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia as 
“non-regime,” this study unpacks the varying forms of collective action in terms of the 
speed of development of cooperative mechanisms and the substantive content of the 
development undertaken by states in the region. The causal relationships between specific 
forms of political leadership, knowledge, and socialization and the degrees and forms of 
regional collective action is explored regarding the transboundary air pollution issues of 
the region, including acid rain, dust and sandstorms, and various long-range 
transboundary air pollutants. In addition to comparing the participation of countries in 
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this region in broader Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms, the study also analyzes 
the differences between European and East Asian experiences on this topic.  
An analysis of the three cases indicates that all three independent variables are 
only partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured by formal 
features and concrete collective action in Northeast Asia. The study’s comparison of the 
varying degrees of collective action in Northeast Asia and Europe and among the three 
studied Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms discovers two useful 
insights.  
First, the analysis supports the hypothesis on social mechanisms among political 
leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization, which asserts that the stronger the 
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely 
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization 
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action. The study finds that 
strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member countries to engage in 
the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared scientific knowledge is 
positively associated with the adaption process of socialization among participants in the 
cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms.  
Another insight is that the lack of shared knowledge and of the learning mode of 
socialization helps explain why all three regional cooperative mechanisms have failed to 
advance to become the legally binding regional environmental regimes rather than the 
comparatively higher degrees of collective action in terms of formalization and 
concreteness among regional entities within the UNEP’s second category of regional 
action. This study argues that knowledge and socialization barriers are key determinants 
 
  
x 
 
of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. Without shared 
scientific knowledge and engagement in the learning process of socialization, even given 
strong political leadership by a participating country, it is not likely for a region to 
develop a legally binding regional environmental regime. Therefore, this study concludes 
that to make the transformation from the least formal and concrete collective action to the 
most formal and concrete depends on creating shared knowledge and the learning process 
of socialization.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: LEADERSHIP, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCIALIZATION 
 
Research Questions 
There has been a growing consensus on the need for international environmental 
cooperation and policy coordination at the regional and global levels. Global warming, 
ozone depletion, and tropical deforestation are typically acknowledged as global 
environmental problems requiring global cooperation, while acid rain, haze, and regional 
water pollution are typically viewed as regional issues. In response to these problems, 
more than a thousand multilateral environmental agreements have been made between 
1950 and 2010.1 Northeast Asia, however, has not yet succeeded in reaching any binding 
regional agreement even though it has developed various environmental cooperative 
mechanisms regarding transboundary pollution, as shown in Table 1.1. It is also notable 
that none of the countries of this region have accepted a binding dispute resolution 
mechanism in the numerous bilateral agreements they have made (Henry, Kim, & Lee, 
2012). 
Table 1.1 
Participation of Northeast Asian Countries in Environmental Cooperative Programs  
 
Issue areas Acronyms Full name Starting Year 
Region/ 
Sub-region 
Level of 
actors 
                                                          
1 This number includes conventions, treaties, agreements, accords, or their non-English 
equivalents and protocols and amendments to such instruments and excludes “soft law” such as 
action plans, agreed measures, codes of conduct, declarations, resolutions, and similar policies 
(Mitchell, 2002-2011).  
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R
egional C
ooperation
a 
APEC 
Asia-Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
1989 Asia-Pacific State 
ASEAN+3 ASEAN Plus Three 1997 East Asia state, IO 
ASEAN+6 ASEAN Plus Six 2005 Asia-Pacific State 
EAS East Asia Summit 2005 East Asia State 
Tripartite 
Summit Trilateral Summit 2008 
Northeast 
Asia State 
C
om
prehensive 
AECEN 
Asian 
Environmental 
Compliance and 
Enforcement 
Network 
2005 Asia State 
Project ABC 
Project 
Atomospheric 
Brown Cloud  
2002 Asia and Pacific State 
ECO-Asia 
Environmental 
Congress for Asia 
and Pacific 
1991 Asia and Pacific State 
NEAR 
The Association 
of Northeast Asia 
Regional 
Governments 
1996 Northeast Asia 
Local 
govern-
ments 
- 
Joint Meeting of 
the 
Intergovernmenta
l Networks on 
Regional Air 
Pollution in Asia 
and the Pacific 
2009 Asia and Pacific IOs 
NEAC 
Northeast Asian 
Conference on 
Environmental 
Cooperation  
1992 Northeast Asia State 
 
  
3 
 
NEASPEC 
Northeast Asian 
Sub-regional 
Program of 
Environmental 
Cooperation 
1993 Northeast Asia State 
TEMM 
Tripartite 
Environment 
Ministers 
Meeting 
1999 Northeast Asia State 
APN 
Asia-Pacific 
Network for 
Global Change 
Research 
1995 Asia-Pacific State 
TPM 
Tripartite 
Presidents 
Meeting 
2004 Northeast Asia 
national 
research 
institutes 
ENVIRO-
ASIA 
Eco-Peace 
Network in 
Northeast Asia 
2001 Northeast Asia NGOs 
Air 
Pollutionb 
EANET 
Acid Deposition 
Monitoring 
Network in East 
Asia 
1998 East Asia State 
TDGM 
Tripartite 
Director General 
Meetings 
for yellow 
sand/Dust sand 
storm among 
China, Japan and 
ROK 
2007 Northeast Asia State 
LTP Project 
Joint Research 
Project on Long-
Range Trans-
Boundary Air 
Pollutants in 
Northeast Asia 
1995 Northeast Asia State 
NEAFF Northeast Asian Forest Forum 1998 
Northeast 
Asia NGOs 
TEEN 
Tripartite 
Environmental 
Education 
Network 
 - Northeast Asia NGOs 
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Water 
Pollution NOWPAP 
Northwest Pacific 
Action Plan 1994 
Northeast 
Asia State 
Biodiversity 
EABRN 
East Asian 
Biosphere 
Reserve Network 
1995 Northeast Asia state, IO 
Crane 
Network 
Northeast Asian 
Site Network 
Center 
1997 Northeast Asia State 
APMWCS 
Asia-Pacific 
Migratory 
Waterbird 
Conservation 
Strategy 
2002 Northeast Asia State 
NAPEP 
Northeast Asian 
and North Pacific 
Environmental 
Forum 
1992 Asia and Pacific NGOs 
 
a These five cooperative mechanisms were not explicitly developed for environmental cooperation 
and have been more focused on general cooperation, particularly economic cooperation, although 
they have set up side meetings for environmental issues. For example, APEC has held meetings 
of ministers responsible for the environment. Some meetings tend to be sporadic rather than 
consistent. For example, the meeting of environmental ministers at APEC in 2012 was held 15 
years after the previous meeting in 1997.   
 
b There are two other international cooperative mechanisms that deal with air pollution in Asia or 
East Asia: Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian 
Countries and Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia). However, China has not 
participated in the POPs monitoring project since 2005, and the ROK has not participated in CAI-
Asia at the governmental level.   
 
Previous research studies addressing this issue have strived to identify the factors 
that determine the emergence, persistence, and dissipation of international regimes 
regarding the environment (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Krasner, 1983; Young, 1989; 
Young and Osherenko, 1993).  For the successful development of such regimes, scholars 
have suggested the following contributing factors: efficient leadership (Chung, 1999; 
Haas 2000); scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Haas, 2000; Kim, 2007; Nam, 2002); the 
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influence of public concern and NGOs (Haas, 2000; Komori, 2010); previous 
institutional experience regarding regional cooperation (Nam, 2008; Valencia, 2008); and 
coordinating mechanisms among various overlapping initiatives (Komori, 2010). 
Northeast Asia has been characterized as a region where the development of 
environmental regimes has been slow. Most researchers have concluded that 
environmental regime-building in this region has remained elusive, or remains at most in 
an embryonic stage, because the main factors that promote regime creation have not yet 
sufficiently developed to trigger real international cooperation.  
This dissertation project focuses on the variations among different regional 
environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia. This does not mean that it 
disregards the regional characteristics of Northeast Asia in explaining regional 
environmental cooperation, as some factors may be more closely related to regional 
characteristics than to characteristics of the issues themselves. However, the focus of this 
project is on the variations among issue areas in Northeast Asian environmental 
cooperation despite general regional characteristics so as to avoid deterministic 
explanations. 
This examination of cooperative mechanisms developed to address environmental 
issues related to air quality is motivated by several driving questions with relevance to the 
field of international relations and policy making that it hopes to answer. If countries aim 
to reduce transboundary air pollution through international cooperation, why have 
various cooperative mechanisms developed different forms and degrees of collective 
action within a region? What determines the forms and degrees of collective action? Why 
do countries participate more actively in certain cooperative mechanisms than in others? 
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What driving forces are contributing factors for regional cooperation to produce 
behavioral changes among participating countries?  
Thus, rather than stating that the cooperative efforts of Northeast Asia have been 
failures by defining them as nonregime cooperation,2 I ask why collective actions 
through various cooperative mechanisms have developed at variant speeds and degrees 
even though regional characteristics are specific and significant enough to explain 
regional environmental cooperation. In doing so, instead of asking what factors are 
missing in the region that could contribute to developing successful environmental 
regimes, this study analyzes the causal relationships between the degrees and forms of 
regional collective action and the existence of political leadership, shared knowledge, and 
socialization.  
 
Background of Research and Purpose 
The comparison of annual anthropogenic sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 2000 from ten 
continental regions in Figure 1.1 shows that East Asia, encompassing Far East Russia, 
Mongolia, China, the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK), and Japan, records the highest 
emissions.3 It is astonishing to see that the small number of Northeast Asian countries 
recorded the highest emissions of SO2 in the world.   
 
                                                          
2 Nonregime cooperation is defined as “transnational policy arenas characterized by the absence 
of multilateral agreements for policy coordination among states” (Dimitrov et al., 2007, p. 231). 
3 Liu and Mauzerall (2007) define the ten continental regions as follows: North America (NA), 
South America (SA), Europe (EU), the former Soviet Union (FSU, excluding part of Russia in the 
European domain), Africa (AF), the Indian subcontinent (IN), East Asia (EA), Southeast Asia 
(SE), Australia (AU), and the middle East (ME). 
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Figure 1.1. Annual anthropogenic SO2 emissions in 2000. Adapted from 
J. Liu & D. L. Mauzerall, D. L., 2007, “Potential Influence of Inter-continental Transport of 
Sulfate Aerosols on Air Quality,” Environmental Research Letters, 2: 045029, p. 3. 
 
Despite its ecological interdependence due to geographical proximity, which is 
considered a primary condition for multilateral environmental cooperation (Soroos, 1997, 
pp. 266-267), Northeast Asian countries have shown relatively slow progress toward 
creating cooperative environmental regimes. Throughout their history, China, Japan, and 
the ROK have been the most interactive parties and thus those most recognized as having 
influenced one another through various channels. It is therefore puzzling that the 
Northeast Asian countries seem to be less active in solving common environmental 
problems than countries of other regions such as Europe and even other subregions of 
Asia.  
Since the first wave of regionalism began in Western Europe in the 1950s, 
regionalism has undergone many ups and downs (Kim, 2004).  After fizzling out in the 
1960s and 1970s, a second wave of regionalism came in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
initiated by the Single European Act of 1986.4  Finally, the so-called new regionalism has 
                                                          
4 Mansfield and Solingen identifies four waves of regionalism: the first wave during the second 
half of the 19th century as “largely a European phenomenon” which “was associated with the 
emergence of a liberal international trading system”; the second wave after World War I as “more 
economically discriminatory” phenomenon; the third wave between the 1960s and the early 
1970s; and the fourth wave during the 1990s (2010, pp. 147-148). 
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blossomed due to the extensive discontents of globalization, such as the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-1998, the collapse of the 1999 World Trade Organization talks in Seattle, 
and the push of European Union toward more rigorous integration through the launching 
of a common currency in 1999.  In fact, regionalism is seen as an emerging notion against 
a backdrop of rapid globalization that contains the triumph of democracy, open financial 
movements, and the comprehensive battle against terror (Rozman, 2004).  Under these 
circumstances, looking at a region to better understand international interactions seems 
inevitable.  
Social science scholars, including those in international relations, have recently 
paid extensive attention to regions. This attention derives from the growing number of 
formal institutional arrangements such as the European Union (EU), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Central 
American Common Market, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur) (Pempel, 2005) as well as the less formalized efforts of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (Breslin & Higgott, 2000).  It has been argued that a focus on 
regions can help us better understand changes in and processes of world orders because 
regions are “social constructions created through politics” rather than natural, or 
“determined by geography” (Katzenstein, 2000, pp. 353-354). 
Northeast Asia is under construction as a region. The two competing views 
among scholars regarding Northeast Asian regionalism are what Rozman called “liberal 
openings and realist suspicions” (2004, p. 12). The liberal political economists argue that 
economic integration based on soaring intraregional trade will soon lead to regionalism, 
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whereas realists doubt that regionalism will form because of insecurity in Northeast Asia.  
Some scholars have focused on the lack of integration within the region based on the 
political actions of governments (Frankel & Kahler, 1993; Mansfield & Milner, 1997).  
Others have highlighted increased “cohesiveness” or “interconnectedness” in the region 
based on nongovernmental actions such as popular culture (Cohen, 2002) and the 
development of “open regionalism” in “more peaceful East Asia” than in “more conflict-
prone Middle East” (Solingen, 2007, pp. 774-775).  Thus, there appear to be both positive 
and negative prospects for regionalism in Northeast Asia, and this study is intended to 
shed light on how the core participant countries have responded to common 
environmental issues under these circumstances. 
Examination of this topic is complicated by the fact that there is little consensus 
on the boundaries of this region. Scholars have included different sets of countries 
depending on the topic of their research (Mack & Ravenhill, 1995).  For example, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are typically included as main actors in economic discourses on 
Northeast Asia, while Russia is generally excluded from the region in cultural studies due 
to a lack of racial and cultural commonalities (Nam, 2002). As most studies regarding 
Northeast Asia name China, Japan, and the ROK as the core states (Kim, 2004; Rozman, 
2004) of the region, this study also focuses primarily on the interactions of these three 
countries.  
As shown in Figure 1.2, this dissertation defines Northeast Asia as containing six 
countries: the Russian Federation, Mongolia, China, Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (hereafter DPRK), the ROK, and Japan.5  
                                                          
5 For further discussion of this region, see Inkyoung Kim, 2007. 
 
  
10 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Map of Northeast Asia. Adapted from NEASPEC. http://www.neaspec.org/envir-
impera.asp.  
 
Northeast Asia as a region is also quite diverse.  It includes not only substantially 
different political systems but also various levels of economic development: an economic 
superpower, Japan; the rapidly developing ROK and east coast areas of China; and the 
poor and largely unindustrialized DPRK, rural China, Russian Far East, and Mongolia.  
Given these different levels of economic development, international cooperation within 
Northeast Asia can serve as a model to the whole world.   
The Asian and Pacific region is worthy of study because it is “home to 60 percent 
of the global population, accounts for over 40 percent of the global economy” (UNEP, 
2011). There are several subregions in the Asian Pacific: Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, 
South Asia, Central Asia, and Pacific Islands.6 Among them, Southeast Asia has 
developed the most environmental cooperation through numerous legal instruments and 
policy statements. This successful institutionalization is attributable to their extensive 
                                                          
6 The classifications of subregions in Asia Pacific may vary across studies and organizations. 
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cooperative experiences through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
since the 1960s (Nam, 2008). The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment was 
established in 1981 as one of 30 ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies. As shown in Table 
1.2, ASEAN has reached agreements on 16 environmental issues. For example, the 
implementation of the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution signed in 2002 by 10 
ASEAN member countries (ASEAN, 2010) was accomplished smoothly by designating 
the ASEAN Secretariat as its secretariat.7 This arrangement is quite different from some 
cooperative mechanisms of Northeast Asia that have struggled with problems such as 
duplication and delays in designating secretariats, as discussed in the following chapters.  
Table 1.2  
Agreements and Declarations of Southeast Asia 
- ASEAN Declaration on the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC and the 3rd session of the CMP to the Kyoto Protocol (2007) 
- Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment (2007) 
- ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (2007) 
- Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development (2006) 
- Agreement on the Establishment of ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (2005) 
- ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks (2003) 
- Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development (2002) 
- ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) 
- Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development (18 September 1997) 
- Bandar Seri Begawan Resolution on Environment and Development (1994) 
- Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development (1992) 
- The Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development (1990) 
- Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development (1987) 
- Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1985) 
- Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment (1984) 
                                                          
7 Haze pollution is defined as “smoke resulting from land and/or forest fire which causes 
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and 
ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses 
of the environment.” (ASEAN, 2010). 
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- ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks and Reserves (1984) 
Note: Adapted from ASEAN, http://environment.asean.org/index.php?page=agreements. 
 
Of course, ASEAN also has faced a few challenges, such as weak enforcement 
due to the “ASEAN Way” based on non-intervention, lack of ratification, and limited 
national capacity (Nam, 2008). In fact, Indonesia, the key polluter, has not ratified the 
Haze Pollution Agreement yet, unlike nine other member countries, namely, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam. The House of Representatives of Indonesia rejected ratification in 2008, 
stating that the agreement threatened Indonesia’s state sovereignty and that it feared other 
countries interfering in their domestic issues (Jakarta Globe, January 23, 2011).  
Despite these difficulties in implementation, ASEAN’s institutional experience 
with transboundary air pollution is way ahead of Northeast Asia’s environmental 
cooperation because of its more highly developed administrative structures. Considering 
that Northeast Asia includes countries with more advanced economic capacity than those 
in Southeast Asia, a lack of national capacity is not a sufficient explanation for the 
limited institutionalization of environmental cooperation. In 2009, the total GDP of 
China, Japan, and the ROK formed more than one sixth of the world’s total GDP, more 
than the U.S. GDP of US$10 trillion: US$4.985 trillion in China, US$5.069 trillion in 
Japan, and US$832.512 billion in the ROK (World Bank, 2011). Despite its rapid 
economic development, this region has not yet developed international regimes to deal 
with transboundary environmental problems even though it has endeavored to build 
regional cooperation since the early 1990s. Bilateral environmental cooperation 
flourished in the 1990s: between the ROK and China (1993), the ROK and Japan (1993), 
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the ROK and Russia (1994), and China and Japan (1994). However, these bilateral 
agreements have been stalled and ineffective due to geopolitical characteristics, 
leadership issues, domestic circumstances, and other such issues (Ye, 2011). 
It is commonly understood among policy makers and experts in Northeast Asia 
that successful European experiences in dealing with transboundary pollution are less 
likely to be transplanted to this region due to “substantially different political and 
economic systems” and “various levels of economic development” (Kim, 2007). In 
addition, little scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Nam, 2002) and political antipathies 
shaped by historical memories (Yoshimatsu, 2010) have been obstacles to regional 
governance.   
It is easy to assume that these unique characteristics of Northeast Asia may have 
prevented the region from building regional institutions. However, it is puzzling to see 
how the European countries managed to create the 1979 Long Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution despite the distrust between the West and East during the Cold War (Farrell and 
Keating, 2006), how the Mediterranean countries were able to reach agreements on the 
Med Plan despite economic gaps and political dissimilarities (Haas, 1990), and how 
ASEAN countries have reached the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution despite even greater cultural diversity. According to previous studies of 
regional environmental governance, this difference can be explained by leadership 
(Chung, 1999, 2010; Haas, 2000), former experiences with regional institutionalization 
(Nam, 2008), and weak organizations and the limited influence of public concerns and 
NGOs (Haas, 2000). To make this study useful for policymakers in the region, however, 
more attention needs to be paid to the specific elements within each of these factors 
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needed for this region to successfully expand its existing cooperation. General 
explanations have flourished, and what is now needed are specific lessons that this region 
can apply to its own surroundings. Thus, this study attempts to shed light on the 
microprocesses of each factor in regime creation within current regional cooperation 
efforts. 
  
Why Study Transboundary Air Pollution? 
 
Social scientists, policy makers, and concerned citizens should care about 
transboundary air pollution in Asia simply because the emissions of Asian countries are 
so extensive and cross national borders. The size of the region’s total economy and the 
resulting emissions has grown at a dramatic speed. For example, the ROK has faced air 
pollution problems that started in the late 1960s due to the nation’s development of heavy 
industries and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the increasing use of 
low-sulfur oil and liquefied natural gas has brought a significant decrease in emissions. 
Various domestic measures were taken in the 1980s, including the 1981 Standard for 
Sulfur Content, the 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and the 1988 Clean Fuel Use 
Duty (Chang et al., 2008). As a result, emissions of SO2 in Seoul have continuously 
declined (Chang et al, 2008). The emission reductions for nitrogen oxides (NOx) are not 
as significant as for sulfur, but it is notable that emissions have been kept at a certain 
level, 125 thousand tons, since the sharp reduction between 1989 and 1990 (Chang et al., 
2008). For particulate matter (PM), Seoul has met the standard of an atmospheric 
environment of 50µg/m³ as of November 2010, for the first time since the 
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countermeasures for improvement of metropolitan atmospheric environments were 
implemented in 2005, recording a 17% improvement.8  
The most recent 2012 Environmental Performance Index indicates the successful 
management of pollution of the ROK to some extent.9 The ROK is ranked 43rd out of 132 
countries classified as “strong performers”10 which is quite different from 2002, when the 
ROK was ranked 135th among 146 countries and its air quality 120th among 122 
countries, evaluated on the performance of urban SO2, NO2, and Total Suspended 
Particles (TSP) concentrations (World Economic Forum, 2002).11 This poor record 
resulted from “rapid urbanization and the exponential growth of the vehicle fleet in the 
Seoul Metropolitan Area12” (Kim, 2010, p. 3). However, the dramatic improvement is 
shown clearly by its ranking of 13th out of 132 countries of Pilot Trend EPI, which 
represents “the change in their environmental performance over the last decade” and 
“who is improving and who is declining over time” (Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy et al., 2012, p. 4). 
In the case of Japan, since modernization in the middle of the 19th century, it has 
achieved rapid economic growth through industrialization and urbanization. In 1955-64, 
                                                          
8 This data was provided by a Korean governmental official of Ministry of Environment in an 
interview. 
9 “The 2012 EPI rankings are comprised of both a snapshot of performance based on the latest 
available data (the 2012 EPI) and a trend rank based on performance over the last decade” 
(http://epi.yale.edu/epi2012/rankings). 
10 Japan is ranked 23rd in the group of strong performers, and China 116th in weak performers. EPI 
classifies countries into five groups; strongest performers, strong performers, modest performers, 
weaker performers, and weakest performers. 
11 TSP is the particle diameters approximately less than 50-100 microns (µm) which is different 
from PM10, inhalable particles less than 10 microns in diameter which penetrates through the 
nose, and PM2.5, “fine fraction” less than 2.5 microns in diameter which penetrates to the lungs. 
12 From 1990 to 2000, the population of the Seoul metropolitan area, covering 12% of the 
nation’s entire area, increased by 20% to almost 22 million, accounting for 46% of all South 
Koreans. More impressively, the number of vehicles in the Seoul metropolitan area increased by 
211%, from 1.8 million in 1990 to 5.6 million, in 2000 (Ministry of Environment, Republic of 
Korea, 2004). 
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the economic development of Japan was supported by tripled energy consumption, which 
resulted in various air pollution problems that were at their peak in the 1960s. However, 
Japan’s technological innovation, institutional development, and collaboration between 
government and industry led to the significant decrease of sulfur dioxide emissions, by 
nearly 40% between 1974 and 1987 (UNEP, 2001, p. 32).  
Northeast Asia has been not an exception to the growing global ecological 
interdependence, which is known as one of systemic process changes that have 
contributed to emerging restrictions on air pollution. In ecological science the term 
“ecological interdependence” refers to the fact that the loss or weakening of an ecosystem 
service, such as the soil’s retaining ground moisture, can harm many species that rely on 
the ecosystem. In environmental politics, however, the term “ecological interdependence” 
is typically used to refer to common environmental problems shared by several countries. 
But as Nam has observed, “Geographical proximity and climate contiguity may seem to 
constitute what shapes a region into a single ecological community, but that is not 
necessarily the case. Rather, deterioration of regional common pool resources drives the 
region to become a destined ecological community” (2002, p. 169).  
Thus the efforts made by the ROK and Japan in the region have been diluted by 
China, which has followed the same pattern of development taken by most developed 
nations, including the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan: “pollute first, control 
later.” Under this model, countries consider environmental protection only after they 
achieve a certain degree of economic development (Wang, 2006-2007).  China has 
developed its economy at a dramatic speed since the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform 
and opening” in the late 1970s. Between 1979 and 2011, China recorded a 9.6% average 
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annual GDP growth rate. Its urban population increased by 4.2% annually between 1990 
and 2003, even though the total population growth rate remained under 1%, and urban 
dwellers accounted for 40.53% of the total population in China (OECD, 2006). The total 
population in China comprises 20% of the global population, although China possesses 
only 6.8% of global arable land. See Figure 1.3 for the remarkable decrease in arable land 
in China between 1996 and 2002. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Change in arable land area in China between 1996 and 2002. Adapted from 
Environmental Information Center, SEPA. (2004). Analysis Report on the State of the 
Environment in China. http://english.mep.gov.cn/SOE/analysis/index.htm#wastegas1.  
 
 
Moreover, China’s “desire for self-sufficiency has exerted large pressures on the 
ecosystem” (OECD, 2006, p. 12). This economic development has led to several key 
problems in China: contamination of fresh water resources; air pollution by particulate 
matter and other pollutants; soil erosion and desertification (“desert now covers 25% of 
China’s territory”) due to degradation and destruction of forests; and the loss of 
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cultivated land due to unsustainable agricultural practices and expansion of urban and 
industrial areas; and biodiversity loss (OECD, 2006, p. 11).  
A 1999 study by the World Bank estimated that “air and water pollution damage, 
especially the dangers that fine airborne particulates pose to human health, have been 
estimated to be at least USD 54 billion a year--nearly 8% of China’s GDP” (OECD, 
2006, p. 11). Another report by the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning for the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2006 states the cost of air 
pollution at CNY 219.8 billion (OECD, 2006, 12). In fact, the amount of emitted 
industrial waste gas has shown a gradual increase, as seen in Figure 1.4, even though the 
rate of increase has slowed to some extent since 1997.  
 
 
Figure 1.4. Change in amount of discharge of waste gas in China, 1990–2002. Adapted from 
Environmental Information Center, SEPA. (2004). Analysis Report on the State of the 
Environment in China. http://english.mep.gov.cn/SOE/analysis/index.htm#wastegas1.  
  
 
Chinese efforts to deal with these environmental problems can be seen in (a) its 
institutional framework for environmental regulation, (b) environmental legislation, and 
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(c) Five-Year Environment Plans in line with Five-Year Social and Economic 
Development Plans (FYPs).13  It should be noted that the national-level institutional 
framework for environmental regulation has been improved. The China’s first top-level 
environmental body was the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), set up in 1974 with 
a staff of 20 as a unit under the State Council. Since then, the status of the EPB has 
improved gradually. After subsequent reorganizations of the governmental system, SEPA 
was set up as a ministry at the end of March 1998, upgraded from the National 
Environmental Protection Agency and promoted from a sub-ministry to a ministry. SEPA 
was placed directly under the State Council as one of its ministries, and at the time “its 
head reports directly to the Vice Premier in charge of environmental protection, has the 
status of Minister and participates in State Council meetings when environmental matters 
are discussed” (OECD, 2006, p. 15). SEPA had around 2,200 employees including 
administrative staff in Beijing and in various SEPA-affiliated national offices and centers. 
Although this number was a great increase over EPB’s staff of 20 in 1974, it remained 
quite small relative to the size and population of China and “still considered a relatively 
weak agency,” as suggested by its not having a permanent seat in the State Council 
(Wang, 2006-2007, p. 199).  
In 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was established to 
replace SEPA. The Ministry of Environmental Protection is the current national-level 
administrative body that prepares and implements national policies, legislation and 
regulations; formulates environmental quality criteria and pollutant discharge/emission 
standards at the national level; organizes environmental quality monitoring; and initiates 
                                                          
13 FYPs have been the basis for coordinating Chinese public policy priorities, developed by the 
Chinese government and approved by the Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s 
Congress. 
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enforcement activities together with local environmental authorities. However, its 
autonomy seems limited due to the large number of ministries and agencies of the State 
Council that have to manage separately a range of environment-related issues. 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) plays a key role as 
the body responsible for developing and implementing FYPs. In this capacity, 
NDRC integrates environmental issues into the overall planning system in China 
and into sector-specific policies (e.g., on energy). The key ministries engaged in 
the implementation of environmental policies include:  
• Ministry of Water Management: watershed management, soil erosion, 
groundwater quality; 
• Ministry of Land and Resources: land use planning, mineral and marine 
resource management, land rehabilitation; 
• Ministry of Agriculture: management of agricultural chemicals, aquatic 
natural reserves, agro-biodiversity and grasslands;  
• Ministry of Forestry: forest management and protection and nature 
conservation;  
• Ministry of Health: monitoring the quality of drinking water and the 
incidences of related diseases;  
• Ministry of Construction: environmental infrastructure, including water 
supply and wastewater treatment plants and solid waste management;  
• Ministry of Communications: shares responsibility with SEPA on vehicle 
emissions control;  
• Ministry of Supervision: takes part in environmental enforcement campaigns 
carried out by SEPA. 
• Other government agencies concerned with environmental policy include:  
• State Forest Administration: forest conservation, afforestation, biodiversity 
and wildlife management;  
• State Oceanic Administration: management of coastal and marine waters, 
including marine biodiversity conservation; and  
• China Meteorology Administration: regional air quality management, climate 
change issues. (OECD, 2006, pp.15-16) 
 
Along with the national-level institutional framework for environmental 
regulation, the sub-national-level framework has improved. Around 2,000 Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) employ some 60,000 people “at the provincial, 
prefecture/municipal, district/counties, and township administration levels” to oversee 
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environmental impact assessment (EIA), to monitor pollution releases from industries, to 
assess fees for pollution discharges, to initiate legal action against violations by firms, 
and to raise public awareness (OECD, 2006, p. 17). These sub-national level EPBs are 
subordinate to provincial and local governments both institutionally and financially, even 
though they receive guidance from SEPA. The EPBs’ dependency on these more local 
governments has led its low ranking in the government hierarchy, as economic 
development has been favored over environmental considerations by local governments 
(OECD, 2006, p. 18). To overcome the low profile of environmental protection, in 2007, 
the State Council adopted a policy that stipulates that performance in energy saving and 
emissions reduction are two of the deciding factors for promotion of leaders and heads of 
local government. Thus, poor performance on either of these two factors will prevent 
governmental officials from being promoted even if the economic performance of the 
region is good (Koyanagi, 2008; Miyajiri, 2009).  
 
Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia 
In the mid-1990s China began to embrace multilateralism, moving away from a 
preference for bilateralism, because of its status as a “primary mover of regional 
economic and security cooperation in East Asia” (Zhao, 2011, p. 53). In May of 2012, 
China released a white paper titled China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2012) to 
review “the history of trilateral friendly exchanges, showcase the achievements of 
trilateral practical cooperation and envision the broad prospects of tripartite relations” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 2012).14 As it shows, the three key countries of 
                                                          
14 China’s motive for this white paper was as the coordinator for 2012 trilateral cooperation, 
hosting the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting. In addition, the year 2012 “marks the 40th 
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Northeast Asia have developed significant cooperation on a variety of issue areas, 
including political and security affairs, trade and finance, sustainable development, and 
social and cultural exchanges. Based on Hidetaka Yoshimatsu’s compilation of trilateral 
cooperative mechanisms on various issue areas (2010, p. 232), Table 1.3 demonstrates 
that environmental cooperation has a longer history in Northeast Asia.  
Table 1.3  
Summits and Ministerial Meetings Among China, Japan, and ROK 
Policy Field Start Date  Major Features 
Summit 1999 
The meeting was not held in 2005 due to 
political tensions. The meeting, 
independent of ASEAN + 3, has been held 
annually since 2008. 
Environment 1999 
Framed as Tripartite Environmental 
Ministers Meeting (TEMM, and issued a 
joint communiqué. 
Finance 2000 Held just before the annual ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers meeting. 
Economy and trade 2002 
Organized on the sidelines of the ASEAN 
+ 3 meeting. The meeting was not held in 
2005. 
Information technology 
(IT) 2002 
The formation of director-general 
meetings in various sub-fields. 
Logistics 2006 The publication of a concrete action plan. 
Tourism 2006 The issuing of a joint declaration. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the China-Japan 
Year of Friendly Exchanges, the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and the ROK, and the Year of China-ROK Friendly Exchanges” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of China, 2012).  
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Health 2007 The issuing of the joint action plan on pandemic influenza in 2008. 
Science and technology 
(S&T) 2007 
The establishment of 'China-Japan-Korea 
Trilateral S&T Cooperation' at 
governmental and institutional levels. 
Foreign Affairs 2008 The Three-Party Committee was held before 2007. 
Note: Adapted from Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 232. 
As noted earlier, cooperation among Northeast Asian countries regarding 
environmental issues has not brought concrete regulations through the creation of 
environment regimes yet. Unlike many studies that ask why Northeast Asia has not built 
any legally binding international regime despite considerable effort to institutionalize 
cooperation since the early 1990s (for example, Kim, 2007; Lee, 1999; Ohta, 2008), this 
dissertation intends to explain the variation in the extent of environmental cooperation 
around different issue areas, and asks what factors can explain the variations among issue 
areas even under the same power relations, economic relations, and cultural surroundings. 
Rather than characterizing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast 
Asia as “non-regime,” the study unpacks varying forms of collective action undertaken 
by states in the region regarding transboundary air pollution in terms of the substantive 
content of their cooperation. In doing so, this study examines the causal relationships 
between degrees and forms of regional collective action and political leadership, 
knowledge, and socialization. 
 
Case Selection 
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China, Japan, and the ROK have participated in more than 20 environmental 
cooperative programs since the mid-1980s as shown in Table 1.1. Some programs include 
Asia-wide cooperation, and others are exclusive to Northeast Asian countries. For this 
study, three cases were selected according to the four following criteria: issue-specific, 
involving a problem with transnational effect related to air pollution, currently operating, 
and participated in by the core three countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and the 
ROK). The three cases that met these criteria are the EANET (Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia), developed to monitor acid deposition among 13 East 
Asian countries; the Tripartite Director General Meetings (TDGM), developed to address 
yellow sand and dust sandstorms among China, Japan, and the ROK under the Tripartite 
Environment Ministerial Meetings (TEMM); and the LTP (Joint Research on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia), developed to cooperate on issues of air 
pollution among the same three countries. Selecting cooperative mechanisms among the 
same countries and in the same issue area (transboundary air pollution) is intended to 
control for other possible independent variables.  
 Two other cooperative mechanisms met the first three criteria but not the last 
criteria of participation of the three core countries and thus were not included. These are 
the Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian 
Countries, and the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia). In December 2002, 
10 East Asian countries (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) established the Workshop on 
Environmental Monitoring of POPs in order to identify the levels of POPs remaining in 
East Asia as required by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The 
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Convention was ratified or accepted by most Asian Countries, including China, Japan, 
and the ROK (UN Treaty Collection, 2013). Although China participated in workshops in 
its early years—2002, 2003, and 2005—it has not attended any meetings of the 
organization, such as expert working group meetings and policy group meetings, since 
2006 (Ministry of Environment in Japan, 2013).   
The second of these rejected mechanisms, the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities 
(CAI-Asia), was established in 2001 by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and 
USAID to “promote better air quality and livable cities by translating knowledge to 
policies and actions that reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from transport, 
energy and other sectors” (CAI-Asia, 2013a, 1). CAI-Asia has various partnership 
members, including 45 cities, 33 government agencies, 112 nongovernmental and 
academic organizations, 17 international development agencies and foundations, and 36 
members from the private sector (CAI-Asia, 2013b). Both the Ministry of the 
Environment in Japan and the Ministry of Environmental Protection in China have been 
participating governmental agencies, but no governmental agency from the ROK has 
been involved in CAI-Asia. Only a few Korean academic institutes have participated in 
CAI-Asia, such as Seoul National University, International Environmental Analysis and 
Education Center, and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.    
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables of this study are the forms and degree of collective 
action in regime-building processes. Collective action is typically categorized into three 
categories: legally binding, structured and science-focused, and less structured 
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cooperative mechanisms. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
classifies regional environmental action and initiatives into three different categories: (a) 
“regional entities with established infrastructure and a policy focus”; (b) “regional 
entities with permanent structure and a science focus”; (c) “other initiatives” that “have 
no permanent structures, but provide viable policy making fora for regional cooperation” 
(UNEP, 2011, 36-37). Most regional cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary 
air pollution in East Asia fall into UNEP’s second category, including the three cases that 
this dissertation examines 
 The first and highest level is “regional entities with established infrastructure and 
a policy focus,” which includes “detailed regional legal instruments and infrastructure” 
(UNEP, 2011, p. 36). Among these, the UNEP recognizes the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) as “the most established example” of 
these entities as it “mandates legally-binding national emission ceilings for different 
pollutants” (ibid.).  
The UNEP’s second category of regional action is regional entities with 
permanent structures and a science focus. These have permanent structures such as a 
secretariat but have not reached any legally binding agreements and are focused largely 
on developing a regional scientific base by promoting or undertaking regional monitoring 
and modeling projects. The UNEP includes in this category the Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) and the Malé Declaration on Control and 
Prevention of Air Pollution and its Likely Transboundary Effects for South Asia.  
Its third category includes regional initiatives that “provide viable policy making 
for regional cooperation” without permanent structures or legally binding measures 
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(UNEP, 2011, p. 37). The UNEP includes several regional initiatives in this category: 
ministerial declarations of Sub-Saharan African governments, such as the Lusaka 
Agreement for southern Africa, the Nairobi Agreement for eastern Africa, and the 
Abidjan Agreement for west and central Africa, which “lay out common policy, set 
regional priorities and offer a framework for future cooperation”; the intergovernmental 
Network on Air Pollution in Latin America and the Caribbean, which “was created and 
given a mandate from the Regional Forum of Environment Ministers of Latin America 
and the Caribbean to develop a regional work plan”; and the Joint Forum on Atmospheric 
Environment Issues in Asia and the Pacific, which draws together several institutions and 
intergovernmental initiatives (UNEP, 2011, 37). 
 None of the Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms have created 
regional legal instruments and infrastructures with legally binding national emission 
ceilings for transboundary air pollutants. Instead, they have all built permanent structures 
with a scientific focus to promote and undertake regional joint monitoring and modeling 
projects. This study compares the experiences of these Northeast Asian cooperative 
efforts to those of Europe in terms of their political leadership, knowledge, and 
socialization processes to explain the reasons for these differences.   
At the same time, there are differences in the degree of collective action among 
these three cases even though they all fall into UNEP’s second category. To compare 
different forms and degrees of collective action in Northeast Asia, this dissertation 
classifies the forms and extents of collective action according to three characteristics: 
their formalization, concreteness, and legalization. Given that none of these Northeast 
Asian cooperative mechanisms have reached legally binding agreements, the 
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formalization and concreteness of their collective action are classified in more detail to 
compare the cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia.  
The dissertation investigates the UNEP’s second category in more detail. To 
determine the formal forms of collective action, it examines not only whether a regional 
cooperative mechanism has permanent structures such as a secretariat but also whether 
those permanent structures are working in practice. For this, this study analyzes the 
division of labor of each entity within a regional cooperative mechanism, such as its 
secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory body, as well as formal financial 
structures shared by member countries. To illustrate the concrete degrees of collective 
action, the study examines the existence of agreed-upon shared formats and guidelines 
for joint monitoring and modeling activities. Based on these criteria, the three cooperative 
mechanisms under study demonstrate different forms and degrees of collective action 
dealing with different transboundary air pollution issues.   
Of the three cases, the EANET has developed the most formal and concrete form 
and degree of collective action. It has a structured, concrete, and specific organizational 
scheme with a clear division of labor among four key entities: a secretariat, 
intergovernmental meetings as a governing body, a scientific advisory committee as its 
source of knowledge, and the network center to control monitoring activities. Moreover, 
the EANET has established formal standards for the financial structures of the EAENT, 
even though they are still on a voluntary basis. In addition to these formal characteristics, 
the EAENT has established the highest degree of collective action through developing 
common and concrete monitoring guidelines and quality assurance and quality control 
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measures to confirm the comparable quality of monitoring data among its 13 member 
countries.   
In contrast, the TDGM has a formal form of collective action that contains a clear 
division of labor among its organizational entities, but it has inspired a lesser extent of 
collective action due to lack of concrete and agreed-upon methods for DSS monitoring. 
The steering committee that serves as a governing body has determined two working 
group activities: Working Group I for “joint research on a regional network for DSS 
monitoring and early warning system” and Working Group II for the prevention and 
control of DSS. These TDGM objectives were also clarified in a joint announcement of 
the 2007 TDGM. However, the participants of the TDGM have not created commonly 
shared monitoring methods and indicators for DSS, as the three governments’ agencies, 
mostly national meteorological agencies, have used their own methods and indicators for 
DSS monitoring.  
The LTP has developed neither a formal nor concrete form of collective action 
despite engaging in cooperative efforts for two decades. Little clarification of financial 
structures and the division of labor between its organizational entities have reduced its 
formalization as a regional cooperative mechanism. Moreover, the three participating 
countries have all used different monitoring and modeling methods, which has made it 
difficult to compare their research results in a useful way. Table 1.4 summarizes the 
variations among these three cases. The following sections discuss what analytical 
approaches this dissertation uses and adopts can explain these variations among three 
East Asian cooperative mechanisms.    
Table 1.4 
Variation Among Dependent Variables 
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 Since Initiator Formal Concrete Legal 
EANET 1993 Japan Yes Yes No 
DSS 2007 ROK Yes No No 
LTP 1995 ROK No No No 
Note: The “formal” degree of collective action is measured through examining the permanent 
structures of cooperative mechanisms, such as a secretariat, and the division of labor of their 
entities, such as the secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory body, as well as formal 
financial structures shared by member countries. The “concrete” degree of collective action is 
measured through examining the existence of agreed-upon shared formats and guidelines for joint 
monitoring and modeling activities. The “legal” form of collective action is measured through 
examining the existence of legally binding agreement among participating countries. 
 
Analytical Frameworks, Independent Variables, and Hypotheses 
The starting premise of this study is that international cooperation is a form of 
social interaction and, furthermore, that each factor that determines the form of 
cooperation itself can evolve along with the social interaction. Mainstream international 
relations theories accept that social interaction can change state behavior (Johnston, 
2008). For structural realists, the social interaction of states tends to occur among 
countries through balancing against rising power in order to maximize security under 
anarchy (Mearsheimer, 1995; Waltz, 1979). Neoliberal institutionalism at the 
international level (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Keohane & 
Nye, 1977; Oye, 1986; Powell 1991; Snidal, 1991) and rationalist institutionalism at the 
domestic level (Milner, 1998) regard social interaction inside institutions as a key driver 
of actors’ behavior through altering cost-benefit analyses based on fixed preferences. For 
them, strategic interactions within political institutions and among domestic constituents 
can explain how diverse domestic preferences are aggregated into collective choices.  
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In contrast, constructivists do not treat preferences as inherent in states or within 
the international system and as generated from states’ material conditions and functional 
needs. Rather, they claim that social interaction in international relations can change 
actors’ interests through such social structural elements as shared beliefs, norms, 
institutions, identities, and discourse (Wendt, 1994). In particular, constructivists suggest 
that “there is a causal link between the presence of particular normative structures 
embodied in institutions and the incorporation of these norms in behavior by the 
actor/agent at the unit level” (Johnston, 2008, p. xx). Following the constructivist view, 
this study assumes that interactions among countries within international institutions can 
change their interests and strategies. Thus, the focus of this research is the interactions 
among participating countries through the processes of the studied regional cooperative 
mechanisms. 
In contrast to the constructivist view, neorealist and neoliberal scholars share an 
unproblematized assumption of pre-specified state preferences of states as actors. For 
them, what states want in the foreign policy arena and international interactions is the 
result of the relevant actors’ actions to maximize their material capabilities. Unlike these 
theories, constructivists pay more attention to how national interests get defined and have 
evolved and treat national interests endogenously rather than exogenously. For them, an 
understanding of national interests is molded by social structural elements, such as shared 
beliefs, norms, institutions, identities, and discourse. This study also dismisses what Haas 
and Stevens called the “standard rationalist account that major problems create the 
incentives for their resolution, and thus modern bureaucracies . . . either develop effective 
responses almost automatically or are so powerfully constrained by the strategic interests 
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of powerful member states or participants” (2011, pp. 127-128). Instead, this study 
highlights the social interactions between states of the region and assumes that 
interactions among countries within international institutions can change their interests 
and strategies throughout the processes of the regional cooperation.  
To analyze these international interactions, this study examines the independent 
variables of leadership, scientific knowledge, and socialization. As discussed below, 
political leadership and knowledge serve as structural girders, and socialization is 
associated with the process. 
Independent Variable 1: Political Leadership 
The first independent variable of this study is leadership, which Underdal has 
defined as “an asymmetrical relationship of positive influence in which one actor directs 
the behavior of other actors toward a certain goal, based on a collective pursuit of 
common good or joint purpose” (Underdal, 1994, pp.178-179). Positive influence 
excludes veto collective action, and thus “being the first to defect from a joint 
undertaking would not qualify as leadership” (Underdal, 1994, p. 179). Unilateral 
behavior without shared interests and beliefs also would not qualify as leadership due to 
the lack of collective pursuit of a common good. Similar to the leadership of religious 
leaders who inspire followers and business leaders who lead explosive performance in 
industrial transformations, political leadership in the international cooperation arena can 
be defined as ability to inspire or lead member countries to reach agreements on proposed 
policy arrangements (Underdal, 1994).  
Previous scholars have asserted that the emergence of leadership is a necessary 
condition for success in efforts to gain agreements at the international level (Young, 
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1991). Once these regimes develop their structure and dynamics, leadership may not be 
important anymore because the systematic arrangements of regimes can run the 
institutions. Until regimes can proceed autonomously, however, “when a regime is 
clearly in a process of evolution, when the principles underlying the regime are still in a 
process of being articulated, when the division of responsibilities between countries is 
still a critical negotiating point, there is a clear role for leadership” (Grubb & Gupta, 
2000b, p. 17). This study presumes that political leadership is a product of international 
interactions rather than granted based on the status of countries’ relative material 
capability. Realists presume that leadership can only come from the most powerful 
country in the region, which in this case would be China. Instead, this study presumes 
that various modes of leadership are contributing factors.  When countries organize 
international cooperative mechanisms, considerable expenses need to be borne to 
complete their objectives; complicated communication must take place to hold 
international meetings; and intellectual systems (ideas) need to be generated to guide the 
direction of their cooperation. To meet these requirements, it has been asserted that the 
emergence of leadership is a contributing factor for successful generation of agreement at 
the international level. 
As shown in Table 1.5, the modes of leadership have been differently categorized 
by various authors (Grubb & Gupta, 2000b; Malnes, 1995; Underdal, 1994; Young, 
1991).15  Notable is the clear correspondence between these various typologies. Despite 
differences in vocabulary and scope, these scholars’ definitions of leadership all fall into 
                                                          
15 In addition, Haas classifies leadership in the following ways for the Mediterranean Action Plan, 
based on “regional economic, scientific, and diplomatic resources” (Haas, 1990, 167).  
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three similar main categories. This study adopts the terms structural, instrumental, and 
directional for these three modes, each of which is discussed in more detail below.  
Table 1.5 
Typologies of Leadership Modes 
 
Authors and Terms for Modes  
Mode of exercising 
leadership Young (1989) Underdal (1994) 
Malnes 
(1995) 
Gupta 
&Grubb 
(2000) 
use political and 
economic power to 
provide incentives  structural coercive 
carrots and 
sticks structural 
craft structures and 
apply diplomatic skills entrepreneurial instrumental problem-solving instrumental 
use ideas and example 
of own domestic 
implementation to 
influence others’ 
perception  
intellectual unilateral directional directional 
 
Structural Leadership 
The first category of leadership typologies is what this study is calling structural 
leadership. Structural leadership comes from the ability to wield economic and political 
power that stems from that state’s material resources and is used to affect “the incentives 
of others to accept one’s own terms or at least make a concession” (Underdal, 1994, p. 
186). Structural leadership “is exercised through the commitment of financial, technical 
and scientific resources necessary for environmental assessment and policy-making with 
the intent of shaping agendas and policy outcomes” (Selin, 2012, p. 216). 
 
  
35 
 
It is hard to say that any single country holds regional hegemonic power in 
Northeast Asia. There is considerable competition for power between China and Japan 
and a solid awareness of the ROK as a middle power, leaving the power of other 
countries such as Mongolia and North Korea far behind within this region. Grubb and 
Gupta argue that pure hegemony, considered the extreme of structural leadership, is not 
relevant to global environmental issues because a single country – even the United States 
or the European Union – “could not impose a global solution that would last; nor would 
they be willing to bear the full and long-term costs of providing enough carrots to bring 
the rest of the world along” (2000, p. 19). Adler and Barnett posit that power, as one of 
structural girders for the development of a security community, is “an important factor in 
the development of a security community by virtue of a core state’s ability to nudge and 
occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance” (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 
39). They argue that the “existence of core states or a coalition of states will be necessary 
for providing leadership, side payments, and perhaps protection to the other members of 
the group” (p. 52). This approach has been appropriated by power theorists who stress the 
role of a hegemon that possesses preponderant material resources in the regime formation 
processes.  
This study, however, asserts that the simple existence of power in a region would 
not necessarily lead to effective cooperation on transboundary environmental issues. No 
matter what country might have the ability to coerce others to create and maintain a 
collective action,16 actually exerting political leadership is a different story. This is 
                                                          
16 This approach to power is based on the famous Dahl’s definition of power, which is the ability 
of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do (1957, pp. 202-03). However, Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) generated a fourfold taxonomy of power based on two dimensions: “the kinds of 
social relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through 
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particularly the case in Northeast Asia, where no one major country would be regarded as 
a regional hegemon or dominant power.  
Accordingly, this dissertation assumes that any state in the region could exercise 
any form of leadership if it is willing to, which is a significantly different approach from 
most leadership literature, particularly regarding structural leadership. As many previous 
studies have already proven, active participation of a hegemonic power is not a necessary 
condition for success in dealing with international environmental problems (Young, 
2011), and different forms of leadership have been wielded in global environmental 
politics. 
The corresponding typologies of structural leadership mentioned above tend to 
focus on the role played by states with the ability to exert economic and political power 
driven by their material resources to shoulder most of the considerable costs of 
cooperation under an assumption that only great powers can succeed in exerting 
structural leadership. This corresponds to the realists’ assertion that leadership can come 
only from the most powerful country in the region.  
This dissertation pays special attention to the material contributions that member 
countries make to regional environmental cooperation as a proxy variable, as we cannot 
see political leadership directly but can see spending. This study treats spending as 
evidence of structural leadership by assuming that states wanting to exercise or actually 
exercising structural leadership will be spending more in that effort. It also argues, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
which power’s effects are produced” (12). They argued that “compulsory power exists in the 
direct control by one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. 
Institutional power exists in actors’ indirect control over the conditions of action of socially 
distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific, 
hence, mutually constituting, kind. And, productive power works through diffuse constitutive 
relations to produce the situated subjectivities of actors” (p. 12). 
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however, that the states of the region decide whether to exercise structural leadership on 
their own, based on their national goals on particular issue areas. As mentioned above, 
this study contends that these national goals or interests are not predetermined but 
changeable throughout international interaction. Thus the study does not regard structural 
leadership as predetermined by a state’s material capabilities. As noted, structural 
leadership may be exercised by powerful countries, but may also be exercised by willing 
countries regardless of their material capabilities. Bill Gates, for instance, is one of the 
largest donors in the world, but there are a large number of willing donors who have 
limited income but are eager to share with others. Thus, structural leadership measured 
by dominant material contributions to regional environmental cooperation is, for the 
purposes of this study, a matter of choice of the states in the region rather than a gift or 
burden determined by the international setting. In this sense, China or Japan would not be 
the only countries who can wield structural leadership in the Northeast Asian context. 
This study argues that any country in the region can try to exercise structural leadership if 
it is willing, based on its national goals for specific issue areas and international 
interactions among member countries.   
Instrumental Leadership 
 The second form of leadership examined by this study is what it terms 
instrumental leadership, which refers to “negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that 
foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude 
participants endeavoring to form international regimes through institutional bargaining” 
(Young, 1991, p. 293). Actors exercising instrumental leadership can “function as (1) 
agenda setters shaping the form in which issues are presented for consideration at the 
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international level, (2) popularizers drawing attention to the importance of the issues at 
stake, (3) inventors devising innovative policy options to overcome bargaining 
impediments, and (4) brokers making deals and lining up support for salient options” 
(Young, 1991, p. 294).  
In Europe, the Nordic countries exerted considerable instrumental leadership 
through active participation in various bodies of the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Several Norwegian and Swedish participants 
presided over the meetings of the executive body and the working group on strategies as 
well as leading the CLRTAP secretariat in the 1980s. Along with the Nordic countries, 
Germany also exerted instrumental leadership after the “catalytic change in German air 
policies” (Wettestad, 2011, p. 51). This instrumental leadership exerted by these 
European countries for CLRTAP, played an important role for strengthening and 
developing the environmental regime further.  
In the case of the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan), UNEP took over 
instrumental leadership from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Haas, 1990) 
and from the chairman, Stjepan Keckes (Haas, 1990) in mid 1970s. Even though the FAO 
continued to be involved in organizing meetings on monitoring and principles, it “lost the 
leadership and coordination of Mediterranean pollution control to UNEP”:  
In August 1974 UNEP informed the FAP that UNEP, after receiving a formal 
proposal from Spain, had decided to convene a meeting of government 
representatives in December 1974 or January 1975 to discuss the preparation of a 
framework convention, based on the FAO consultations. (Haas, 1990, p. 91) 
 
UNEP exerted its instrumental leadership through mobilizing scientific support 
for the exercise and elaborating the FAO’s early efforts for monitoring. UNEP 
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cosponsored the International Workshop on Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean with 
other agencies in September 1974, and the Workshop “served to set the agenda for all 
subsequent pollution discussions” (Haas, 1990, p. 91). Through this process, UNEP was 
able to create “agreement on an extremely comprehensive list of sources and channels of 
pollution” (Haas, 1990, p. 91).  
In the case of the three Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms on 
transboundary air pollution issues examined in this study, Japan and the ROK have 
exercised instrumental leadership to a limited degree particularly within the cooperative 
mechanisms that they initiated. In addition, the scientific focus rather than policy 
innovation of the cooperative mechanisms has limited the development of instrumental 
leadership in Northeast Asia.  
Directional Leadership 
The third form of leadership is what this study is terming directional leadership, 
the ability to produce “intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the 
perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 298). 
This directional or intellectual leadership “relies on the power of ideas, norms, and 
knowledge to shape the way other participants involved in regime formation perceive 
issues and conceptualize policy alternatives,” and thus intellectual leaders “often seek the 
adoption of particular policies by trying to secure broad assimilation and acceptance of 
new ideas, norms, and knowledge” (Selin, 2012, p. 216). Examples of ideas that have 
played a significant role in building international regimes are the “embedded liberalism” 
that provided coherent support of free trade and establishment of a new system of 
adjustable exchange rates (Ruggie, 1982) and the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 
 
  
40 
 
1968) that showed the dilemma of common property resources. This form of leadership is 
generally considered one that middle powers and even small and weaker countries a can 
also exert (Kanie, 2005). The active role played by the Scandinavian countries in building 
CLRTAP in Europe is a case that demonstrates this form of leadership. 
In addition to the intellectual influence of knowledge, another aspect of 
directional leadership is the ability to persuade other countries. Social persuasion is “the 
possibility of states leading by a combination of internal and external initiatives that seek 
to influence the perception of other countries as to what is desirable and what is possible” 
through demonstrating successful domestic policy (Grubb & Gupta, 2000b, p. 20). States 
can serve as a good example for other countries to follow in two ways. The first way is 
through advocacy “groups of environmentalists who claim that by unilaterally imposing 
on one’s own society strict standards of pollution control a government may help 
strengthen public demands in other countries for equally strict measures,” and the second 
is through a government who “can strengthen demand within its own society for 
international regulations” “by imposing or threatening to impose unilateral environmental 
protection measures” (Underdal, 1994, p. 185). Kanie anticipates that the EU can exert 
this form of leadership on the post-2012 international climate-change regime-building 
process through demonstrating the successful implementation of the EU Emissions Trade 
Scheme (Kanie, 2005). 
This study examines these three modes of leadership as practiced by national 
(rather than individual) leadership under the assumption that states operates as aggregate 
political entities. Despite having different political systems, the three core countries of 
Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and the ROK—share “a strong orientation of 
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developmentalism” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 231).17 Democratic Japan and South Korea 
with their capitalist economies and state-party-dominant China with its socialist market 
economy all allow their governments to exert “strong influences on the market in order to 
attain steady economic development” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 231).  
This study does not discuss the role of environmental NGOs for the development 
of regional environmental cooperation as transboundary pollution has not attracted much 
public attention in Northeast Asia. It is true, however, the quantity of environmental 
NGOs in the three countries has grown significantly. In particular, increased 
democratization in the ROK has led to the rapid growth of the environmental movement 
there since the late 1980s (Schreurs, 2002, p. 61). The issues that the Korean 
environmental NGOs pay attention to have also diversified, from political and economic 
concerns with compensation from the government through the mid-1990s to ecological 
concerns with neighboring environments after the mid-1990s (Cho, 2010). In a regional 
scale, chemical management and e-waste management systems have been developed with 
strong support from NGOs in Northeast Asia (Yoshimatsu, 2010). However, 
transboundary air pollution issues still have not captured much public attention in these 
countries. According to Komori, for example, the “environmental NGOs and the public 
in South Korea have focused more on domestic environmental problems than regional 
and global issues” (2010, p. 11). Some researchers have acknowledged the role played by 
the public and NGOs regarding the problems of dust and sandstorms (Ohta, 2008), but 
their effect remains less impressive than it might due to their tendency to organize 
sporadic events without long-term strategies.  
                                                          
17  The developmental state is “characterised by the strong state with autonomous power to 
achieve economic development through direct intervention in the market” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 
231). 
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Given the strong influence of states and limited influence of NGOs, this study 
focuses on the national leadership played by each country rather than leadership exerted 
by individuals or groups who participate in cooperative environmental mechanisms. 
Other studies that have examined national leadership in this way include that of Kanie 
(2005) on the successful leadership of the middle-power countries of Australia and 
Canada in the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT and of 
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) on the leadership of Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and 
the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the negotiations 
regarding stratospheric ozone depletion.  
Considering the importance of political leadership played by particular states in 
the region, this study analyzes the exercise of three forms of leadership on three different 
cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia. This study 
hypothesizes that the strong political leadership exerted by a particular country or 
countries, the more formal and concrete we can expect collective action to be. Stronger 
political leadership by any country in the region can increase the likelihood of 
development of more formal and concrete collective action.  
Thus, these analytical frameworks and previous research lead to the first 
hypothesis of this study: 
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the leadership, whether structural, instrumental, or 
directional, by a participating country (not necessarily a hegemon or the 
regionally dominant state actor) or a group of countries in a form of regional 
environmental cooperation, the more formal and the more concrete will be the 
collective action developed in the region.  
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Independent Variable 2: Knowledge 
Regarding the role of ideas in political action and cooperation, international 
relations theory has been divided into two varying approaches, which various scholars 
have given different names: “cognitive” versus “constructivist” (Bieler, 2001; Yee, 
1996); “weak” versus “strong” cognitivism (Hasenclever et al., 2000, 10-12); or “top-
down” versus “bottom-up” approaches (Knopf, 1998).  According to Bieler, the main 
focus of cognitive approaches is the causal effects on policy exerted by ideas, or in other 
words, “the transmission of ideas into policy,” while constructivism emphasizes the 
constitutive role played by “intersubjective meanings” in constructing part of the social 
totality (2001, p. 94), although this distinction is somewhat elusive because cognitive and 
constructivist approaches often seem to be incorporated into each other. Adler also 
recognized that constructivism should be complemented by a cognitive approach, such as 
a “cognitive evolution” theory, to explain why certain ideas succeed in being accepted 
more generally than others (1997).  
The contrast between “weak” versus “strong” cognitivism seems a clearer 
categorization. According to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, both strands of 
cognitivist thought agree that actors’ preferences should not be treated as exogenous 
“givens,” as realists and neoliberals simply assume (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 
2000).  Nonetheless, they also argue that there is a significant difference between the 
weak and strong strands of cognitivism. Strong cognitivists are concerned with 
intellectual knowledge, like their weak counterparts, but they stress the underpinnings of 
social knowledge such as norms and identity rather than the causal beliefs that are the 
focus of weak cognitivists (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 2000). In this sense, strong 
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cognitivism can be viewed as a “bottom-up” approach, while weak cognitivism can be 
seen as a “top-down” analysis. Weak cognitivism tends to be state-centric, as scientific 
knowledge groups create new interpretations of state interests and try to convince state 
leaders why cooperation is more desirable through the leverage of knowledge.  
Weak cognitivists stress the role of causal beliefs. They argue that decision-
makers face high levels of uncertainty in many issue areas and the necessity of complex 
learning. In particular, a high degree of uncertainty about causal relationships leads 
decision-makers to seek reliable issue-specific knowledge, and in turn those who supply 
it can exert a significant political influence. Numerous works have explored the interplay 
between science and politics and the conditions under which policy processes are 
influenced by information (Dimitrov, 2006). 
Among others, the epistemic community approach examines this mechanism of 
knowledge and policy-making (Haas, 1989, 1992, 2004). Haas has defined epistemic 
community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (1992, p. 3). He asserted that a community that shares 
consummatory values or principled beliefs, causal beliefs or professional judgments, 
common notions of validity, and common policy enterprises can contribute to 
formulating state preferences.  In Haas’s view, contemporary politics and international 
relations are highly interdependent and global, which make them highly complex. In turn, 
this complexity increases uncertainty about goals and preferences and limits substantive 
rationality. Accordingly, “embedded and institutionalized beliefs about the nature of 
collective response” rather than rationally formulated state preferences play a more 
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important role in national/international politics and policy choices (Haas, 2004, p. 
11579).  Therefore, growing demands for information and specific knowledge to frame 
policy debates make it possible for an epistemic community to play an eminent role as “a 
principal channel through which consensual knowledge about causal connections is 
applied to policy formation and policy coordination” (Haas, 2004, p. 11579).  
In the example of the Med Plan, few countries were aware of the degree of their 
coastal pollution at the beginning. Only a few LDCs, such as Egypt and Lebanon, 
possessed domestic monitoring capabilities. Given this lack of knowledge regarding 
pollution, countries were reluctant to take a positive position toward regional 
cooperation. As Haas pointed out, the Algerian case demonstrates the importance of 
national knowledge, which also has significant implications for Northeast Asian efforts 
Algeria was so opposed to controlling industrial pollution that a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) consultant’s demonstration of the extensive 
pollution of Algerian harbors was denied by the government. It was only after 
Algerian marine scientists with access to the government could produce similar 
evidence were its implications accepted, and Algeria came to support the Med 
Plan. (Haas, 1990, p. 84) 
 
Engaging in cooperative action to deal with transboundary air pollution also 
requires “much scientific knowledge on the definition of the problems, the identification 
of dangerous substances, the monitoring of possible damages, the understanding of causal 
mechanisms, and the analysis of policy responses and their impact on ecosystems” 
(Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 93). As Adler has asserted, “the political influence of 
transnational epistemic communities . . . is most likely to rest on the transfer from the 
international to the domestic scene of the ideas that national scientists and experts raise at 
their transnational meeting” (2005, p. 150). For him, national experts and through them 
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national governments are the decisive “customers” of such knowledge from domestic and 
international political perspectives, even though both national and international epistemic 
communities may contribute to the evolution of international cooperation under 
conditions of technical uncertainty and complexity.   
Considering the potential roles played by the epistemic communities who share 
scientific knowledge and policy options, this study analyzes the status of knowledge and 
policy suggestions on specific transboundary air pollution issues in Northeast Asia to see 
whether this region has been able to create epistemic communities for particular issues. 
As most regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia have focused 
on data gathering through joint monitoring and research, few policy options have yet 
been suggested by scientists, and in turn this study anticipates few epistemic 
communities. Thus this research emphasizes the development of scientific knowledge on 
particular issues rather than the development of epistemic communities themselves. As a 
result, this study posits the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating 
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the 
more concrete will be the collective action found in the region.  
 Independent Variable 3: Socialization 
 The third independent variable of this study is socialization, defined for the 
purposes of this dissertation as “the internalization of the values, roles, and 
understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a 
member” (Johnston, 2008, p. 22), a process that in this context occurs through 
participation in regional cooperative mechanisms. According to Johnston, there is 
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“general agreement across the social sciences that socialization is a process by which 
social interaction leads novices to endorse ‘expected ways of thinking, feeling, and 
acting’” (Johnston, 2008, p. 20) and to therefore engage in cooperative efforts.  
 Many political scientists have adopted a narrow notion of socialization based on 
neoliberal institutionalism that holds that nations develop strong international institutions 
when they perceive that the payoff or benefits of doing so will outweigh the costs 
(Keohane & Axelrod, 1993). Thus, for instance, Schimmelfennig views international 
socialization as “a process of rational action in a normatively institutionalized 
international environment”: 
Rational state behaviour is constrained by value-based norms of legitimate 
statehood and proper conduct. Selfish political actors conform to these norms in 
order to reap the benefits of international legitimacy, but as instrumental actors 
they also calculate whether these benefits are worth the costs of conformity and 
how they can be reaped efficiently. (2000, p. 109) 
 
The problem with adopting this view for investigating the development of international 
environmental cooperation is that there are few mechanisms through which the scientists 
and policy makers within a given country can discuss and assess the complex costs and 
benefits of their government’s involvement in such efforts.    
 This study, in contrast, adopts a broader notion of socialization that holds that 
institutional processes and mechanisms also play a role in the adoption of common 
values, roles, and understandings that lead states to become more accountable and 
transparent to others. According to this view, socialization occurs through a set of 
learning processes and international institutions that together have the effect of 
constraining participating states from engaging in free riding because they become more 
densely interdependent with one another (Ikenbury & Kupchan, 1990). In other words, 
 
  
48 
 
socialization is a whole process of interaction among states beyond one particular issue 
area, which shows that if states are more economically interdependent and they know one 
government is depending on another government, then they are more likely to cooperate 
in other areas as well. This is a much thicker notion of socialization.  
 This thicker conception of socialization was adopted as more appropriate for this 
study in large part because of two particular characteristics of Northeast Asia. First, the 
three countries examined in this study have developed a significant economic 
interdependence, as shown by the intraregional trade among them, which accounts for 
more than 50% of their total trade. This number is high in comparison to the ratio of 
intraregional to total trade in ASEAN and South Asian countries, which is 20-25% and 
5%, respectively (Nam, 2008). Second, in contrast to the narrower understanding of 
socialization, the countries in the region, particularly Japan, would seem to have had 
comparatively little to gain scientifically from the cooperative efforts of the studied 
mechanisms, as they had already accumulated adequate funding for their scientists and 
considerable scientific knowledge of their own.  
 To better understand how socialization processes may shape the forms and extent 
of regional environmental cooperation, this study examines two different processes of the 
internalization of norms that operate within these regional cooperative mechanisms: 
adaption and learning. According to Haas (1990), adaptation refers to the acceptance and 
adoption of preexisting, external norms and behaviors, while learning is a more 
transformative process, which Levy described as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of 
confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a 
result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (1994, p. 283).  Describing this 
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difference metaphorically, Johnston observed that while “adaptation refers to tactical 
shifts in cooperation, say, by a player with prisoners’ dilemma preferences, as the 
exogenously imposed relative costs of defection increase,” learning can be viewed as “a 
change in the basic preferences of the player, a shift away from one type of preferences 
through intensive socialization processes” (Johnston, 2008, p. xxiv).18 Within this 
framework, adaptation can lead actors to change their behavior in response to new events 
without questioning their own preexisting values or understanding of basic causal 
mechanisms. Learning, in contrast, yields “behavior changes as actors question original 
implicit theories underlying programs and examine their original values” (Haas, 1990, p. 
3). In other words, through the adaptation process, the broad goals of countries do not 
change even though their means do as a result of their social interaction with other 
participants at meetings among them. In contrast, through the learning process, 
international actors can change their behaviors through new thinking that reflects “a 
process more fundamental than adaptation” (Johnston, 1996, p. 29).  
To determine which of these two processes of socialization the participating 
countries have engaged in, this study qualitatively assesses the participation patterns of 
member countries in international meetings of the studied cooperative mechanisms in 
terms of two criteria. First, for each of the three studied cooperative mechanisms, the case 
studies investigate whether the participation of countries in the region has been prompted 
by indirect, rather than intrinsic, concerns about particular transboundary air pollution 
issues. Countries are considered as having engaged in the adaptation process of 
                                                          
18 Valencia, using the terms “tactical learning” and “complex learning” to explain these processes, 
argued that the former, “in which behavior toward cooperation changes,” needs to be replaced by 
the latter, “in which values and beliefs about reaching goals through cooperation change,” if 
Northeast Asia is to build cooperative security (2008, p. 158). 
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socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to participate in regional 
environmental cooperation on such issues; they are considered as having engaged in the 
learning process of socialization if they have found intrinsic motivations for their regional 
cooperation. 
Second, each of the following case studies analyzes the participation patterns of 
delegates to international meetings of that particular cooperative mechanism as a proxy 
for socialization. This study assumes that social interaction among delegates attending 
international meetings can enhance their understanding of the objectives and issues of the 
meetings, which they can then share with colleagues and policy makers in their home 
country and which can in turn lead to continued international cooperation. Given that the 
learning process of socialization typically requires extended exposure to the expected 
norms, values, and practices, the case studies assume that delegates are more likely to 
have engaged in the adaptation process of socialization if they have had the opportunity 
to attend international meetings for only a short period or in a sporadic manner, and to 
have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have been able to attend 
international meetings for an extended period in a consistent manner.  
Based on the above assumptions regarding socialization processes as they relate 
to political action and cooperation, this study poses a third and final hypothesis, as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: If participating countries in regional environmental cooperation 
efforts adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization, they 
are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional 
cooperation. 
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Interaction Among Variables 
Socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay between sets of 
independent variables, and thus socialization processes can be viewed as the intervening 
variables or “social mechanisms” (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998) that link the 
independent variables to my dependent variable of the forms and degrees of collective 
action. Mechanism-based explanations like this one search for systematic relationships 
between variables or events and aim to “specify the social ‘cogs and wheels’ . . . that 
have brought the relationship into existence” (ibid., p. 7), unlike black-box explanations 
that search for mere systemic covariation under the assumption that “the link between 
input and output, or between explanans and explanandum,” is “devoid of structure, or, at 
least, whatever structure there may be is considered to be of no inherent interest” (ibid., 
p. 9). In short, they assume that a mechanism (M) can provide a plausible account of how 
input (I) and output (O) are linked to one another: 
I                →               M            →             O 
This study calls for attention to the causes and consequences of collective action 
rather than mere associations between variables, as “it is actors and not variables who do 
the acting” (ibid., p. 24). Table 1.6 demonstrates the hypothesized social mechanism 
between the other variables of leadership and knowledge in which the stronger the 
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely 
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization 
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action.   
Table 1.6 
Social Mechanisms Among Variables 
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 Knowledge No Knowledge 
Leadership 
a) Learning 
b) Most formal and concrete  
collective action 
a) Learning/adaptation 
b) Less formal and less 
concrete collective action 
No Leadership 
a) Learning/adaptation 
b) Less formal and less concrete 
collective action 
a) Adaptation 
b) Least formal and concrete 
collective action 
 
As the arrow in Table 1.6 illustrates, to make the transformation from the least 
formal and concrete collective action to the most formal and concrete depends on 
creating the independent variables that are present in the uppermost left-hand box. This 
study examines whether this transformation can occur if participating countries of the 
region develop both or either strong political leadership and shared scientific knowledge 
among participating countries. In doing so, it also examines two additional questions: 
whether political leadership and shared scientific knowledge are necessary or sufficient 
factors for the engagement in the learning process of socialization of participating 
countries in the first place, and whether the learning process of socialization can lead the 
region to achieve more formal and concrete collective action.  
 
Research Methods 
To test these three hypotheses, this research study employs content analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. Reports on meetings of the target cooperative mechanisms 
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are the main source of information for the content analysis. Most of this information was 
available on the organizations’ websites; where those groups have not created their own 
websites, I examined reports from the sponsoring or umbrella organizations that deal with 
the issues addressed by the cooperative mechanisms. All of the reports on meetings, 
proceedings, and other information are indicated in the reference. 
For semi-structured interviews, more than 40 interviews were conducted with 
governmental officials from ministries of environmental and foreign affairs and experts 
from national research institutes and universities in China, Japan, and Korea. For the full 
list of interviewees, see Appendix I. Delegates to the international meetings from 
Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, were also interviewed, as were a few 
participants from Europe to examine the transfer of knowledge and experiences from 
Europe to East Asia.  
To identify key participants in the policy-making meetings, I used snowball 
sampling or a chain referral sample. The crucial feature of this sampling strategy is the 
direct or indirect linkage through which each person or unit is connected with another, 
which allows for the verification of the respondents’ accounts through third parties. This 
triangulation increases the validity of the interviews with relevant decision makers that 
would otherwise be unavailable. The semi-structured interviews used open-ended 
questions because this approach let the interview subjects provide detail, depth, and an 
insider’s perspective and to organize their answers within their own frameworks. In 
structured interviewing in which investigators define the question and problem and looks 
for answers within the bounds set by their presuppositions, the cognitive processes of the 
respondents could not be teased out as successfully.  
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At the same time, this technique can also decrease the likelihood of achieving 
good triangulation, as snowball sampling can be a source of biased inference. It is risky 
to sample only self-selected parts of the government apparatus if a researcher speaks only 
with officials who recommend one another, which could result in missing out on 
dissident perspectives within that government apparatus. To avoid this selection bias, I 
tried to diversify the verification process beyond snowball sampling by interviewing 
several authors of peer-reviewed journal articles to cross-check the validity of 
information gained from the interviews and by choosing some interviewees among 
participants of international meetings who were not referred by others. These efforts can 
widen our understanding of the scope of internal competition regarding policies.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
Before presenting the substantial case studies of the selected cooperative 
mechanisms, chapter 2 is a background chapter that shows a big picture of Northeast 
Asian environmental cooperation. It introduces two comprehensive and three issue-
specific environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia that have been 
designed to tackle transboundary air pollution. For comprehensive cooperative 
mechanisms, it focuses on the participation by the ROK as a middle-power state in the 
North-East Asia Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) and 
the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan 
(TEMM); for issue-specific cooperative mechanisms, it examines EANET, TDGM, and 
LTP. This chapter finds the role played by the ROK promising in that it creates some 
positive competition between member countries, but it also points out challenges that 
 
  
55 
 
Northeast Asian countries have to deal with in order to create solid regional 
environmental cooperation.  
The following three chapters examine the three cooperative mechanisms 
examined for this study. Chapter 3 discusses the development of Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET). Even though EANET has developed into the 
most formal and concrete form and degree of collective action among the various 
regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in which Northeast Asian countries have 
participated, this chapter argues that EANET is largely a failure in terms of generating 
broader cooperation and producing useful measurement data that could lead to the 
creation of a regional environmental regime. It concludes that political leadership is the 
only variable positively associated with this highly formal and concrete collective action 
as Japan’s much greater financial contributions to the EANET budget have enabled 
EANET to enhance capacity building and the quality of monitoring data in a practical 
sense. However, the lack of shared and new scientific knowledge regarding acid 
deposition among the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation process of 
socialization that they have taken fail to show that EANET’s highly formal and concrete 
form and degree of collective action are attributable to shared scientific knowledge and 
the learning process of socialization.  
Chapter 4 discusses regional environmental cooperation through the Tripartite 
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms (DSS). This chapter argues 
that TDGM has become a formal cooperative mechanism, yet it has neither developed 
specific obligations that participating countries are required to fulfill for the joint research 
program nor largely proven a success in generating broader cooperation and useful 
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measurement data for the region. This study concludes that political leadership is the only 
variable positively associated with highly formalized collective action. The lack of shared 
scientific knowledge about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM and the 
adaptation rather than learning process of socialization in which they engage cannot 
explain why TDGM has succeeded in creating the first governmental-level, multilateral 
cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS issues in Northeast Asia in a 
relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present.  
Chapter 5 discusses Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants 
in Northeast Asia (LTP). Despite the active involvement of working-level governmental 
officials from the ministries of environmental affairs of China, Japan, and the ROK, the 
LTP project has achieved little formal form and little concrete collective action. This 
study argues that this can be attributed to a lack of political leadership, particularly 
instrumental and directional leadership; little development of shared scientific knowledge; 
and little development of adaptation as a socialization process among delegates to the 
LTP meetings, particularly among governmental officials. 
Chapter 6 compares the current state of regional environmental cooperation 
regarding transboundary air pollution, particularly on emission reductions, in two regions, 
Northeast Asia and Europe. This chapter argues that Europe has succeeded in reducing 
air pollution through developing better air quality management with regional regulatory 
regimes, whereas Northeast Asia has encountered increasing air pollution due to the rapid 
growth of energy consumption in China. A comparative analysis between cooperative 
efforts in Northeast Asia and Europe demonstrates that the Northeast Asian cooperative 
efforts through EANET, TDGM, and LTP have failed to generate broader cooperation 
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and produce useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional 
environmental regime with a solid infrastructure and a policy focus such as that which 
European cooperative efforts have achieved through CLRTAP. This chapter also finds 
that shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of socialization are key 
determinants of the success or failure of regional environmental cooperation. The small 
amount of conclusive scientific knowledge shared by member countries and the adoption 
of the adaptation process of socialization among participating countries may explain why 
all three of Northeast Asia’s regional cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air 
pollution issues have been unable to advance beyond the UNEP’s second category of 
regional action, regional entities with permanent structures but a scientific rather than a 
policy focus.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MESSAGES FROM A MIDDLE POWER: PARTICIPATION BY THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION ISSUES19 
 
Introduction 
Since regime studies began in the 1980s, a few scholars have used negative cases 
of policy creation in order to understand the obstacles to regime creation. Nonregime is 
defined as “transnational policy arenas characterized by the absence of multilateral 
agreements for policy coordination among states” (Dimitrov et al., 2007, p. 231). These 
so-called “nonregime” studies regard the absence of policy coordination in certain issue 
areas as a result of a collective decision, and try to respond to why institutions for 
collective action do not come into being (Dimitrov, 2006).   
In order to understand why Northeast Asian countries have not created any 
agreements on transboundary air pollution issues, less-developed cases of collective 
action must be examined to understand why there have not been agreements on 
transboundary air pollution issues, despite various regional efforts for around two 
decades. Successful cases of European experiences with transboundary pollution are not 
applicable to Northeast Asia due to its diverse political systems, different levels of 
economic development, and mutual distrust drawn from historical memories. However, 
                                                          
19 This chapter was published in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics in 2014, entitled “Messages from a Middle Power: Participation by the Republic of 
Korea in Regional Environmental Cooperation on Transboundary Air Pollution Issues” (14(2): 
147-162). This paper is based on a draft presented the International Experts Workshop on 
International Framework and Co-benefits Approach to Promote Air Pollution Control in East 
Asia, January 17-18, 2011, Hayama, Japan. This research was supported in part by the Global 
Environment Research Fund of the Ministry of Environment, Japan (S-7-3) and the Institute of 
Global Environmental Strategies (IGES). The author would like to thank Dr. Mark Elder and Mr. 
Xiaofeng Zhou at the IGES as well as three anonymous reviewers for useful comments and 
discussion. 
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even if Northeast Asia has not succeeded in creating any regulatory regime yet, this 
region has created various cooperative mechanisms in order to deal with transboundary 
pollution issues since the early 1990s. It would be too simplistic to state that their efforts 
have been failures through juxtaposition of regime vs. nonregime. Rather than stating that 
Northeast Asia has not built any regime to manage environmental challenges driven by 
transboundary issues, we need to understand how countries have participated in a variety 
of channels of regional cooperation in varying degrees in different issue areas.  
In doing so, this study will focus on the participation by the ROK as a middle 
power of the region in regional cooperative mechanisms particularly regarding 
transboundary air pollution issues. The study examines the extent to which the ROK as a 
middle power has contributed to regional cooperation, illustrating the ROK’s diplomatic 
ability and limitations on regional environmental cooperation. During the Cold War 
period, Canada and other smaller Western states “defined themselves as middle powers 
through their staunch support of international institutions, their ability to mediate, and 
their limited relative power” (Collins, 2012). David R. Mares does not provide a clear 
definition of middle powers when presenting “a model of the international behavior of a 
middle power located in a regional hegemony” (Mares, 1988, p. 453). He treats lesser 
powers vis-à-vis greater powers as middle powers, such as Brazil and Mexico in Latin 
America.  
In the post-Cold War era, the definition of middle powers has been discussed 
more diversely. Melissa Rudderham (2008) describes middle powers as states that are 
“politically and economically significant,” leaving the meaning of “significant” wide 
open. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) assert that states have to act as middle powers 
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in order to identify themselves as middle powers in specific attributes such as economic 
issues, environmental issues and human rights, taking passive actions on issues like 
security. As Collins points out, however, middle powers are neither “a homogenous 
group of states” nor do they act in the same way. Thus, these definitions are challenging 
to apply. Due to these difficulties, some studies make the simple assumption that material 
variables determine whether states are middle powers or not. For example, Sohn simply 
states: 
Based on material variables such as gross domestic product, population and 
military capability, it [the ROK] is, indeed, a middle power. In 2010, South 
Korea’s GDP ranked 15th in the world, while its military budget ranked 12th. Its 
population, meanwhile, is about 50 million. (Sohn, 2012) 
 
Despite the simplicity of Sohn’s definition, the ROK’s categorization as a middle power 
is useful because of the ROK’s power relative to other regional countries such as China 
and Japan, which are considered as greater powers distinguishing from middle powers. 
For these reasons, this article follows Sohn’s identification of the ROK as a middle 
power. 
 
Northeast Asia 
Geographic proximity, shared perceptions of the region, and intensity of 
interactions have been the three common conditions for defining regions (Katzenstein, 
1997; Nam, 2002).  However, there is no consensus on the boundaries of the Northeast 
Asia region.  Based on the conditions of geography and ecological interdependence, this 
study defines Northeast Asia as six countries: People’s Republic of China (China), 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, Mongolia, the ROK, and the 
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Russian Federation (primarily the Far East). Seen from the composition of countries, 
Northeast Asia as a region has great diversity in terms of political and economic 
development.   
This region has not developed any legally binding international regime yet to deal 
with transboundary environmental problems, even though it has endeavored for regional 
cooperation since the early 1990s. Some might argue that this lack of formalization is the 
salient characteristic of the region. In fact, East Asia has been summarized in two points: 
underinstitutionalization and disjointedness, compared to ones of other regions such as 
Europe and North America (Lee, 2012). For underinstitutionalization, realists focus on 
historical mistrust or power rivalry as the legacy of the Cold War, and argue that the 
“hub-and-spoke” bilateral security system organized by the United States has led the 
region to have little necessity of formal institutionalization of East Asian regionalism 
despite increasing economic interdependence (Acharya, 1991; Aggarwal & Koo, 2007; 
Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).  
For disjointedness of East Asian regionalism, it is argued that East Asian 
institutions are lacking of systematic linkages (Pempel, 2010), even though East Asian 
countries have searched for many regional institutions for various regional issues on 
security, economy and environment. Instead of sticking with overarching institutional 
arrangements, East Asian institutions have evolved in decentralized, overlapping and 
sometimes contradictory regionalism. Some scholars name this feature “thin gruel 
(Friedberg, 1993)” or “informal regionalism” (Katzenstein, 1997). All has led Asia’s 
characteristics of “marginal adjustments, insistence on state sovereignty and a preference 
for bilateralism” (Katzenstein, 2005, p. 103). 
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These characteristics of Northeast Asia might have prevented this region from 
building regional institutions. Interestingly enough, these blocking factors for regional 
security are quite similar to ones that explain the lack of environmental cooperation in 
Northeast Asia. It is commonly understood among policy makers and experts in 
Northeast Asia that successful European experiences in dealing with transboundary 
pollution are less likely to be transplanted to this region due to “substantially different 
political and economic systems” and “various levels of economic development” (I. Kim, 
2007). In addition, there is little scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Nam 2002, p. 168) 
and due to historical memories, political antipathy (Yoshimatsu, 2010) has been an 
obstacle to regional governance.  
Particularly, this paper pays considerable attention to the disjointed regional 
efforts as Pempel pointed out. It is argued that “characteristics of complexity, 
disconnection, and lack of an organization hub” have been key features of regional 
environmental cooperation in dealing with Northeast Asia yellow sand, implying “a lack 
of a coordinating mechanism to eliminate project overlap” (Jho & Lee 2009, p. 69). In 
addition, a more “holistic approach” is necessary for “subregional/regional framework in 
East/North-East Asia” to cover “all components of transboundary air pollution 
management” (NESPEC, 2012a, p. 3).  
Under these fragmented circumstances, it is crucial to shed light on each 
cooperative mechanism. Thus, this article divides the cooperative mechanisms into two 
groups to discuss transboundary air pollution issues: comprehensive and issue specific 
ones. Even though comprehensive cooperative mechanisms have included some issues, 
the issue-specific mechanisms still bear stand-alone features to represent participation of 
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member countries. The Northeast Asian environmental cooperation would be more so 
due to the lack of interlinkages between various mechanisms.  
 
The ROK’s Environment and Its Performance 
The ROK faced air pollution problems which started in the late 1960s due to the 
national development of heavy industries and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the increasing use of low-sulfur oil and liquefied natural gas has brought 
significant decrease of emissions. Emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in Seoul 
have been achieved continuously (Chang et al., 2008). For nitrogen oxides (NOx), the 
emission reductions are not significant as much as sulfur, but it is notable that emissions 
have been controlled at a certain level, 125 thousand tons, since the sharp reduction 
between 1989 and 1990.  
To improve air quality, the ROK took various domestic measures in the 1980s, 
including the 1981 Standard for Sulfur Content, 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and 
the 1988 Clean Fuel Use Duty (Chang et al., 2008). The ROK has also participated in 
various multilateral cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air pollution since the 
early 1990s. Global environmental efforts and regional cooperation of Europe and North 
America have awakened the ROK’s concerns on transboundary pollution. Since Principle 
21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
clarified the right and responsibility of states regarding transboundary pollution, Europe 
and North America have developed successful frameworks, protocols or provisions to 
tackle acid rain in their respective regions since 1979. Paragraph 9.26 of Agenda 21 of 
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the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development explicitly pointed 
that European experiences should be shared with other regions. 
Northeast Asia has tried to implement its learning from these international 
experiences regarding transboundary pollution issues. In particular, the ROK has strongly 
committed to regional environmental cooperation in Northeast due to its environmental 
and geographic conditions that situate Korea as “a principal victim of transferred air 
pollution from China, while its emissions also affect the region’s ecosystem to some 
degree” (Yoon, 2006, p. 85). In contrast to the ROK, Japan has been active in developing 
“broader regional cooperation” circumscribing East Asia or Asia-Pacific. Japan has 
focused on the East Asia Acid Deposition Monitoring Network (EANET), which covers 
both Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the Environment Congress for Asia and the 
Pacific (ECO-Asia). It is revealing to see that the ROK has paid little attention to the 
Eco-Asia and Regional Environmental Sustainable Transport (EST) Forum in Asia 
established by the Ministry of Environment in Japan (MOEJ)20.  
Since the Basic Environment Plan was enacted in 1994, Japan has manifested its 
leadership role as a key resource provider for regional environmental cooperation. 
However, the Japanese “leadership raises suspicions in the region, due to its history of 
military invasions of neighboring countries; and Japan itself seems reluctant to step out in 
front” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84). In addition, Japan is “cautious and passive when it comes to 
government-level multilateral cooperation” in Northeast Asia as it regards the multilateral 
framework as redundant “form of development aid” which Japan has already been “active 
in utilizing unofficial channels of cooperation through the Green Aid Plan” (Jho & Lee, 
                                                          
20 Interview with Gyu Il Kim, Deputy Director of Climate and Air Quality Policy Division at the 
Ministry of Environment in the ROK on December 23, 2010. 
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2009, p. 66). In fact, Japan has provided China with various lower-interest loans for 
environmental projects through the Official Development Assistance. As such, bilateral 
cooperation has been a major channel for Japan to deal with its “concern with and 
enthusiasm for the acid rain issue” (Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848).   
These Japanese preferences for bilateral cooperation have coincided with China’s 
pursuit on “bilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea, which might enable it to have 
more leverage in negotiations” and China’s opposition to “binding agreements that would 
supersede the sovereign control of environmental policy-making” (Yoon, 2006, p. 85). 
As a result, unlike Japan and China, the ROK as a middle power has promoted 
environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia with a “strong incentive to pursue binding 
environmental cooperation that would impose some constraints on its two powerful 
neighbors’ unilateral interpretation of international agreement” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84).  
 
Comprehensive Intergovernmental Cooperation Mechanisms 
The ROK has participated in numerous multilateral environmental cooperation 
mechanisms since the early 1990s. It can be argued that the following two mechanisms21 
have directly related to transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia: the North-East 
Asia Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) since 1993 and 
the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan 
(TEMM) since 199922.  
                                                          
21 There is one more multilateral mechanism, the NEAC (Northeast Asian Conference on 
Environmental Cooperation), which the ROK has participated since 1992. However, the activities 
of NEAC have been discontinued since 2009 and it is not currently working.  
22 The Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), within the Regional Seas Programme of the 
United Nations Environment Programme, also deals with air pollution issues to some extent in 
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The NEASPEC  
This mechanism includes six member countries: China, DPRK23, Japan, 
Mongolia, the ROK and the Russian Federation. At the 1996 Third Meeting of Senior 
Officials (SOM3), the NEASPEC adopted the “Framework for the North-East Sub-
Regional Program for Environmental Cooperation,” recognized as “a unique and 
remarkable event and a significant milestone in the subregion as the six countries of 
North-East Asian subregion for the first time came to a consensus and adopted an 
agreement on subregional environmental cooperation” (NEASPEC 1996, p. 1). Currently, 
the NEASPEC is implementing projects in the three areas: i) Mitigation of transboundary 
air pollution from coal-fired power plants; ii) Cooperation mechanisms for nature 
conservation in transboundary areas; iii) Implementing the regional master plan for the 
prevention and control of dust and sandstorms. Transboundary air pollution, particularly 
SO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants, has been considered in a greater degree in 
the subregion. For Mitigation of Transboundary Air Pollution from Coal-Fired Power 
Plants, the NEASPEC has undertaken the first and second phase (1993-2008) technical 
assistance projects funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
The current third phase of the Mitigation Program is trying to achieve integrated 
strategies for mitigating air pollution and greenhouse gases, standardization and 
regulation of technology related to the management of SO2, demonstration projects and 
knowledge transfer and dissemination. While the Mitigation program overwhelmingly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
relation to marine deposition. However, this study does not include the NOWPAP due to its 
extensive focus on marine environment. For the NOWPAP’s development, see Chung 2010.  
23 The DPRK participated in only five out of 13 meetings of senior officials between 1993 and 
2008. The years attended were 1994 (SOM2), 1996 (SOM3), 1998 (SOM4), 2000 (SOM 7), and 
2007 (SOM12), which none of them were held in the ROK.  
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relies on international institutions, two other programs (Prevention and Control of Dust 
and sandstorms from Source Areas in China and Mongolia; and Cooperation Mechanisms 
for Nature Conservation in Transboundary Areas) have been conducted through the 
NEASPEC Core Fund. The NEASPEC has added most recently marine environment for 
its expenditure (NEASPEC, 2012e) to the Nature Conservation and Dust and sandstorms. 
The NEASPEC has tried to diversify its focus, reducing its previous concerns on 
transboundary air pollution.  
The annual revenue from the Core Fund consists of three sources: balance carried 
forward from the previous reporting period, contribution from member countries and 
interest income in previous years. As seen in Table 2.1, the Core Fund has been 
composed of mainly Korean (the ROK) contribution, and in a less degree, Japanese (in 
previous years) and Chinese (in recent years) contributions.  
Table 2.1 
Contributions to the Core Fund of the NEASPEC (Unit: US$) 
  ROK Japan China Russia Mongolia 
2001 100,000 100,000 0 0 0 
2002 100,000 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 72,000 50,000 0 0 
2004 100,000 57,600 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 49,970 0 0 
2006 100,000 0 49,985 0 0 
2007 100,000 0 49,985 0 0 
2008 100,000 0 49,985 0 0 
2009 0 0 49,985 0* 0 
2010 0** 0 50,000 0*  
2011 100,000 0 50,000 0* 0 
Total 700,000 229,600 399,910 0 0 
* The Government of the Russian Federation has contributed $75,000 to the 
Secretariat since 2009 to directly support a project on nature conservation. 
** The ROK did not contribute to the Core Fund in 2010 as it was supposed to 
contribute to the Secretariat of US$100,000-120,000 from the Korea Environmental 
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Note: Adapted from SOM Reports. 
 
Japan has provided financial and technical support for establishing a regional 
network on environmental monitoring, data collection, comparability and analysis, 
implemented by the Japanese agencies such as the Ministry of Environment and the 
Japan Environmental Technology Association (JETA) (NEASPEC, 2004; 2011). 
However, it is interesting to note Japan’s limited financial contribution to the NEASPEC 
compared to other cooperative mechanisms, particularly the EANET, which Japan took 
the initiative as this paper will examine in more detail later. Japan’s reduction in 
contribution has been interpreted by the Koreans as a sign of Japan’s lack of willingness 
to improve the NEASPEC as a legitimate regional comprehensive or far-reaching 
cooperative tool. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the NEASPEC member 
countries have not succeeded in showing “any great leadership in turning the sub-region 
into a hotbed for environmental solutions and cooperation” (Chung, 2008, p. 161). 
Particularly, during the most recent years the Korean initiative has not been impressive as 
“China has been the only member State that sustains the annual contribution to the Core 
Fund” (NEASPEC, 2011, p. 3). 
Since the member states agreed to establish the Core Fund at the Sixth Meeting of 
Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-East Asia in 2000, there were 
two difficulties: establishing Trust Fund and creating a permanent secretariat. As of 
November 2012, the NEASPEC has not succeeded in creating its Trust Fund. Instead, the 
ADB and the Russian Federation have provided project-based funding (NEASPEC, 
Industry and Technology Institute and Suwon city for two joint activities: the 
Meeting of Asia-Korea Carbon Footprint Partnership Program in 2011 and the 
North-East Asian Forum on Eco-efficiency for Low Carbon, Green Cities in 2011 
(NEASPEC, 2011). 
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2010). However, the concern on building a permanent secretariat has been solved to some 
extent. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) had acted as an interim secretariat for the NEASPEC until mid-2011. The 
secretariat was relocated from the UNESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, to its 
Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia (SRO-ENEA) in Incheon, the ROK, 
during 2009-2010. The 67th UNESCAP Commission Session in 2011 decided to 
“discontinue the interim nature of the NEASPEC Secretariat” and endorsed “the SRO-
ENEA to function as the secretariat” (NEASPEC, 2011). The Korean government 
interprets this as other member countries have given the ROK the leadership for the 
NEASPEC.24 It could be a correct interpretation in the sense that the ROK and Japan 
finally agreed on this issue, unlike in the past when they competed to build the Secretariat 
of the NOWPAP and ended up creating two offices in Japan and the ROK. The ROK has 
succeeded in establishing organizational foundations to exert its influence on regional 
environmental cooperation as a middle power. 
Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan 
(TEMM) 
This multilateral cooperative mechanism was initiated by the ROK at the 6th 
Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in May 1998. 
Since then, it has been recognized as the highest-level environmental meeting in 
Northeast Asia. The Ministers of the three countries have reaffirmed the needs of 
promoting the existing activities under other mechanisms such as the EANET and joint 
research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) through 
                                                          
24 Interview with Jang Min Chu, a senior researcher at the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) on  
December 29, 2010. 
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the TEMM. It also created new cooperative programs in 2009. The future 10 priority 
areas for cooperation during the period of 2009-2014 have been selected and 
implemented. Even though taking a lead on certain issue areas does not necessarily mean 
that the lead country would have specific interests in it, it can show at least higher 
degrees of concerns on certain issues among others.25  In fact, the ROK has distinct 
interests in dust sandstorms, and this will be elaborated in the later section on DSS as an 
issue-specific mechanism. Japan prioritizes pollution management and has actively called 
for more Korean governmental cooperation on marine litter or floating wastes on the 
coasts of Japan from the ROK26.  
The TEMM has wider array of participating actors. For example, the Tripartite 
Environmental Education Network (TEEN) program has built networks on environmental 
education among research institutes, experts and NGOs of three countries. The TEEN 
program has established a cornerstone for environmental education, which combines both 
theories and practices. It is also notable that the TEMM is the highest-level meeting in 
Northeast Asia. In fact, China, as the largest stakeholder country, pays the most attention 
to the TEMM as an intergovernmental cooperative mechanism in the region27.  
However, the TEMM still has shown various limits in tackling transboundary air 
pollution issues. First, even for information sharing activities, guidelines and formats 
have not been agreed upon. This has led member countries to take only voluntary and 
                                                          
25Interview with Sang-Joon Lee, Deputy Director of International Cooperation Office in 
International Affairs Division at Ministry of Environment of Korea on December 23, 2010. 
26 Interview with Sangwoo Park, Third Secretary of Climate Change Team in Energy and Climate 
Change Division at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK on December 29, 2010. And 
Ministers also agreed to pay more attention to “marine litter” on the Tenth TEMM in 2008 (TEMM 
2008).  
27 Interview with Haibin Zhang, Professor at School of International Studies in Peking University 
on January 18, 2011.   
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spontaneous actions. Since the working group was established in 2004, based on the 
agreement of the Sixth TEMM, they have worked to improve this problem and create 
new programs. However, the TEMM still does not have any agreements on specific 
responsibilities and action plans (Chu, 2005).  
In terms of financing, the TEMM has established only a weak structure. The ROK 
has provided the largest contributions and Japan has kept passive attitudes on resource 
provision related to TEMM programs. China has provided resources only for holding 
TEMM meetings without additional spending on cooperative activities (Chu, 2005). 
Although the ROK has endeavored for establishing and promoting TEMM’s activities 
within its limited financial capability, the ROK has exerted limited leadership due to the 
competitive relationships with Japan regarding selections of cooperative programs.  
 
Issue-specific Cooperative Mechanisms 
The ROK has participated in the following three issue-specific cooperative 
mechanisms related to transboundary air pollution. They not only deal with different 
issues of transboundary air pollution, but they also have different focuses on activities. 
The EANET tackles acidification in the region, and its main objectives are collecting 
monitoring data through the compilation, evaluation and storage of data at the Network 
Center. The LTP deals with more diverse air pollutants including PM and ozone, and its 
main focus is to establish sound scientific explanation on source-receptor relationships 
through modeling. The Tripartite Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and 
Sandstorms among Japan, China and the ROK aims to develop specific activities for both 
control and prevention of dust and sandstorms and deforestation. 
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Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) 
The ROK has been participating in the EANET since the very beginning 
including four expert meetings between 1993 and 1997, and preparatory phase between 
1998 and 2000. The three monitoring sites in the ROK for the EANET have reported 
monitoring data on many air pollutants including SO2, O3 and PM10 (EANET, 2010a). 
For these activities, the EANET has established a sound format for countries to provide 
comparable data. At the Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting in 2000, 
member countries approved the technical documents of the EANET, including technical 
guidelines, manuals and data reporting procedures and formats. This provides specific 
guidelines for monitoring, such as monitoring sites and interval, monitoring parameters 
indicating first and second priority, and meteorological measurement. The creation of a 
specific monitoring format for compatible data can be evaluated as strong advancement 
of the regional environmental cooperation. It is also notable that the development of 
Quality Assurance/Quality Control manual of the EANET activities has also enhanced 
data compatibility among member countries. 
The ROK has recognized EANET’s high status as an international program in the 
region compared with other programs regarding transboundary air pollution. The EANET 
has been equipped with the most advanced organizational setting in the region. Unlike the 
TEMM, the EANET has developed specific statements on obligations of member 
countries. Despite these achievements, EANET has faced two problems. First, Japan’s 
unilateral leadership has caused the EANET to be regarded as a one-country-led program 
rather than an international program in which other participating countries contribute on 
an equal basis. The other problem of the EANET is its limited scope of activities and 
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specific air pollutants. As a result of the specific objections of China, the scope of 
activities has been limited to monitoring of acid deposition without moving toward 
modeling. Monitoring itself must be a meaningful activity for future discussions on 
enhancing transboundary air pollution. However, only monitoring acid deposition is 
limited in its scope and could prevent the creation of complex solutions to acid 
deposition. In addition to the limited scope of activities, the limited scope of air pollutants 
is another problem for the EANET. Since the Gothenburg Protocol to Abate 
Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, adopted in the framework of the 
UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution in 1999 and amended 
in 2012, interconnectedness of various air pollutants has been discussed extensively. 
Under these circumstances, the EANET’s focus on monitoring and acidification is 
incomplete and outdated. 
The ROK signed the “Instrument for Strengthening the Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia” at the Twelfth Intergovernmental Meeting (IG12) in 
2010. It was argued that concerns of the ROK and China on the Japanese dominant 
leadership have reduced the status and scope of activities of the EANET (Chu, 2005). 
However, through signing of the Instrument, the ROK acknowledges Japan’s leadership 
on the EANET28. This is meaningful for further development of the EANET as the ROK 
is one of the major contributors to the Secretariat of the EANET.  
The EANET’s financing capability is regarded as the highest among other 
regional cooperative mechanisms. The EANET has put in a lot of effort to ensure 
organizational principles for financial arrangement. After three sessions of the Working 
                                                          
28 Interviews with Jang Min Chu and LimSeok Chang at the National Institute of Environmental 
Research (NIER) of the ROK on December 29, 2010. 
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Group on Further Financial Arrangement for the EANET in 2002 and 2003, the Fifth 
Intergovernmental Meeting adopted the Decision on the Further Financial Arrangement 
for the EANET (EANET 2003). This decision mentions participating countries’ 
responsibilities to make financial contributions to the Secretariat and the Network Center 
budgets on a voluntary basis but using the latest UN assessment scale-based burden 
sharing as the first step. The Japanese government has played a vital role for this 
development of the EANET. At the Eighth Intergovernmental Meeting in 2006, it was 
agreed that a flat rate amount for a three consecutive year period (2008-2010) would be 
applied for the voluntary financial contribution to the Secretariat budget from the 
participating countries. In addition, the “Revised Procedures and Guidelines for 
Voluntary Financial Contribution to EANET” was approved at the Ninth 
Intergovernmental Meeting in 2007.  
 Japan’s contribution (US$382,262) comprised more than 90% of total 
expenditures of the Secretariat (US$423,033) in 2009. Japan’s contribution to the 
Network Center Core Budget (US$422,967) comprised more than 99% of the total 
contribution from participating countries in 2009. In addition, more than 94% of total 
expenditure of the Network Center in 2009 has been supported by the Japanese 
government through various channels, including contribution to the core budget, 
additional budget for technical support and training, and contracts for its Ministry of 
Environment and National Institute for Agro-Environmental Studies29.   
Despite Japan’s status as the dominant resource provider, Korean researchers and 
governmental officials have raised a “transparency issue” of the Network Center of the 
                                                          
29 The author calculated these figures, based on information provided at the IG 12 of the EANET 
in 2010. These percentages far exceed the UN scale of assessment during the 2007-2009 period 
(16.6%). For these scales, see EANET 2009. 
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EANET. For this reason, the ROK has not yet transferred any contributions to the 
Network Center Core Budget while it has contributed around US$18,000 to the 
Secretariat annually in recent years. The ROK has asserted that it is necessary to 
reorganize the Network Center of the EANET into a more international, rather than 
Japanese, organization for the ROK to be motivated to contribute to the Network Center 
core budget.30 Even though this transparency issue has been raised quite a few times 
during various meetings including the IG 12, no party has pushed the issue in detail and 
this has led to many misunderstandings and unresolved disputes between members31. A 
Japanese delegate to the EANET points out that the language barriers are quite serious in 
the international meetings of the region. Communicating in English must be a significant 
problem as delegates speak all different native languages. The ROK has requested more 
diversified participation in the Network Center which means hiring more international 
researchers rather than relying on mainly Japanese researchers. Member countries need to 
pay attention to how to reduce these disputes driven by miscommunication and often 
language barriers. 
Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia 
(LTP) 
The LTP was initiated by the ROK in 1995 through the first Northeast Asian 
Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants among China, Japan, and the ROK. 
The three countries agreed to launch a working group, composed of both governmental 
officials and experts, and to establish an interim secretariat at the National Institute of 
                                                          
30 Interviews with Korean delegates, Professor Seog-Yeon Cho at Inha University in the ROK, 
and LimSeok Chang at the NIER in the ROK at various EANET meetings. 
31 Interview with Dr. Ken Yamashita, Head of Planning and Training Department at the Asia 
Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) in Japan on February 8, 2011.  
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Environmental Research (NIER) of the ROK. Since the first Expert Meeting in 1996 
when participating countries agreed to perform a joint research on both monitoring and 
modeling of the LTP, the Expert Meetings have been held annually mostly in the ROK 
but sometimes in China or Japan. The Terms of Reference for Joint Research on Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia was adopted at the first Sub-
Working Group Meeting in 1999 (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010).  
The LTP has achieved meaningful development in that it persuaded China to 
participate in the monitoring and modeling activities despite its passive attitudes toward 
transboundary air pollution (Chu, 2005). Even if main actors of the LTP activities are 
environmental research institutes32 of three countries, the LTP has reached a higher status 
as an international cooperative program beyond research due to active involvement of the 
countries’ respective ministries of environment. The participation of governmental 
officials in the annual meetings as well as experts in the field has contributed to 
increasing its status as an official international cooperation in the region33 (Chu, 2005). 
The funding of the LTP relies heavily on the ROK’s contribution, between 2000 and mid 
the 2000s around US$600,000 and between 2007 and the present US$1,000,00034. This 
shows that the ROK has taken the greatest initiative for the LTP. 
                                                          
32 The NIER of the ROK, the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) of Japan, and 
the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Studies (CRAES) of China. 
33 It is worth noting that China and Japan seem to have different perceptions on the LTP’s status. 
The Chinese delegates to IG12 of EANET in 2010 seemed to understand that the LTP is only one 
of many research activities that China has participated in. (Interviews with two Chinese delegates, 
Jun Zhou from Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy and Shuyan Xie from the 
China National Environmental Monitoring Center. Japan has rarely mentioned the LTP as one of 
various cooperative mechanisms that the region is working currently in its projects. (For example, 
see UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific 2009) 
34 Interview with LimSeok Chang at the NIER of the ROK, on December 23, 2010. 
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It is notable that countries have been less resistant to the proposal of extending the 
scope of air pollutants. The LTP has undergone three phases: the 1st phase between 1999 
and 2004; the 2nd phase between 2005 and 2007; and the 3rd phase between 2008 and 
2012. The first phase mainly focused on monitoring on the ground and aviation to 
understand air quality in Northeast Asia. The second phase started modeling to figure out 
source-receptor relationships regarding SO2, and the third phase is examining source-
receptor relationships regarding NO, Ozone, PM focusing on their human health effects.  
This expansion of scope of air pollutants might have been possible as the LTP is 
more research-oriented without showing intensions on regime creation.35 It is different 
from the EANET in which member countries have been reluctant in expanding and 
broadening scope of activities. It could be also because China does not seem to regard the 
ROK as its competitor36. This could be true to some extent in that both China and the 
ROK have been categorized as developing countries unlike Japan37. China seems to 
apply the principle of the “common but differentiated” responsibilities to the regional 
cooperation like the climate change discussions38. However, China’s stance could 
become a potential obstacle for future development of the LTP toward the EANET’s 
direction. The EANET has wider array of member countries as well as more systemized 
and clearer principles than the LTP.  
The LTP has a stronger possibility for the inclusion of wider array of air 
pollutants than the EANET as mentioned above. In addition, both cooperative 
mechanisms deal with monitoring which can create duplication of work. This does not 
                                                          
35 Interview with Gyu Il Kim. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Interview with Haibin Zhang.   
38 Ibid. 
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mean, however, that they share the same objectives or activities. The EANET focuses on 
measuring pollution to establish a regional framework compatible to Europe’s with a 
long-term purpose, while the LTP is aiming to establish common understanding on 
modeling in the nearer future (I. Kim, 2007). However, it seems unavoidable to have 
some overlapping activities on monitoring. In fact, a Japanese researcher at the Network 
Center of the EANET has collaborated in monitoring for a LTP project by sharing data 
from the EANET39.  
Due to this duplication of activities, the ROK proposed to combine the EANET and 
the LTP for an ideal mechanism through reasonable division of labor in 2009. However, 
the Korean proposal was rejected by both China and Japan. Northeast Asia needs to 
consider any possibility and benefits of combining these two mechanisms to enhance 
regional cooperation. As shown by the proposal, the ROK as a middle power can become 
a good mediator for China and Japan for further environmental cooperation on regional 
air pollution issues. 
Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) 
While DSS has been regarded as a natural phenomenon of wind carrying dust 
from the Yellow River basin and deserts, the rapid increases of frequency and intensity 
highlight the anthropogenic causes for DSS (MOEJ, 2008). Human factors in the 
formation of strong sandstorm weather include population growth, the rapid development 
of urbanization and irrational land-use such as excessive cultivation, deforestation, 
grazing and the abuse of water resources (Longjun, 2001). Due to these anthropogenic 
                                                          
39 Interview with Dr. Tsuyoshi Ohizumi, Head of Atmospheric Research Department at the Asia 
Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) on February 8, 2011. 
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causes, the number of storms in two source countries, China and Mongolia, has increased 
significantly (Wilkening, 2006; Natsagdorja et al., 2003).  
 Various impacts by DSS have also been observed in the ROK. The frequency and 
intensity of PM in Seoul have increased significantly. A study mentions that around 
US$3-5 billion of financial damages are incurred per year due to “respiratory & mucous 
membrane diseases, retarded growth of crops, difficulties in outdoor activities” (J. Kim, 
2007). In addition, some industries have claimed damages on precision machines and 
electronics which require very clean conditions, and food processing industries have also 
complained of contamination by DSS. 
To tackle these problems, the ROK has taken various domestic measures. In order 
to build infrastructure for prevention of damages from DSS, a legal framework of the 
“Comprehensive Measures for Prevention of DSS Damage” was introduced, and the 
“Framework Plan for National Safety Management” deals with DSS response system at 
the level of disaster management. These measures aim to strengthen standards for DSS 
early warning, to improve DSS forecast through expanding monitoring stations, to share 
observation information with source countries for early warning, to strengthen 
monitoring and research on DSS, and to promote measures for certain areas. The serious 
impacts of DSS in the ROK have led its government to place the issue in the forefront of 
environmental concerns.  
In addition to various domestic measures, the ROK created numerous bilateral 
cooperative mechanisms. The bilateral cooperation has mainly focused on forestation on 
desert areas in source countries, China and Mongolia. In fact, the ROK has supported 
several plantation projects in China to plant trees for erosion control. Despite the 
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impressive development of bilateral cooperation, various bilateral initiatives tended to be 
limited to some specific fields and national boundary areas even though DSS is a 
transboundary environmental problem at a regional scale (ADB, 2005). 
The ROK has also participated in several multilateral programs. The United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) was enacted in 1994 to stop the 
anthropogenic deforestation and desertification caused by excessive development through 
providing developing countries with financial and technical assistance. China, Japan and 
the ROK all signed and ratified the Convention in the 1990s. Since the adoption of this 
convention, various multilateral programs have evolved. A preliminary investigation of 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) launched an ADB/GEF joint project on 
Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in North-East Asia from January 2003 to 
March 2005 (NEASPEC, 2009; MOEJ, 2008). This project is evaluated as “meaningful 
in that it provided the basic framework for building the first regional cooperation scheme 
with the aim of countering yellow sand in Northeast Asia” (Jho & Lee, 2009, p. 51).  
Along with this project, the three countries agreed to create the Tripartite Director 
General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms at the Eighth TEMM in 2006. At the 
first meeting of the TDGM on March 2007 in the ROK, three countries started to discuss 
the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee for Joint Research on DSS. At 
the second meeting of the TDGM in September 2007, the TDGM adopted the TOR for 
Joint Research. The high political will of the Korean government for DSS is revealed in 
the ROK’s efforts to create the TOR of the Steering Committee for Joint Research on 
DSS. 
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The ROK recognizes three important meanings of the creation of the Joint 
Research on DSS (MOEK, 2007c). First, even though the Joint Research is a research-
oriented cooperative body, it is the first governmental level multilateral cooperative 
mechanism in Northeast Asia which was agreed at the TEMM and the TDGM. Thus, this 
body can garner high levels of political commitments from each government. Second, the 
Joint Research can be a channel for important policy dialogue for governments and 
experts. Third, the Joint Research is expected to play a role of an incubator that helps the 
region boost multilateral cooperation for DSS monitoring and network for early warning 
and forecasting.  Past bilateral channels and new multilateral mechanisms have revealed 
several challenges such as “the lack of an irrigation system, quick-shifting sands, 
destroying newly planted trees and shrubs, and limited local interests” (NEASPEC, 
2009). New cooperative mechanisms must take into consideration these difficulties that 
past projects have experienced.  
 
Conclusions 
The ROK has shown strong interests in developing an overarching regional 
mechanism through playing a role of an initiator at various multilateral mechanisms such 
as the NEASPEC, the TEMM, the LTP and the TDGM. Despite its initiatives in all of 
these mechanisms, the ROK argues that regional cooperative mechanisms require more 
even contributions and participation by member countries, rather than mainly being led 
by one country. In this sense, the ROK has proposed to combine the EANET and the LTP 
for an ideal mechanism through reasonable division of labor. It is worth noting that the 
activities of the ROK as a middle power show its intention to create an institutional 
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atmosphere for shared ownership without dominance by one country. However, the 
proposal was not accepted by China and Japan. This shows that the Korean initiatives 
have not been strong enough to construct a new direction of regional environmental 
cooperation. The ROK needs to better strategize how to meet this challenge throughout 
regime creation processes to become a successful middle power. 
Northeast Asia has a far way to go in terms of institutionalization of a regional 
environmental regime. Despite this lack of formal regime creation, this region has 
developed a variety of cooperative mechanisms. Even though they are fragmented 
without creative interlinkages between them, they are still under construction. The 
ROK’s initiatives in the various cooperative mechanisms might have become an example 
to other participating countries, and have led to a growing participation in financial 
contributions from China and Russia in the NEASPEC. In this sense, the role of the ROK 
as a middle power is promising. 
The other side of the coin, however, tells us that no single country has grasped 
strong leadership in any of the cooperative mechanisms and the unnecessary competition, 
particularly between Japan and the ROK, might have interrupted institutional 
development of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia. It could be too early to tell 
because the regime creation processes are still in the nascent stage despite two decades of 
cooperation. The ROK will continue to contribute to developing current regional 
environmental cooperation as a middle power, until a country in the region takes firm 
leadership, probably China, once it is ready to pay more attention to regional 
environmental issues.  
 
 
  
83 
 
CHAPTER 3 
ACID DEPOSITION MONITORING NETWORK IN EAST ASIA (EANET) 
 
Introduction 
EANET is an intergovernmental regional network in which 13 East Asian 
countries currently participate to address acid deposition problems in the region (Figure 
3.1). After holding four meetings of experts between 1993 and 1997, 10 countries, 
including China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, ROK, Russia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, joined the EANET at the First Session of the Intergovernmental 
Meeting on the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia in 1998 in Yokohama, 
Japan. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar also became members of EANET in 2001, 
2002, and 2005, respectively.  
Despite considerable progress of monitoring activities through EANET which has 
developed into a highly formal and concrete cooperative mechanism, this chapter argues 
that EANET is largely a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation and producing 
useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional environmental 
regime. This chapter finds that its existence appears to be driven by Japanese diffuse 
interests in promoting soft power and applying foreign aid to cement more diffuse 
political relations in the region; there are few broader effects or benefits. There are also 
few opportunities for the learning mode of socialization because of the too frequent 
turnover of bureaucrats and diplomats, and the very small numbers of scientists who are 
trained under the program.  
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Figure 3.1. Member countries of EANET as of 2013. Adapted from EANET 
http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/org.html 
 
As of December 2012, participating countries had established 54 monitoring sites 
for wet deposition and 47 sites for dry deposition (Jiro, 2012) (Figure 3.2). The 13 
participating countries conduct ecological surveys at 20 soil survey sites, 18 
forest/vegetation survey sites, and 18 inland aquatic environment sites, such as lakes and 
rivers. 
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Figure 3.2. Locations of EANET monitoring sites by area type. Adapted from “Review of 
Exisitng and Required Capacities for Addressing Adverse Environmental Impact of 
Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia,” by Sato Jiro, 2012, p. 15. 
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_jul_2012/Session1-Japan.pdf.  
 
Table 3.1 
Numbers of Monitoring Sites of Member Countries 
 Wet Deposition Dry Deposition Total 
Cambodia 1 1 2 
China 8 3 11 
Indonesia 5 4 9 
Japan 12 12 24 
Lao PDR 1 1 2 
Malaysia 4 3 7 
Myanmar 1 1 2 
Mongolia 2 2 4 
Philippines 3 3 6 
Republic of Korea 3 3 6 
Russia 4 4 8 
Thailand 6 6 12 
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Viet Nam 4 4 8 
Total 54 47 101 
Note: Adapted from “Review of Existing and Required Capacities for Addressing Adverse 
Environmental Impact of Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia,” by Sato Jiro, 2012, p. 
15. http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_jul_2012/Session1-Japan.pdf.  
 
EANET has developed into one of the most successful cooperative mechanisms in 
terms of “formal” modes and “concrete” degrees of collective action in East Asia.40 Its 
high level of formalization can be seen in its clear organizational scheme and the 
financial structures. Participating countries have succeeded in structuring clear 
indications of the purpose and division of labor among their secretariat, 
intergovernmental meetings, scientific advisory committee, and network center. The 
EANET’s financial structure has been constructed through formal measures agreed to by 
member countries. In addition to these formal characteristics, the EAENT has established 
the most concrete forms of collective action by developing a common set of formats and 
guiding principles for monitoring for EANET activities as well as common monitoring 
guidelines and quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) measures to confirm the 
comparable quality of the monitoring data among its 13 member countries. The 
monitoring itself has been improved by implementing quality assurance and quality 
control activities through their Inter-laboratory Comparison Projects. Capacity building in 
participating countries has been significantly enhanced through various EANET activities, 
such as individual training and the network center’s technical missions.  
 As discussed later in the chapter, a qualitative analysis of the data indicates that 
EANET has developed into a highly formal cooperative mechanism in which high-level 
governmental officials attend meetings and sign non-legally binding agreements on 
                                                          
40 For specific explanation about measurement of formal and concrete characteristics of regional 
cooperative mechanisms, see Table 1.5 in chapter 1. 
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proposals even though it is a science-focused cooperative effort that does not attempt to 
reach any legal agreements, it. Of the three variables included in this study’s 
hypotheses—political leadership, knowledge, and socialization—the only variable 
positively associated with this highly formal and concrete form and degree of collective 
action is political leadership. Strong structural leadership by the Japanese has enabled 
participating countries in the region to structure their cooperation, particularly during the 
early phase of EANET development. Japan’s biggest financial contribution to the 
EANET budget has made EANET the most financially abundant regional cooperative 
mechanism in East Asia and has created the most practical benefits and capacity building 
through its monitoring activities. Japan’s leadership, particularly its structural leadership 
based on its material capabilities, has succeeded in driving more highly formal and 
concrete forms and degrees of collective action.  
Yet Japan’s dominant contributions also have become an obstacle to moving 
EANET to the UNEP’s first category of regional cooperation, which, as mentioned in 
chapter 1, is legally binding cooperation. Regional efforts over the past 2 decades have 
not led to the creation of any regulatory regional environmental regime to address acid 
deposition in East Asia. EANET still falls into the UNEP’s second category of regional 
environmental action, a regional entity with a permanent structure and science focus 
without the solid legal infrastructure and a policy focus of the characteristics of the first 
category.  
The relatively small amount of scientific knowledge about acid deposition shared 
among the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation rather than learning 
process of socialization in which they engage do not seem sufficient to explain why 
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EANET has achieved the most highly formal and concrete form and degree of collective 
action among regional environmental cooperative mechanisms. Nonetheless, an 
examination of those two variables of scientific knowledge and socialization reveals the 
social mechanisms among political leadership, shared scientific knowledge, and 
socialization and explains why EANET remains in the UNEP’s second category without 
advancing to the highest category of legally binding cooperative mechanisms. First, the 
examination of the hypothesized social mechanism—i.e., that the stronger the political 
leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely 
participants in regional cooperation will be to engage the learning process of socialization 
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action—shows that strong 
political leadership alone did not lead participating countries to engage in the learning 
process of socialization, and the lack of shared scientific knowledge can be attributed to 
the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization by participants in the EANET 
activities. Second, the lack of scientific knowledge and the adaptation process of 
socialization among the participating countries of EANET can address why EANET has 
been stuck in the UNEP’s second category over the course of 2 decades of cooperative 
efforts regarding transboundary acidification issues despite producing the most formal 
and concrete mode of collective action in the region.   
The lack of shared knowledge among regional scientists about the compelling 
impacts of acid deposition has not motivated the countries participating in EANET to 
develop a more regulatory regional regime. Political calculations among countries in the 
region about whether to participate in EANET activities and East Asian bureaucratic 
rotation systems, which make public officers hold the same position for only a limited 
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time to prevent corruption and increase creativity, have led countries in the region to 
engage in the adaptation process of socialization, and thereby they have not been 
motivated enough to pursue a regional environmental regime creation.    
 To better understand how EANET has achieved of the most successful collective 
action of the three cases but failed to generate a legal infrastructure on acid deposition in 
the region, this chapter investigates how the existing level of cooperation through 
EANET has resulted from political leadership and scientific knowledge and whether the 
adaptation or learning as socialization processes constrained or boosted its regional 
collective action. As socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay 
between sets of independent variables, this chapter calls for attention to the social 
mechanism between the two variables of political leadership and scientific knowledge. 
The following sections explain how the acid rain issue has become an environmental 
concern in East Asia, and how the region has responded to its concern through 
developing the EANET mechanism.    
 
Acid Rain 
Acid rain refers to rain below an acidity of pH 5.6. It affects most constituents of 
the ecosystem, such as lakes, valleys, mountains, forests, plants, and animals. The 
damage it produces is widespread and diverse. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) that are emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels are known to be major causes 
of acid rain. Acid rain was first recognized as an environmental problem in 19th century 
Europe. In his pioneer 1872 article, “Air and Rain: The Beginnings of a Chemical 
Climatology,” English chemist Robert Angus Smith coined the term acid rain to describe 
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the acidic precipitation in Manchester, England. About 90 years later, Svante Odén, a soil 
scientist working at Sweden’s Agricultural College near Uppsala, synthesized diverse 
strands of research to conclude that the acidity of precipitation and surface water was 
increasing in many areas and causing detrimental impacts on fish, forests, and materials 
(Odén, 1968). Following Odén’s hypotheses, various research and monitoring programs 
were initiated after the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, Sweden. According to Clark and colleagues, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s Cooperative Technical Program to Measure Long-Range 
Transport of Air Pollutants, initiated in 1972,“provided international legitimation for 
Odén’s ideas in 1977” (2000, p. 51). Indeed, the Canadian Network for Sampling 
Precipitation (CANSAP) was established in 1976, the United States National 
Atmospheric Deposition Program (NADP) in 1978 was organized by the State 
Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES), and later funded by the National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) to measure the effects of atmospheric 
deposition on the environment.  
These various programs and studies have found that widespread loss of fish 
populations, especially in Scandinavia but also in the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, has resulted from surface-water acidification. In addition, severe forest 
dieback has been noticed in the vicinity of emission sources over the centuries, 
particularly that caused by direct SO2 damage. Central Europe observed widespread 
forest declines in the 1980s even though it was far from emission sources.  
Table 3.2 
Acidity and Its Effects 
Acidity (pH) Effects 
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6.0 or lower Freshwater shrimp cannot survive. 
5.5 
Bottom-dwelling bacterial decomposers begin to die, causing non-
decomposed leaf litter and other organic debris to lie on the bottom and 
depriving plankton of food supply. 
4.5 or lower 
All fish and most frogs and insects die. Acid rain also damages buildings 
and historical monuments; leads to the release of harmful chemicals, such 
as aluminum, from rocks and soils into drinking water sources; and 
corrodes lead and copper piping. 
Note: Adapted from “Acid Rain in China and Japan: A Game-theoretic Analysis,” by Y. Nagase 
and E. C. D. Silva, 2007, Regional Science and Urban Economics 37, pp. 100-101. 
 
Acid Rain in Northeast Asia 
Acid rain has been a serious and growing problem in Northeast Asia. In China, 
acid rain emerged as an important environmental problem in the late 1970s and grew 
worse throughout many years of record economic growth due to increased energy 
demand, greater coal combustion, and larger emissions of pollutants. As smokestack 
heights are usually very high in China, its emissions contribute more to regional than to 
local acid rain.  
Acid rain in China is caused mostly by emissions of sulfur dioxide by power 
plants, industrial boilers, ore smelters, and oil refineries. Power plant boilers are known 
as the single largest contributor, followed by industrial boilers and residential stoves and 
boilers. Moreover, power plants contribute to pollutant emissions that are transported 
long distances and accordingly to regional acid precipitation, while industrial and 
residential sources contribute mainly to local acid precipitation (Sinton, 1991).  
Between 1980 and 2004, China’s aggregate energy consumption grew 
enormously. Even though shares of other energy sources such as hydropower, nuclear 
power, and natural gas have grown, coal remains the dominant source of energy in China. 
In fact, the proportion of coal in China’s energy mix increased from 51% in 1980 to 62% 
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in 1996, as its economy made a particularly quick expansion (Aden & Sinton, 2006). Due 
to its pattern of energy consumption, the acid rain in China is still evident, and serious 
acidification is most dominant in Southeastern China, where the economy is growing fast. 
Figure 3.3 shows pH values in 2007 in China.  
  
Figure 3.3. 2007 regional distribution of acid rain in China. Adapted from “Report of China’s 
Environmental Conditions,” by Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, 2007, 
http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/2007zkgb/200811/t20081117_131297.htm  
 
Development of EANET 
Along with this serious and growing problem regarding acid rain in East Asia due 
to the rapid increase of China’s energy consumption, international discussions on acid 
rain alarmed East Asia. Agenda 21, adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, declared that “the experiences of the 
programs on transboundary air pollution in Europe and North America needed to be 
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shared with other regions of the world” (EANET, 2010d, p. 15). In addition, the World 
Bank estimated in 1995 that 1990 levels of sulfur dioxide emissions in East Asia would 
nearly triple by 2020 if energy and environment policies remain unchanged (EANET, 
2011a). These two findings led the region to recognize the potential problem of adverse 
impacts of acid deposition in the region. Thus, Japan initiated regional discussions 
regarding the acid deposition issue. Dr. Naoko Matusmoto at the Institute for Global 
Environmental Strategies (IGES) in Japan stated that the fundamental basis for 
establishing the EANET was the Rio Conference and the resulting Agenda 21 (IGES, 
2010). The development of EANET was led by bureaucrats from Japan’s Environment 
Agency because acid rain was “considered to be an issue which Japan had the capability 
to take up and contribute to, and could have high visibility among East Asian countries” 
(IGES, 2010, p. 4).  
Japan’s initiative was set in motion in 1993 by holding the First Expert Meeting in 
Toyama, Japan (EANET, 1993). At this meeting, participants shared the view that 
atmospheric protection was a critical issue for sustainable development in East Asia and 
recognized that acid precipitation due to the expanding economies was being observed in 
East Asia. They shared a common fear that the adverse effects of acid precipitation would 
become a problem in certain areas in the future despite a lack of evidence of acid 
precipitation at the time. Accordingly, the participants acknowledged the necessity of a 
comprehensive approach to assessing the impact of acid precipitation and providing 
greater monitoring of acid precipitation. Thus, the participants agreed that regional 
cooperation would be essential to this end and to collaborative monitoring to understand 
the state of acid precipitation in East Asia through creating regional monitoring 
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guidelines, as monitoring methods varied across countries. Finally, the participants 
shared the view that an Acid Precipitation Monitoring Network in East Asia needed to be 
established in the near future.  
Since then, Japan’s initiative developed in three phases: the early years between 
1993 and 1997, the preparatory phase between 1998 and 2000, and the regular phase 
since 2001. Four Expert Meetings were held between 1993 and 1997 to discuss the state 
of acid deposition in the region, ecological effects, and potential steps toward regional 
cooperation regarding acidification. Through these meetings, participants agreed on the 
necessity of creating a comprehensive approach for assessing impacts and establishing a 
regional monitoring network with standardized monitoring methods and analytical 
techniques. The participants are composed of delegates from ministries of environment 
and national research centers.41 
During the preparatory phase from 1998 to 2000, participating countries agreed 
on the Joint Announcement on the Implementation of EANET and the Tentative Design of 
EANET, resulting in the organizational structure of EANET shown in Figure 3.4. The 
Third Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG3) in 2001 adopted the Rules of 
Procedure for EANET. Since the IG3, the Intergovernmental Meetings and Scientific 
Advisory Committee (SAC) meetings have been held annually. Four subsidiary bodies—
                                                          
41 Specific institutes involved in EANET activities are Ministry of Environment for Cambodia; 
The China National Environmental Monitoring Center & Ministry of Environmental Protection 
for China; Ministry of the Environment for Indonesia; Ministry of the Environment for Japan; 
Water Resources & Environment Administration for Lao P.D.R; Malaysian Meteorological 
Department (MMD) for Malaysia; Ministry of Nature and Environment for Mongolia; Ministry of 
Transport for Myanmar; Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for 
Philippines; Environmental Management Bureau(EMB) for Philippines; Ministry of Environment 
& The National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) for ROK; Ministry of Natural 
Resources of the Russian Federation & Russian Academy of Sciences for Russia; Pollution 
Control Department(PCD) for Thailand; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MONRE) for Viet Nam.  
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the Task Force on Monitoring for Dry Deposition, Task Force on Soil and Vegetation 
Monitoring, Task Force on monitoring instrumentation, and Task Force on Research 
Coordination—were established under the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). It was 
also decided that the senior technical managers (national QA/QC managers) from the 
participating countries should meet to discuss important technical issues related to the 
network and exchange information on their 2001 monitoring activities.  
 
Figure 3.4. Organizational structure of EANET. Adapted from EANET, 2013b, 
http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/org.html 
 
The Intergovernmental Meeting is the decision-making body of EANET, 
composed of the representatives of all the participating countries. Its tasks are as follow: 
1) review and approval of the work program and budget of the Network; 2) 
review of implementation of the work program; 3) review and approval of 
periodic reports on the state of acid deposition in East Asia; 4) establishment of 
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subsidiary bodies as necessary and appropriate; 5) review and approval of 
scientific, technical, administrative and financial matters for the management of 
the Network; 6) adoption of the rules of procedures for the Intergovernmental 
Meeting and subsidiary bodies, including the Scientific Advisory Committee; 7) 
provision of necessary instructions and guidance to the subsidiary bodies, the 
Secretariat and the Network Center, on their activities; and 8) decision on other 
matters related to the management of the Network and implementation of the 
work program. (EANET, 2000b, p. 2) 
 
The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) is the advisory team that supports the 
Intergovernmental Meeting on scientific and technical issues of the EANET. It is 
composed of scientists and technical experts nominated by the participating countries, 
and establishes task forces when necessary. In fact, the members of the SAC include 
scientists at national research institutes and professors at universities (EANET, 2010e). 
Its tasks are to advise and assist the Intergovernmental Meeting with the following 
matters:  
1) scientific and technical aspects of the monitoring strategies for the Network; 2) 
development and revision of the monitoring guidelines and technical manuals; 3) 
matters related to the selection of monitoring sites, QA/QC programs, data 
reporting procedures and formats; 4) matters related to collection, evaluation, 
assessment and analysis of monitoring data; 5) preparation of periodic reports on 
the state of acid deposition in East Asia, based on the data reports by the Network 
Center; 6) matters related to studies of other scientific issues; and 7) other 
scientific matters as requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting. (EANET, 
2000b, p. 3) 
 
The secretariat is in charge of communication among the participating countries. 
The United Nations Environment Program’s Regional Resource Center for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNEP RRC.AP) in Bangkok, Thailand was designated as the secretariat 
following the interim secretariat run by the Environment Agency of Japan in 2001. It 
consists of three employees: one coordinator, one program officer, and one administrative 
assistant. The employees tend to be Thais due to the location of the secretariat. It prepares 
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for the meetings and conducts necessary administrative and financial management 
activities. The secretariat is designated by the Intergovernmental Meeting and facilitates 
cooperation among member countries in a transparent manner. Under the guidance of the 
Intergovernmental Meeting, the secretariat carries out the following tasks: 
1) necessary administrative arrangements for the meetings of the 
Intergovernmental Meeting, the Scientific Advisory Committee, and other 
subsidiary bodies; 2) necessary administrative and financial arrangements for 
managing the Network; 3) communication and cooperation in administrative 
aspects as the focal point of the Network; and 4) other necessary tasks as 
requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting. (EANET, 2000b, p. 3) 
 
The network center has conducted the most important activities for the EAENT 
because of its main objective of monitoring. The Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research 
Center (ADORC, renamed as Asia Center for Air Pollution Research [ACAP]) based in 
Niigata, Japan was designated as the network center for EANET. It compiles and 
evaluates the monitoring data and provides data upon request from the participating 
countries. It has helped participating countries enhance their quality assurance and quality 
control (QA/QC) activities, and has provided technical support and training for the 
participating countries. It has also worked on the promotion of public awareness on acid 
deposition issues. A list of its tasks includes: 
1) central compilation, evaluation and storage of monitoring data and related 
information; 2) preparation of data reports on acid deposition in East Asia; 3) 
dissemination of monitoring data and other relevant information; 4) provision of 
technical assistance to the participating countries in implementing the network 
activities; 5) implementation and coordination of QA/QC activities; 6) 
development and implementation of education/training programs for those 
engaged in the network activities; 7) implementation of research activities on acid 
deposition; 8) provision of scientific and technical support for the 
Intergovernmental Meeting, Scientific Advisory Committee and other subsidiary 
bodies; and 9) other tasks as requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting. 
(EANET, 2000b, p. 4) 
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Each of the participating countries organized its national focal points of the 
EANET, national centers, and national QA/QC managers.  The national focal points of 
the 13 member countries are basically all governmental officials in ministries of 
environment and are responsible for communicating with the EANET secretariat and the 
network center regarding implementation of their network activities (EANET, 2010g). 
The national centers of participating countries collect national monitoring data and 
submit them to the larger network center. They deal with technical matters regarding the 
network activities and with promoting national QA/QC activities. The national centers 
consist mostly of national research institutes, such as the China National Environmental 
Monitoring Centre (CNEMC) in China, the Asia Center for Air Pollution Research 
(ACAP) in Japan, and the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) in the 
ROK (EANET, 2010a). National QA/QC managers, mostly from the national centers of 
the EANET, work to promote national QA/QC activities in cooperation and coordination 
with the national centers (EANET, 2010c).  
 
EANET’s Achievements and Limitations 
Since 2001,42 the EANET’s objectives are (a) to “create a common understanding 
of the state of acid deposition problems in East Asia”; (b) to “provide useful inputs for 
decision-making at local, national regional levels aimed at preventing or reducing adverse 
                                                          
42 To test the feasibility of creating EANET, the objectives of the preparatory phase of EANET 
between 1998 and 2000 were more specific than those of the regular phase of EANET since 
2011. They included (a) “to examine the feasibility of the designed Network activities and 
relevant guidelines and technical manuals”; (b) “to provide time for participating countries to 
further develop national monitoring systems for the Network; and (c) “to formulate policy 
recommendations for the further development of the Network” (EANET, 2013a). During this 
period, participating countries developed the technical manuals and guidelines for monitoring of 
wet deposition, soil, and vegetation and inland aquatic environments, and finally adopted them at 
the Second Interim Scientific Advisory Group Meeting of EANET in 2000.   
 
  
99 
 
impacts on the environment caused by acid deposition”; and (c) to “contribute to 
cooperation on the issues related to acid deposition among the participating countries” 
(EANET, 2011a). The Tentative Design of EANET outlined the activities required to 
achieve several objectives such as collection of the monitoring data and information, the 
implementation of the QA/QC programs, and publication of periodic reports on the state 
of acid deposition in the region.43  
 EANET has accomplished several achievements. First of all, the number of 
monitoring sites in the network has increased from 42 at the start of the regular EANET 
monitoring activities in 2001 to 54 in 2010, which has improved the quantity of data. As 
shown above in Table 3.1, Japan has established nearly a quarter of total monitoring sites 
of EANET (24 out of total 101 sites) as of December 2012. Thailand has established the 
second largest number of monitoring sites, 12. China has 11; Indonesia 9; Russia and 
Vietnam 8 each; Malaysia 7; Philippines and ROK 6 each; Mongolia 4; and Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, and Myanmar 2 each.  
In addition to increasing the number of monitoring sites, EANET has enhanced 
concrete procedures for monitoring through developing clear monitoring guidelines 
(EANET, 2000e), technical manuals (EANET, 2000d), and QA/QC programs (EANET, 
2000c). Particularly, QA/QC plays an important role in acid deposition monitoring by 
ensuring the collection of meaningful data and enhancing the quality of datasets “at the 
national levels and in the Inter-laboratory Comparison Project schemes” (EANET, 2011d, 
p. 9). Thus, EANET has developed several documents on QA/QC programs intended to  
support the provision of reliable data with comparability among participating 
countries and with information from other monitoring networks outside the East 
Asian region, such as EMEP (the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and 
                                                          
43 For specific objectives, see EAENT, 2000a, pp. 1-2. 
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Evaluation of the Long-range Transmissions of Air Pollutants in Europe) and 
WMO (the World Meteorological Organization) (EANET, 2011d, p. 1).  
 
EAENT’s QA/QC programs have supported work at the national level in participating 
countries through providing appropriate documentation on QA/QC procedures and 
regulation of individual monitoring entities. The QA/QC program aims to “obtain reliable 
data that can be comparable among the countries of the East Asian region, as well as with 
other networks by ensuring data accuracy, precision, representativeness and completeness 
in acid deposition monitoring” (EANET, 2000e, p. 1).  
In particular, the annual “Inter-laboratory Comparison Projects” implemented by 
the network center of EANET, contributed to improving “reliability of analytical data 
through assessment of suitable analytical methods and techniques” (EANET, 2013b, p. 
1). The projects have been expanded to a wider range of fields including dry deposition, 
soil, and inland aquatic environments.  
For example, the EANET network center distributes artificial rainwater samples 
for testing to participating laboratories in the13 member countries to compare the 
analytical precision and accuracy of the measurement of wet deposition.44 The 
participating laboratories have to dilute the artificial samples 100 times with deionized 
water and analyze the diluted samples for 10 parameters: pH, EC, SO4²-, NO3-, Cl-, Na+, 
K+, Ca²+, Mg²+, and NH4+ (EANET, 2013b, p. 6). The laboratories are required to apply 
the analytical methods and data-checking procedures specified in the Technical Manual 
for Wet Deposition in East Asia and the QA/QC Program for Wet Deposition Monitoring 
in East Asia and to submit their results to the EANET network center. The results of this 
wet deposition comparison in Figure 3.5 indicate the percentage of data that satisfied the 
                                                          
44 For specific information on participating laboratories in member countries, see Table 1.1, 
Participating Laboratories in EANET, 2013b, p. 3.  
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data quality objectives (DQOs) and flags those that did not. The flags indicate the degree 
of deviation from the DQOs: Flag E stands for deviations between 15% and 30% and 
Flag X for deviations over 30%. Figure 3.5 shows that the quality of measurement data 
has improved over time as the blue bars, which indicate the qualifying percentage of data, 
appear to be increasing. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Results of the inter-laboratory comparison project on wet deposition for 1998-2009. 
Adapted from The Second Periodic Report on the State of Acid Deposition in East Asia: Part III: 
Executive Summary, by EANET, 2011e 
http://www.eanet.asia/product/PRSAD/2_PRSAD/2_ex.pdf. p. 5 
 
In addition to improvements in the quantity and quality of data, capacity building 
in the participating countries of EANET has improved. According to EANET, the 
“technical capabilities and skills of the participating countries in acid deposition 
monitoring and assessment were significantly enhanced” through EANET’s training of 
individuals and the network center technical missions taken to assist all the participating 
countries in “monitoring performance, laboratory operations, data management, and other 
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procedures” (EANET, 2011b, p. 10). Various activities such as scientific workshops and 
individual training courses at EANET’s network center and Japanese agencies helped to 
enhance the skills and knowledge of personnel in national monitoring centers. China, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam have consistently received individual 
training. Russia participated in the individual training program three times for a total of 
13 years. The ROK has never participated in any of training opportunities because of the 
preexisting capabilities of its own personnel. The individual training program has been 
held at ADORC, now ACAP, annually to teach monitoring and data management skills 
(Table 3.3). It is striking to see the remarkably small numbers of people trained each year. 
Table 3.3  
Individual Training Programs at ADORC 
Year  Number of Participants Countries  Training Provided 
1998 2 Thailand, Russia Filter-pack monitoring 
1999 10 China (9), Indonesia Training on EANET activities 
2000 4 Philippines, Russia, Thailand (2) 
Training on EANET wet and dry 
deposition monitoring, data 
management 
2001 6 
Indonesia (3), 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Vietnam 
Wet and dry deposition, soil and 
vegetation, inland aquatic 
environment monitoring, and data 
management 
2002 6 
China (2), Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Philippines, 
Thailand  
Wet and dry deposition, soil and 
vegetation, inland aquatic 
environment monitoring, and data 
management 
2003 6 
Cambodia, China, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, 
Philippines 
Wet and dry deposition, soil and 
vegetation, inland aquatic 
environment monitoring and data 
management 
2004 5 
Cambodia, China, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, 
Philippines 
same as above 
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2005 6 
Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
same as above 
2006 2 Cambodia, Lao PDR same as above 
2007 5 
Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia  
same as above 
2008 5 
Cambodia, China, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, 
Vietnam 
same as above 
2009 6 
Indonesia, Malaysia 
(2), Mongolia, Russia, 
Thailand 
same as above 
2010 3 China, Indonesia, Vietnam same as above 
Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future 
Development of EANET, by EAENT, 2010g, p. 73. 
 
 According to EANET, not only its network center but also Japan’s International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) “has delivered the training program through conducting the 
JICA Third Country Training Program in Thailand and the JICA Training Course on 
EANET in Japan to provide training on acid deposition and air quality management” 
(EANET, 2011b, p. 10). All of the member countries except Russia and the ROK have 
sent at least one researcher to the JICA Third-Country Training Course every year (Table 
3.4). Cambodia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam have sent the largest 
number of researchers between 2004 and 2009. 
Table 3.4 
Participants in JICA Third-Country Training Course on Acid Deposition Monitoring and 
Assessment in Thailand (NC collaboration with JICA and PCD, Thailand) 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Cambodia 2 3 2 2 3 2 14 
China 2 2 2 1 1 0 8 
Indonesia 0 1 3 3 0 0 7 
Lao PDR 2 2 2 0 3 2 11 
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Malaysia 0 2 1 1 0 2 6 
Mongolia 2 2 3 1 2 2 12 
Myanmar 0 2 2 3 2 3 12 
Philippines 0 1 1 0 2 2 6 
ROK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 6 4 6 6 6 8 36 
Vietnam 4 3 2 2 3 0 14 
Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future 
Development of EANET, by EANET, 2010c, p. 75. 
 
These training programs have enhanced the monitoring skills of member countries 
of EANET. One of the Chinese delegates has stated that the training implemented by the 
network center has let Chinese trainees learn monitoring techniques that are believed to 
have improved other monitoring sites in China as well.45 
The technical manuals and guidelines for monitoring of wet deposition, soil, and 
vegetation and inland aquatic environment were developed during the preparatory phase 
between 1998 and 2000. Each country provides the EANET network center with data and 
related information obtained from the monitoring activities conducted at the EANET sites 
in their respective countries following the technical manuals and guidelines for 
monitoring by the end of June of each calendar year. Then, the network center prepares 
and presents an annual draft data report containing the monitoring data submitted by the 
participating countries at the meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). After 
it is reviewed by the SAC, which is composed of experts from the participating countries, 
the draft data report is finalized. Since 2000, data reports have been published annually 
without interruption.  
                                                          
45 Interview with a Chinese delegate at the Twelfth Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting on 
the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia 23-24 November 2010, Niigata, Japan. 
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The Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG5) held in 2003 decided to 
establish a Working Group on Future Development of EANET (WGFD) to review the 
performance of the secretariat and network center and develop guidelines for their 
administrative and financial management. A high-level segment held with the Seventh 
Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG7) in 2005 launched the Report for Policy 
Makers: Goals, Achievements and Way Forward. IG7 also adopted Decision 1/IG7 
(Niigata Decision), which endorsed the necessity of an appropriate instrument and legal 
status for a sound basis for financial contributions to EANET. The Eighth Session of the 
Intergovernmental Meeting (IG8), held in 2006, adopted a 5-year medium-term plan 
(MTP), renamed Strategy on EANET Development (2006-2010), which was then 
followed by another for 2011-2015.  
EANET characterized the most recent agreement on and the operation of the 
Instrument for Strengthening the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia at the 
12th Intergovernmental Meeting (IG12) in 2010 as “another important historical 
milestone of the EANET cooperation” (EANET, 2012b, p. 1). Seven participating 
countries – Cambodia, Japan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, the ROK, and Thailand – 
signed the instrument, waiting for responses from the other countries at the IG12 in 2010. 
In 2011, Indonesia announced that it “is not able to sign the Instrument due to 
consideration on legal aspects. The willingness was expressed to continue joining the 
activities of EANET” (EANET, 2011c, p. 5). Lao PDR informed the IG that its Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs approved the instrument and it would contact the secretariat soon, and 
Malaysia informed the organization that it was “already at the final stage of internal 
consultation to sign the Instrument. The clarification was requested to the Session if there 
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will be any legal obligations as the effect on signing the Instrument after the operational 
date” (ibid., 6). In Russia, the instrument has been undergoing internal processes among 
ministries such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance to seek approval 
for a financial contribution (EANET, 2011c). Christer Holtsberg, Senior Technical 
Advisor at RRC.AP, Asian Institute of Technology, “encouraged the two remaining 
countries to expedite the internal process for the signing of the Instrument as soon as 
possible” in his opening remarks at the 11th Session of the Working Group on Future 
Development of the EANET in 2012 (EANET, 2012b, p. 1).  
The high-level segment meetings have enhanced the authority of the agreements. 
The fact that very senior officials, including the Minister of the Environment of Japan, 
the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Vice-Minister of the 
Ministry of Nature, Environment, and Tourism of Mongolia, and the Director General at 
the Climate and Air Quality Policy Department of the Ministry of Environment of ROK, 
attended IG12 in 2010 to sign the instrument has made it a strongly official and formal 
statement. This official involvement has made EANET a formal form of collective action 
regarding acid deposition in East Asia. 
Based on these developments, it can be asserted that the monitoring activities 
have been managed properly to the standards of providing clear monitoring guidelines, 
technical manuals, and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) programs. These forms 
of EANET activity go much beyond simple discussion. The devotion of the network 
center to the EANET monitoring activities is well represented by its various publications, 
including strategy papers, technical manuals, and scientific and technical reports. In terms 
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of organizational structure, the clear division of labor among the secretariat, the network 
center, and SAC support the EANET’s strong presence in the region.  
Despite this development of formal and concrete collective action, EANET has 
not advanced to a legally binding agreement since countries in the region started 
discussions in 1993 regarding acid deposition in East Asia. A comparison of the 2000 
Tentative Design and the 2010 Instrument shows the slow development of EANET. The 
Instrument is almost identical to the Joint Announcement on Implementation and the 
Tentative Design of 2000, essentially just adding several phrases and labeling each 
section in the text. Two perhaps significant differences between the two are more 
clarification of financial contributions and an expansion of the scope of monitoring air 
pollutants, as discussed next.  
As to the first of these, the Tentative Design indicates financial arrangements of 
EANET very briefly: 
 The administrative and operational costs of national monitoring within each 
country will be borne by each country. The administrative and operational costs 
of the Network will be financed by voluntary contributions by the participating 
countries, while efforts should be made to mobilize existing funding sources and 
seek new ones. (EANET, 2000e, p. 4) 
 
However, Item 14 of the 2010 Instrument indicates more specific financial arrangements 
than the Tentative Design.46 But, this more specific indication of the financial structure in 
the later document is not that different from the earlier one in that all financial 
contributions are still on a voluntary basis.  
The key change between the 2000 and 2010 documents might be the latter’s 
indication of a potential expansion of EANET in the future. Along with the objectives of 
                                                          
46 For detailed arrangements, see EANET, 2010a, p. 22 
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EANET, the new document adds a statement that the “scope of this Instrument may be 
extended, as decided by the IG” (EANET, 2010d, p. 17). Other than this 
acknowledgement of potential expansion of EANET’s research scope, the 2010 
document is very similar to the texts agreed to 10 years earlier, and remains not legally 
binding.  
As noted, a few countries declined to sign the instrument due to internal processes 
that might be required for their signature. It is notable, however, that Japan and the other 
countries that signed the instrument in 2010 were not concerned about following national 
processes to obtain approvals for their signature, not because their national delegates had 
full authority to sign it, but because it is a non-legally binding agreement.  
Regarding the EANET’s future direction, according to one of Japanese delegates 
to the IG 12 of 2010,47 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of 
Environment seemed to have agreed that Japan wanted a legally binding agreement. But 
in 2008, the MOFA reviewed the document and concluded that Japan needed to keep 
EANET not legally binding because making it legally binding might require a more equal 
contribution among member countries rather than the then-current heavy reliance on the 
Japanese financial contribution, which supplied more than 90% of the annual budgets of 
both the secretariat and the network center.48 The Japanese MOFA was concerned that 
                                                          
47 Informal discussion with a Japanese delegate at the Twelfth Session of the Intergovernmental 
Meeting on the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia, November 23-24, 2010, in 
Niigata, Japan. 
48 Japan made financial contributions of US$ 367,402 in 2008 and US$ 382,262 in 2009 for the 
secretariat and US$ 422,967 to the network center core budget in 2009 (EANET, 2010b). Most of 
the network center’s additional budget is also contributed by the Japanese government, including 
its Ministry of Environment, National Institute for Agro-Environmental Studies of Japan, and 
Niigata city and prefecture, and Japanese companies such as Nissan Science Foundation and 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (EANET, 2010c). 
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the existing system of EANET might not work if Japan reduced its contribution and few 
of the other countries were willing to increase their financial contribution to EANET.   
This internal decision by the Japanese government led to the proposed non-legally 
binding instrument, which seven countries signed without much difficulty or reluctance. 
As mentioned above, the instrument specifies no mandatory financial contribution or 
regulations for the reduction of pollution because the objectives of the EANET are only 
to set up a common monitoring system and to formulate policy recommendations for the 
further development of the network based on their monitoring results without considering 
specific emission standards.  
Thus, Japan’s significant financial contributions have made the EANET’s 
financing capability “the highest among other regional cooperative mechanisms” (Kim, 
2013, 12).  The other side of the coin, however, is that Japan’s enormous contribution has 
prevented EANET from moving on the next step of creating a legally binding regional 
agreement. The reasons for both these achievements and limits of EANET are discussed 
in the following sections.  
 
Political Leadership 
This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political 
leadership—whether structural, instrumental, or directional—that a participating country 
in the region exerts, the more formal and the more concrete the collective action in the 
region will be. It examines whether stronger political leadership taken by any country in 
the region increases the likelihood of developing more formal and concrete collective 
action.   
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Since EANET’s beginning, Japan has exerted firm structural leadership through 
its dominant financial contributions, but only limited directional leadership despite its 
advanced research and limited instrumental leadership. Before discussing Japan’s 
structural leadership, we need to understand the limit of Chinese leadership. In terms of 
environmental cooperation, as discussed in chapter 1, China, despite its growing political 
and economic strength in the global order and its enormous emissions that contribute to 
regional air pollution, has emphasized its status as a developing country without showing 
any leadership in acid deposition issues.  
Although China has taken various domestic measures to tackle air pollution and 
acid rain in particular, it has shown little interest in regional environmental cooperation. 
China’s environmental policy is essentially decided in accordance with its National 
Economic and Social Development Plan on a 5-year basis. In the sixth 5-year-plan period 
between 1979 and 1985 during the reformation of the country’s political and economic 
systems, widespread acidic pollution was observed and the issue of acid rain emerged in 
China based on nationwide surveys on precipitation chemistry (Lai, Kawashima, Shindo, 
& Ohga, 2001).  
In the seventh 5-year-plan period between 1986 and 1990 during a period of 
economic stabilization, the acid rain issue was adopted as one of China’s national key 
projects. Systemic studies suggested that the level of acidity was going to worsen and that 
Southern China was the most seriously hit area. Accordingly, China adopted the Air 
Pollution Control Act in September 1987, but the act excluded many sulfur emission 
facilities, such as power stations, from those requiring control. During the eighth 5-year 
plan period between 1991 and 1995, when China was experiencing a booming economy 
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and its government advocated the concept of sustainable development, Chinese officials 
strengthened the acid rain projects in the National Plan and began to release data relating 
to acid rain to make information about pollution openly available in response to growing 
public concerns. During the ninth 5-year-plan period between 1995 and 2000, the plan for 
economic development included environmental protection: 
The Air Pollution Control Act 1987 was amended, and articles dealing with sulfur 
and acid rain pollution were revised in 1995. The new act prescribes provisions 
relating to the acid deposition control zone and the sulfur dioxide control zone. It 
has been a remarkable step in China’s policy toward acid rain control. In 1996, 
sulfur dioxide was listed as one of the pollutants requiring control under the 
System for Controlling the Total Amount of Major Pollutants. (Lai et al., 2001, p. 
1846) 
    
Despite China’s considerable concern about domestic air pollution, particularly 
the acid rain issue, it has shown little interest in regional environmental cooperation. 
China has cited its insufficient financial capacity and more pressing domestic issues, such 
as wide economic gaps among regions and various problems in public health,49 to explain 
its low level of activity on environmental questions. However, it seems evident that the 
Chinese disinterest in EANET is related to its strategic recognitions of what the network 
might find because of its status of a source country. China’s position was similar to those 
of the United Kingdom and Poland who refused to sign the 1985 Sulfur Protocol 
(Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes) which 
mandated uniform reductions of 30% in sulfur dioxide emissions from 1980 levels by 
1993 because these two countries “burned large amounts of dirty coal, and were upwind 
from the very sensitive ecosystems in Scandinavia” (Levy, 1993, p. 94). According to 
                                                          
49 Interview with a Chinese professor at Peking University in April 2011. 
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Komori, China, as a net contributor to regional air pollution, “had initially denied any 
responsibility for its role in causing transboundary acid rain” (Komori, 2010, p. 17).  
Since the China-Japan Environmental Cooperation Agreement was signed in 
March 1994, bilateral environmental activities in the area of air pollution have been 
heavily promoted by Japan. The environmental projects addressed by the two countries 
have been supported by the Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs50. 
Japan has provided China with special lower-interest loans for environmental projects 
since 1995, which it has assessed as “effective in helping to control China’s acid rain” 
(Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848). Accordingly, bilateral cooperation between China and Japan 
has been largely one-way, in which Japan has been a resource provider and China a 
resource beneficiary. In fact, the bilateral projects have been “a reflection of Japan’s 
concern with and enthusiasm for the acid rain issue” rather than a reflection of China’s 
(Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848).  
Structural Leadership in EANET 
Structural leadership is measured by contributions to the financing of the regional 
cooperative mechanisms, treating spending as evidence of structural leadership. The lack 
of interest in leading regional environmental cooperation on the part of China means that 
Japan has been the only country exerting leadership in the acid deposition issue. As noted 
earlier, Japan has been the key resource provider for the EANET monitoring activities. 
To support the monitoring activities of EANET, its network center has provided basic 
measuring equipment for most member countries except the ROK, which was able to 
make its own monitoring samples and other tools (Table 3.5). One of the Chinese 
delegates to IG12 in 2010 stated that EANET’s capacity building was one of the most 
                                                          
50 The Japanese ODA programs for China began in 1979.   
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important outputs of EANET.51 In fact, the provision of this monitoring equipment to 
member countries enhanced their monitoring capabilities in a practical manner.  
Table 3.5 
Equipment Provided to Participating Countries for Monitoring Activities 
Year Country Assisted  Equipment Provided 
1998 Mongolia  IC, Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
  Russia Wet-Only Sampler 
1999 China Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
  Philippines Wet-Only Sampler, Refrigerator 
  Vietnam Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
2000 Indonesia Wet-Only Sampler 
  Malaysia Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
  Vietnam Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Flow Meter 
2001  - - 
2002 Cambodia Wet-Only Sampler, Power Stabilizer 
  Lao PDR Wet-Only Sampler, Power Stabilizer 
  Mongolia  Pure Water Generator Boiler 
  Vietnam Flow Meter 
2003 Cambodia pH and EC Meter 
  Lao PDR pH and EC Meter 
  Mongolia  Digital Pipette, Flow Meter 
  Philippines Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Computer, Digital Camera 
  Russia AAS (used) 
2004 Philippines Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Refrigerator 
  Vietnam Filter Pack pump 
2005 Lao PDR Refrigerator 
  Vietnam Refrigerator 
2006 Cambodia IC (purchased using Secretariat's savings) 
  China Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
  Lao PDR IC (purchased using Secretariat's savings) 
  Myanmar Wet-Only Sampler, pH and EC Meter 
  Philippines Rain Sensor 
2007 Cambodia Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
  Lao PDR Filter Pack Sampler Kit 
2008 Cambodia Refrigerator of Wet-Only Sampler 
                                                          
51 Interview with a Chinese delegate in November, 2010 in Niigata, Japan.  
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  Philippines Refrigerator of Wet-Only Sampler 
2009 Myanmar IC (donated by JICA) 
  Lao PDR IC Suppressor 
  Vietnam Filter Pack Pump 
2010 China Filter Pack Kit 
  Indonesia Filter Pack Kits (2) 
  Myanmar Refrigerator for Wet-Only Sampler 
Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future 
Development of EANET, by EANET, 2010c, p. 69. 
 
As mentioned above, based on the Tentative Design, the EANET member 
countries have borne the administrative and operation costs of national EANET 
monitoring activities. The Report of the Second Session of the Working Group on Further 
Financial Arrangements for EANET in 2003 reported the annual expenses for national 
monitoring, as seen in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 
Annual Expenses for National Monitoring (US$) 
Cambodia N/A Mongolia 11,000 
China 135,000 Philippines 24,000 
Indonesia 22,000 ROK 125,000 
Japan 874,000 Russia 37,000 
Lao PDR  N/A Thailand 69,000 
Malaysia 248,000 Vietnam 16,000 
Note: Adapted from Report of the Session: The Second Session of the Working Group on Further 
Financial Arrangement for EANET, by EANET, 2003, 
http://www.eanet.asia/event/wgf/wgf02.pdf. p. 3 
 
Unlike self-borne expenses for national monitoring, Japan has consistently 
contributed the bulk of the financing of the secretariat and the network center. Because of 
Japan’s considerable financial support, EANET has established the most financially 
abundant regional cooperative mechanism in East Asia. At the same time, continuous 
efforts have been made to diversify financial resources other than the contributions of 
Japan. Decision on the Further Financial Arrangement for EANET was adopted in 2003 
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at the Fifth Intergovernmental Meeting (IG5) to urge member countries to contribute to 
the financing of the secretariat and network center. EANET considers the latest UN 
guidelines for burden sharing based on assessment scales as the first step in this direction. 
(The UN assessment scales are set by the UN General Assembly for all UN member 
states based on GNP, population, and geographic criteria.) At the annual 
Intergovernmental Meetings, the secretariat and the network center announced the 
expected contributions of each of the member countries using something like the UN 
assessment formula to calculate the money share. For example, Japan took part in 
16.624% UN scale of assessment in 2007-2009, and reflecting its sharing on the global 
scale, 71.314% scale of EANET burden sharing on the regional scale. Based on this 
calculation, it was estimated that Japan might make an EANET contribution of 
US$337,571 in 2010 (Table 3.7) (EANET, 2009a, p. 236).  
Table 3.7  
Estimated Participating Countries’ 2010 Contributions to Secretariat Budget, Based on 
Latest UN Assessment Scale 
 
  
UN scale of 
assessment, 2007-
2009 (%) 
Scale of EANET 
burden sharing 
(%) 
Estimated 
contribution (US$) 
in 2010 
Cambodia 0.001 0.004 19 
China 2.667 11.441 54,157 
Indonesia 0.161 0.691 3,271 
Japan 16.624 71.314 337,571 
Lao PDR 0.001 0.004 19 
Malaysia 0.19 0.815 3,858 
Mongolia 0.001 0.004 19 
Myanmar 0.005 0.021 99 
Philippines 0.078 0.335 1,586 
ROK 2.173 9.322 44,127 
Russia 1.2 5.148 24.368 
Thailand 0.186 0.798 3,777 
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Viet Nam 0.024 0.103 488 
Total 23.311 100 473,359 
Note: Adapted from Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting on 
Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia by EANET, 2009a, p. 236.  
 
EANET financial reports have shown that few countries have met these estimated 
contributions, however, which may be because they are made on a voluntary basis 
without any specific enforcement measures. Revised Procedures and Guidelines for 
Voluntary Financial Contribution to EANET was adopted at the Ninth Intergovernmental 
Meeting (IG9) in 2007 to determine the minimum amount of US$50 for the voluntary 
financial contributions by participating countries, and Cambodia, Mongolia, and Lao 
PDR have paid US$50 annually in recent years. China and the ROK have annually 
contributed around US$15,000 and US$18,000, respectively, for the financing of the 
secretariat since 2002 and 2006. However, compared to the total actual annual expenses 
(between US$330,000 and US$500,000) of the secretariat (Table 3.8), these contributions 
seem minor, and as a result, the shortfall in the budget has been covered by Japanese 
contributions. 
 Table 3.8 
Summary of Income and Expenses of the Secretariat in US$ 2004-2009 
Details Income Expenses (Regular + Savings) 
Savings from 2002 and 2003 budget 469,931  
Income for 2004 budget 290,284  
Total expenses for 2004 budget  329,814 
Income for 2005 budget 346,831  
Total expenses for 2005 budget  337,720 
Income for2006 budget 254,302  
Total expenses for 2006 budget  413,101 
Income for 2007 budget 343,988  
Total expenses for 2007 budget  367,407 
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Income for 2008 budget 408,50352  
Total expenses for 2008 budget  497,920 
Income for 2009 budget 423,08353  
Total expenses for 2009 budget   423,033 
Total 2,532,382 2,350,995 
Note: Adapted from “The Review of Performance of the Secretariat (2008-2009),” by EANET, 
2010f.  
 
Based on the latest UN assessment scale, contribution estimates (in U.S. dollars) 
were China, $73,942; Japan, $290,526; ROK, $52,403; Russia, $37,146; and the other 
countries, less than $6,000 (EANET, 2010f). Yet the actual contributions of member 
countries for the financing of the secretariat have fallen far short of that except Japan’s. 
In 2009, Cambodia contributed $50; China $15,000; Japan $382,262; Lao PDR $50; 
Malaysia $3,835; Mongolia $50; the ROK $18,029; and Thailand $3,777. In 2008, 
Cambodia contributed $50; China $15,000; Japan $367,402; Malaysia $3,836; Mongolia 
$50; ROK $18,388; and Thailand $3,777. Japan’s contributions for the financing of the 
secretariat ($382,262) comprised more than 90% of the total expenditures of the 
secretariat in 2009.   
Japan’s dominant contributions to the EANET budget are even more significant 
for the financing of the core budget of the network center, accounting for more than 99% 
of the total contributions of participating countries toward this budget in 2009. 
Furthermore, the network center has been supported by the Japanese government, which 
has provided extrabudgetary contributions for technical support and training and 
contracts for research through its Ministry of Environment. The 99% contribution of 
Japan resulted partly from the lack of participation of other member countries, 
                                                          
52 In USD, Cambodia contributed 50; China 15,000; Japan 367,402; Malaysia 3,836; Mongolia 
50; Korea 18,388; and Thailand 3,777. 
53 In USD, Cambodia contributed 50; China 15,000; Japan 382,262; Lao PDR 50; Malaysia 
3,835; Mongolia 50; Korea 18,029; and Thailand 3,777. 
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particularly China and the ROK, in the financing of the network center. For example, 
Korean delegates to EANET have expressed their reservations about contributing to this 
financing because of some transparency issues, and therefore the ROK has not made any 
contribution to the core budget of the network center, whereas it has made around 
$18,000 in annual contributions to the secretariat in recent years. 
One of key arguments of the Korean delegates regarding the controversial 
transparency of EANET is that the annual budget for the network is too high considering 
the size of the EANET, with just 13 participating countries. The annual core budget of 
the network center, US$400,000-500,000, is almost same as the budget of the Chemical 
Coordinating Centre (CCC) of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), which 
is in charge of measurements, including data monitoring, data storage, and quality control 
and assurance, for more than 40 member countries (UNESC, 2012, p. 13). Moreover, the 
additional budget for the EANET network center (US$803,000 in 2009) is considerably 
higher than the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU)’s voluntary extrabudgetary 
contributions for the CCC of EMEP (US$326,438 in 2008). In the view of Korean 
delegates, EANET’s relatively high budget might have resulted from its more expensive 
personnel costs in comparison to those of the secretariat. As stated during discussions at 
the IG8 on problems with hiring a coordinator in the secretariat in 2006, staff members in 
the secretariat have earned a “low salary for this position compared to similar positions in 
the UN system” (EANET, 2006b, p. 2).54  
                                                          
54  Interviews with Ken Yamashita, a Japanese researcher at Asia Center for Air Pollution 
Research (ACAP) on February 8, 2011, and with Korean participants in various EANET 
meetings. 
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This cost issue has been raised since the early years of development (see, for 
instance, EANET, 2002, p. 5), and is still controversial in 2013. Against the Korean 
assertions about the higher personnel costs in the network center, a Japanese participant 
argues that there actually is not much difference in the personnel costs between the 
network center and the secretariat. According to the organization’s financial reports, the 
EANET secretariat spent $135,518 for three employees, including the coordinator, the 
program officer, and an administrative staff member, while the network center spent 
$577,794 for 12 employees. On this account, the Korean delegates argue that the staff of 
the network center is not responsible solely for EANET monitoring activities but also 
conduct domestic measurements and other research activities, costs which should not be 
borne by other participating countries. A Japanese participant explained that the network 
center had tracked the amount of labor allotted to EANET activities by employees for a 
year and has included only a percentage of the salary of staff members in the annual 
EANET budget and expenditures. However, the Korean delegates have not been 
persuaded by the Japanese argument about the division of labor within the Network 
Center because of the potential difficulties of distinguishing between the labor for 
national research and for international research.  
Therefore, even though Japan’s dominant role in the financial support of EANET 
has given it the highest financial capability among various regional cooperative 
mechanisms, it has also become an obstacle to other nations’ justifying the use of their 
national resources to financially contribute to EANET’s operations.  The key point of 
Korean delegates on the transparency issue has been that the EANET’s network center is 
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not an international organization but a Japan-led program for which the Japanese 
government discretionally sets and executes the annual budget. 
As mentioned above, this problematic Japanese dominance was recognized by the 
Japanese government when it decided to maintain EANET as a voluntary, not binding, 
mechanism. EANET recently discussed whether to convert its current voluntary 
mechanism to a legally binding one, but ironically Japan opposed the idea in favor of 
maintaining the current EANET system. One Japanese scholar attributes this to 
bureaucratic inertia,55 saying that the Japanese government wishes to keep EANET’s 
existing system even though it recognizes that doing so might not work for further 
development of EANET. Under the current voluntary circumstances, it is doubtful the 
dominance of Japanese financial contributions is likely to change in the near future.  
Directional Leadership in EANET 
Directional leadership refers to developing substantive solutions based on 
knowledge and changing perceptions of risks. Japan also seems to have expected to exert 
directional leadership and instrumental leadership from the beginning of EANET 
activities. Neither of these two modes of leadership, however, has been successfully 
practiced by Japan because of other member states’ objections to Japanese leadership. 
Regarding directional leadership, Japan anticipated leading the technical arrangements of 
EANET in the early years (1993-1997) based on its high technology. As described below, 
the development of the Guidelines for Monitoring Acid Deposition in the East Asia 
Region demonstrates how Japanese directional leadership has been both asserted and 
denied throughout the development of EANET.  
                                                          
55 Interview with Professor Atsushi Ishii at Tohoku University, Japan on October 17, 2010. 
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At the early years of EANET, Japan exerted its directional leadership without 
objections from other countries. At the First Expert Meeting in 1993, the participating 
countries welcomed the leadership exerted by the Environment Agency of Japan, as they 
believed that Japan “could play a coordinating role toward the establishment of a 
monitoring network and host this kind of expert meeting for the next two years” (EANET, 
1993). This meeting recognized that a regional acid precipitation monitoring network was 
needed, as “adverse effects of acid precipitation would become a critical problem in 
certain areas in the future although evidence of the effects of acid precipitation on 
ecosystems has yet to be determined” given the significant expansion of the economies in 
the region (ibid.). Thus, draft guidelines had been prepared by the Environment Agency 
of Japan and adopted at the Second Expert Meeting in March 1995 in Tokyo, Japan 
without many difficulties.  
“Data Reporting Procedures and Formats for Acid Deposition Monitoring in East 
Asia”56 was agreed to in the Second Interim Scientific Advisory Group Meeting in 2000 
without difficulties. It included concrete formats for reporting monitoring results and 
guidelines for monitoring, such as monitoring sites and intervals, monitoring parameters 
indicating first and second priorities, and meteorological measurement.57 This creation of 
a concrete monitoring format for compatible data can be considered a strong 
advancement in environmental cooperation in the region.  
Since April 1998, when EANET’s activities were accelerated by the First 
Intergovernmental Meeting in March 1998, the participating countries grew more 
                                                          
56Available at http://www.eanet.cc/product/datarep_form.pdf 
57 EANET has collected monitoring data on SO2, NO2, O3, CO, PM10 for ambient air quality; 
pH, EC, Cation including NH4+, NA+, Ca2+, Mg2+ and Anion for wet deposition; and PM2.5 
mass and composition in PM2.5 for dry deposition (EANET, 2010f).  
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concerned about the guidelines and technical leadership provided by Japan. While the 
adoption of “Data Reporting Procedures and Formats for Acid Deposition Monitoring in 
East Asia” was not controversial, adoption of other technical documents, including 
QA/QC and technical manuals, raised significant concerns among other participating 
countries. If EANET were to be established as an international program, only monitoring 
devices that were appropriate to the technical documents should be used in EANET 
activities.58 Several Japanese monitoring device companies had dispatched employees to 
the network center anticipating the adoption of their devices for EANET monitoring 
activities because the network center purchased equipment from Japanese companies and 
provided them for the member countries for free in the earlier stage of EANET.  
However, there were two problems that the official adoption of the Japanese 
devices because they were very different from the international standards or the often-
used global techniques that the United States and Europe had invented. First, the East 
Asian countries, particularly the ROK, which had already equipped itself with monitoring 
devices (mostly made in the United States), would have to change their existing devices 
to the Japanese devices. Second, the monitoring data could not be compared and accepted 
globally because of the different standards. Accordingly, the Interim Scientific Group 
made considerable modifications to the guidelines that were proposed by the 
Environment Agency of Japan and submitted by the network center. In fact, the meeting 
report of the Interim Scientific Advisory Group in Jakarta in March 2000 stated that 
“[a]fter intensive review and discussions, ISAG [Interim Scientific Advisory Group] 
adopted the monitoring guidelines, technical manuals and other technical documents 
                                                          
58 Email discussions with a Korean delegate on March 17 and 19, 2012. 
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(EANET/ISAG 2/4/1-8) with the modifications presented in Annex II” (EANET, 2000c, 
p. 4).  
Under these circumstances, the Japanese device companies could not dominate 
the sale of monitoring equipments and lost their desire to play a role as stakeholders in 
EANET. There is an interesting parallelism here to the Med Plan except the subjects of 
opposition to the leadership of a particular country, Japan in the case of EANET and 
France in the case of the Med Plan (Haas, 1990). In the Med Plan, France tried to 
exercise directional leadership, which is similar to that of Japan – providing money, soft 
power, and seeing an opportunity for selling French technology, yet it failed because 
UNEP interceded and created a network of scientists that were able to socialize other 
governments and thus the efforts that France initially helped support evolved in ways far 
different from what France anticipated and wanted. In the case of EANET, participating 
countries rather than an international organization opposed to the directional leadership 
that Japan tried to exert, through opposing to the idea of adopting Japanese technology. 
Thus, directional leadership by the Japanese has been reduced since 1998, but 
without leading to an increase in directional leadership by other participating countries. 
During the regular phase since 2001, no other countries have demonstrated a strong 
interest in exerting leadership in developing EANET. In fact, few participating countries 
actually contribute to writing the manuals due to their own limited labor resources, which 
has let Japan maintain its practical leadership in preparing technical guidance and QA/QC. 
Nonetheless, Japanese directional leadership has been subtle and unstable to some extent, 
due to technical reasons such as those mentioned above.  
Instrumental Leadership in EANET 
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Instrumental leadership is demonstrated by negotiating skills to frame issues and 
to put together deals through institutional bargaining. Like its directional leadership, the 
instrumental or entrepreneurial leadership played by Japan also has not been impressive, 
but no alternative country has shown an interest in taking firm instrumental leadership 
over EANET, either. Instrumental leadership can be defined as exercising the 
“negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put 
together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form international 
regimes through institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 293). In the case of EANET, 
which has not created any regulatory mechanisms, countries which provide instrumental 
leadership could function mainly as agenda setters and popularizers, drawing more 
attention to the issues, rather than as inventors or brokers of policy options.  
Japan’s limited instrumental leadership is well represented by the issue of 
extending EANET’s scope in terms of substances and activities. At the Second Expert 
Meeting in 1995, the participating countries agreed to use the term “acid deposition,” 
rather than “acid precipitation,” to accommodate all aspects of acid rain issues in the 
future development of the network. Thus, in the early years of the EANET, countries 
understood that acid rain might be too narrow a concept for regional cooperation in the 
future and adopted the more inclusive term, acid deposition. During the preparatory phase, 
the potential extension of EANET therefore had been anticipated. At the Second Interim 
Scientific Advisory Group in March 2000, in Jakarta, Indonesia, scientists endorsed a 
statement regarding the eventual necessity of modeling, mentioning that “[c]ontribution 
by anthropogenic and natural emission sources cannot be distinguished through the 
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network monitoring activities. It will be done at the next step through modeling” 
(EANET, 2000c, p. 2).  
China has stressed the step-by-step process since the beginning of the regular 
phase. The ideal steps in such a progression would be to move from monitoring to 
inventory work to modeling and then to the mitigation of impact damage. This 
incremental approach advocated by China has consistently blocked Japan’s ambition to 
expand the scope of EANET and thereby exert its instrumental leadership. Comments of 
a key Japanese delegate who has participated in the EANET meetings since March 1998 
reflect the Japanese view which is different from China’s. He mentioned that EANET is 
not focusing on acid deposition only and that participating countries need to think big and 
integrate air pollutants and climate issues.59 He asserted that the hemispheric transport of 
air pollution (HTAP) could serve as a good precedent study regarding intercontinental 
transport of ozone, aerosols, mercury, and persistent organic pollutants.  
In fact, the Report of the Long-Term National Acid Deposition Monitoring in 
Japan (JFY 2003-2007) produced by Japan’s Ministry of Environment in 2009 clearly 
points out the necessity of extending the scope of EANET’s actions to include more 
diverse air pollutants and modeling: 
Aiming to extend the action scope of EANET from the conventional acid 
deposition monitoring to the management of the atmosphere environment in East 
Asia, it is necessary to establish the international cooperative relationship and 
promote regional collaboration to prevent air pollution. . . . It is needed that the 
transboundary air pollution monitoring including not only acid deposition but also 
ozone and aerosol should be conducted. (MOEJ, 2009, pp. 6-7) 
 
                                                          
59 Interview on April 23, 2010. 
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However, Japan’s ambitions toward instrumental leadership have not been exerted 
due to Chinese objections to the expansion of the scope of air pollution substances and of 
EANET activities to modeling. The Chinese objection was not the only reason for 
Japan’s failure to exert instrumental leadership. As the regular phase evolved, Japanese 
delegates started to realize the necessity of enhancing the ownership of other countries in 
the organization through various meetings. In fact, Japanese delegates have consciously 
tried to let delegates from other countries talk more rather than guiding the meetings to 
increase other countries’ sense of ownership in EANET.60  
In short, as EANET has evolved from its early years through its preparatory and 
regular phases, various forms of Japanese leadership have been exerted and also 
challenged. Above all, the structural leadership of the Japanese brought the acid 
deposition issue to the attention of the region. The establishment of the cooperative 
mechanism during the earlier phases is attributable to Japanese structural leadership. 
Despite criticisms by other member countries regarding Japan’s dominant contributions 
and seeming lack of transparence about the expenditures of the network center, Japan 
seems to be the only country which has been willing to exercise structural leadership up 
to now. Japan’s strong willingness will need to continue to be a driving force if EANET 
is to remain the most formal and concrete collective action among various regional 
cooperative mechanisms. In addition to Japanese structural leadership, Japanese 
directional leadership succeeded in igniting the regional discussions on acid deposition in 
the first phase, it was reduced at the second preparatory phase due to potential problems 
regarding Japanese-led technical guidance. During the final regular phase, Japan has 
                                                          
60 Informal discussions with a Japanese delegate to the Twelfth Intergovernmental Meeting in 
November 2010, Niigata, Japan.  
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relaxed its instrumental leadership through its own initiative in order to better share 
ownership with other member countries. Some member countries, particularly China, 
have objected to the Japanese instrumental leadership regarding the issue of extension of 
EANET. Such challenges to Japanese directional and instrumental leadership have made 
Japan more cautious in exerting its political leadership. However, no other member 
country has stepped up to the plate with meaningful financial support for this issue. This 
has created a considerable gap in the leadership of EANET, which is one of obstacles that 
EANET must overcome if it is to proceed to the next stage of regime creation so as to 
produce visible outcomes in both institutional and environmental terms.  
 
Knowledge 
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that a region will develop more 
formal and more concrete forms of collective action if participating countries in its 
environmental cooperation efforts develop greater commonly shared knowledge. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, this research emphasizes the development of scientific 
knowledge rather than the development of epistemic communities because of the 
characteristics of regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia, 
principally its focus on science without the development of policy options by scientists.   
Japan had developed research on acid deposition between 1868 and 1920 that was 
conducted by foreign professors in Japan, but no syntheses of the environmental 
phenomena were made due to “sporadic, uncoordinated, and minimal” ideas from the 
West (Wilkening, 2004, p. 86). In the 1930s and 1940s, limnological research focusing 
on the chemical analysis of lake water with comprehensive field research was conducted 
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in Japan, but none of researchers at that time succeeded in making “a link between acidic 
inputs from the atmosphere and changes in lake chemistry” (Wilkening, 2004, p. 101).  
The field of air pollution research began in the late 1950s in Japan. The Air 
Pollution Society of Japan was established in 1959, and the number of articles on air 
pollution significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The journals of the Air Pollution 
Research group and the National Air Pollution Monitoring Network (NAPMN) were 
founded in 1965 and spurred further research. Scientists found tree decline in the Kanto 
Plane surrounding Tokyo in the 1970s, and the Environment Agency of Japan started a 
survey on wet air pollution in the Kanto region in 1975. Wilkening argues that before the 
1970s, however, “Japan lay completely outside the mainstream of this international 
activity on acid rain” (Wilkening, 2004, p. 144).61  
One of the reasons for the late development of research regarding acid deposition 
in Japan is that Japanese scientists could not get funding without the establishment of law 
about environmental problems.62 Wilkening argues that the environmental “law was the 
first in Japan to establish general principals and objectives for overall environmental 
policy and to provide a legal mechanism for their implementation” (Wilkening, 2004, p. 
127). As a key Japanese scientist, Dr. Hajime Akimoto, stated, “In Japan, without law, no 
research fund is provided. It is contrasting that no law is created without research in the 
U.S. In Japan, science has little power. Laws are made ahead of science. This is quite 
state-centric.”63 As these statements indicate, it is hard for Japanese scientists to get 
                                                          
61 The international literature regarding acid rain in China appeared in the 1980s, which was 
much later in than Japan (Larssen et al., 2006).  
62Interview with Director General of the Network Center of EANET on February 8, 2011. 
63 Interview with Dr. Akimoto, Director General of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research 
(ACAP), on Feb. 8, 2011.  
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money from even a general research fund or from their government, including the 
Ministry of Environment, because research funds in Japan are available only when legal 
measures are developed.  
Even though research capacity has spread to local research institutes, it is an 
undeniable fact that the “national-level researchers remained the scientific leaders” 
(Wilkening, 2004, p. 148). The national-level researchers are more reliant on 
governmental funding to research a phenomenon, and the Japanese government is 
reluctant to provide funding before certain laws are established. Thus, the development of 
measures to control sulphur dioxide emissions in Japan, as outlined in Table 3.9, can be a 
key to understanding why Japanese researchers started to recognize acid deposition only 
in the early 1970s. 
Table 3.9 
Measures to Control Sulphur Dioxide Emissions in Japan 
 
YEAR Description 
1962 Establishment of the Law Concerning the Regulation of Smoke and Soot 
Emissions and Other Measures 
1968 Establishment of the Air Pollution Control Law 
1969 Establishment of the Environmental Quality Standards concerning SOx 
1970 Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (introduction of the K-value 
regulation for each designated area) 
1973 Revision of the Environmental Quality Standards on sulfur dioxide 
1974 Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (introduction of Total Mass 
Emission Control) 
1976 Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (revision of the emission 
standards) 
Note: The information presented in this table was provided by a Japanese delegate to EANET in 
an interview on February 8, 2011. 
 
As Table 3.9 shows, the first Japanese law passed to control air pollution was 
enacted in the 1960s. With the legal infrastructure in place, Japan started to pay attention 
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to the possible causes of acid rain in the mid-1980s (Wilkening, 2004, p. 140). In 1983, 
Japan started its National Acid Deposition Survey with 14 national monitoring stations 
through the Acid Deposition Prevention Committee, established by the Environment 
Agency of Japan. The committee consisted of experts in air pollution, soil/vegetation, and 
inland water, and it has extended the number of monitoring sites and conducted research 
on acid deposition to clarify the actual condition and influence of acid deposition in Japan. 
The monitoring results between 1983 and 2002 were summed up in the “General Report 
about Acid Deposition Research” in 2004, which noted that acid depositions in Japan 
were not observed to be as high as those in Europe and the United States (Ministry of 
Environment of Japan, 2009).  
The results of Japan’s domestic research were identical to the reports of the 
Expert Meetings of EANET in the organization’s early years. At the First Expert Meeting 
of EANET in 1993, participants agreed that acid deposition would cause adverse effects 
and become a critical problem in some areas in the future, considering the expanding 
economies in the region, even though evidence of its effects had not yet been determined 
(EANET, 1993). Monitoring results over the following 2 decades have also shown only 
low impact of acid deposition in East Asia.  
The key outcomes of EANET research activities have also been published in two 
periodic reports on the state of acid deposition in East Asia, in 2006 and 2011. EANET 
concludes that acid deposition is still common in East Asia, but has not yet had a 
significant impact on ecological systems in the region. The first Periodic Report on the 
State of Acid Deposition EANET in 2006, based on its monitoring activities between 2000 
and 2004, stated that no clear adverse ecological impacts had been found. For impacts on 
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soil, the report points out that little evidence of acid deposition causing changes in soils 
had been observed because it had been only a few years since EANET began soil 
monitoring. For impacts on vegetation, the report asserted that there had been no report of 
data that clearly blamed acid deposition for the deterioration of tree conditions, even 
though trees in Russia showed some symptoms of decline.64 Although it had been alleged 
that high ozone concentrations may be harmful to plants, the report acknowledged that 
this issue could not be verified through EANET activities because they had not conducted 
specific observations on ozone effects. Regarding lakes and rivers, the report mentioned 
that no clear trend in acidic values was observed in the aquatic environments in the 
region. Finally, the report concluded its findings on the impacts of acid deposition as 
follows: 
Some EANET data revealed high values of sulfate and nitrate loadings from the 
atmosphere, as well as low pH precipitation. The effects on vegetation and aquatic 
life are still inconclusive, however, so more coordinated studies are needed. Based 
on previous studies conducted in different areas, the ecological impacts of acid 
deposition, especially on forest tree species and aquatic organisms, could not be 
determined or were not observed with the short observation period. (EANET, 
2006a, p. 25)  
 
In 2011, the most recent periodic report of the EANET also stated that: 
EANET’s monitoring work has demonstrated that acid rain remains prevalent 
across East Asia. The annual average pH of rainwater is lower than 5.0 (the 
threshold for acid rain) at 60% of monitoring sites, and values of less than 4.6 
have been recorded in several locations. Sulphuric acid (H2SO4) remains the 
primary contributor to acid rain across the region . . . [and] contribution of nitric 
acid (HNO3) to acid rain is almost equal to that of sulphuric acid. Despite 
continued acidification in the region, the impact of acid deposition on eco-system 
functions still appears limited. No decline in tree growth or in the number of 
                                                          
64 Despite forest decline in some areas of China due to the direct effects of SO2, effects on forests 
are much less certain in China because “few reports are made about widespread damage in more 
remote areas,” and “scientists have stated that soil acidification is likely to have negative effects 
on forest growth in China” in the future (Larssen, 2006, p. 422).  
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species in understory vegetation has been observed during monitoring, and overall 
forest functions and structures apparently remain sound. (EANET, 2011d, p. ii) 
 
Whereas some sites in Malaysia, China (Chongqing), Indonesia, the ROK, and Japan had 
recorded 5-year (2005-2009) average rainwater pH values lower than 4.6, other sites in 
China (Xi’an) and Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar) had recorded average rainwater pH values 
higher than 6.0 due to “increased contribution of alkaline species such as ammonia (NH3) 
from agriculture and calcium carbonate in soil dust, respectively” (EANET, 2011d, iv).  
Despite no evidence of significant damage from acid deposition at that time, the 
report pointed out that “the influence of acid deposition could become obvious in the 
future if we continue to have acid depositions as it is, because the influence of acid 
depositions to soil/vegetation and land water is considered to appear after long term 
period” (Ministry of Environment Japan, 2009, p. 9). Along this line of thought, EANET 
acknowledged acid deposition as one of several future problems, and it regarded 
monitoring as a way of preparing for those problems. As it noted, “Considering the 
significance of possible future problems regarding acid deposition, it becomes 
increasingly important to obtain accurate and precise data on acid deposition” (EANET, 
2000a, p. 1). 
Probably due to this inconclusive state of acid deposition in East Asia, EANET 
has not provided precise analysis of acid deposition in this region and only vindicated the 
need for “further amplification.” According to the Second Periodic Report,  
Although the EANET has accumulated ten-year record at most, the length of 
period does not suffice for temporal trend analysis because the wet deposition has 
a number of factors most of which are quite variable with time, the existing time 
trend could be concealed unlike gas and aerosol species. This would stress the 
significance of a long-term high-quality monitoring is indispensable to detect 
some symptoms at all for elimination and mitigation of potential impacts. . . The 
data trend generated over the years of monitoring in the ecological stations across 
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the EANET participating countries suggests possible acidification or nitrogen 
saturation in several sites. There is, however, a need to isolate other existing 
environmental conditions that may have contributed to such an observation. . . 
The pH of water in five inland aquatic systems significantly decreased from 2000 
to 2009. The accumulated data for the last years suggested the possible 
acidification or nitrogen saturation of the inland ecosystems in several EANET 
sites. But just like in the cases of the forest soil and vegetation, some other factors 
that can bring about nitrogen saturation in inland waters need further 
amplification. (EANET, 2011a, pp. 2-3) 
 
Given that one of the objectives of EANET is to “create a common understanding of the 
status of acid deposition problems in East Asia” (EANET, 2010b), it is uncertain whether 
this weak scientific conclusion can help EANET achieve that objective in the near future. 
As Dimitrov argues, a key factor in international policymaking is knowledge about 
transboundary consequences of an environmental problem rather than just the extent and 
causes of the problem. Considering that the position of the Federal Republic of Germany 
“dramatically changed after the release of its first comprehensive forest survey in 1982” 
(Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, p. 98), it seems that East Asia will need greater evidence 
of the environmental impact and consequences of acid deposition in East Asia to justify 
regional environmental cooperation.  
East Asian countries seem little motivated to exert their political leadership given 
this “lack of an urgent ecological imperative” (Komori, 2010, p. 18). When the Japanese 
government, particularly the Environment Agency of Japan, decided to pay more 
attention to the regional implications of European experiences after Agenda 21 of the 
1992 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, it 
asked Japanese scientists to identify the most appropriate issue on which Japan could 
initiate regional environmental cooperation. The accumulation of scientific knowledge in 
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Japan in the 1970s and 1980s had given Japan the confidence to proceed to regional 
environmental regime creation.  
It is argued by a Japanese scientist that the Japanese government was informed by 
its scientists that acidification was not a serious threat to this region due to the 
naturalization and diversity of its forests, which are quite different from Europe’s. The 
former are more diverse than the latter, as Europe’s forests are dominated by very similar 
kinds of trees that are very sensitive to acidity.65 Ironically, the Japanese government 
pushed the issue of acid deposition to be the regional agenda precisely because of these 
characteristics of acid deposition in East Asia, thinking it would be easier for East Asia to 
begin regional environmental cooperation by addressing a less sensitive and non-urgent 
issue. Indeed, Korean participants in the Intergovernmental Meetings asserted that if the 
acidification issue had generated intensive concerns regarding responsibility and 
regulations, other countries might have not agreed on Japan’s initiative to create EANET 
in the first place.66  
Therefore, since EANET was established, Japan’s scientific knowledge has been 
neither challenged nor strengthened by EANET research activities. The state of 
knowledge has remained elusive, requiring further research. For around 2 decades, 
regional scholars have not discovered any commonly shared significant adverse 
consequences of acid deposition in East Asia, and Komori argues that “governments’ 
commitment to the acid rain problem is primarily limited to the enhancement of scientific 
cooperation” due to “the lack of an urgent ecological imperative” (2010, p. 18).  
 
                                                          
65 Interview with Dr. Akimoto, Director General of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research (ACA) 
on February 8, 2011.  
66 This statement was frequently made by Korean interviewees. 
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Socialization 
This section tests Hypothesis 3, which is that participating countries in regional 
environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective 
action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a 
process of socialization.  Through the adaptation process of socialization, international 
actors can change their behaviors in response to new events, but they do so without 
fundamental changes in their beliefs about underlying values and causal mechanisms. In 
comparison, the learning process of socialization can produce more significant behavioral 
changes, as international actors can raise questions on fundamental and implicit theories 
and have a chance to examine their original values.    
As mentioned in chapter 1, to determine which of these two processes of 
socialization the participating countries have engaged in, this chapter assesses the 
participation patterns of member countries in international meetings of EANET in terms 
of the two criteria. First, this section investigates whether the participation of countries in 
the region has been prompted by not intrinsic but indirect concerns about particular 
transboundary air pollution issues. It is considered that countries have engaged in the 
adaptation process of socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to 
participate in regional environmental cooperation on the acid rain issue; it is considered 
that countries have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found 
intrinsic motivations for their regional cooperation.  
Second, this section also analyzes the participation patterns of delegates to 
international meetings as a proxy for socialization. Given that the learning process of 
socialization typically requires extended exposure to the expected norms, values, and 
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practices, it is considered that delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation 
process of socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings 
for only a short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning 
process of socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an 
extended period in a consistent manner.  
For the first criteria of the participation patterns, the following sections examine 
the external and internal contexts of East Asia to illustrate processes of socialization. 
Thus, it is helpful to examine the external environment of international negotiations in the 
early 1990s, such as Europeans’ responses to transboundary pollution issues, in order to 
understand the socialization processes of Northeast Asian countries.  
Japan, the initiator of EANET but a novice in regional environmental cooperation, 
took the adaptation process rather than learning process in the early years of EANET 
because of both its external and internal political environment rather than because of its 
intrinsic concerns over acid rain issues. Japan recognized regional environmental 
cooperation could be a means to improve its international status through leading regional 
cooperation. Other countries, particularly China and the ROK, also took the adaptation 
process, as they recognized joining the EANET as their chance to achieve other 
objectives than solely focusing on acid deposition issues in East Asia. 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment had awakened global concerns on transboundary pollution.67 It 
stated that although each nation has “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
                                                          
67 In terms of international law, the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and 
Canada is known as the starting point in the evolution of transnational environmental dispute 
resolution. For the historical development of international environmental law from classical 
dispute resolution based on the principle of territorial sovereignty to multi-state regulation based 
on conservation and prevention ethics, see Sand, 2007. 
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pursuant to their own environmental policies,” it also has “the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”68 As shown above, 
even though various domestic measures were taken to respond to air pollution problems, 
it was not until the 1990s that Japan, the initiator of EANET, began regional initiatives. 
The Agenda 21 of the 1992 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development explicitly stated that successful European experiences on 
tackling acid rain should be shared with other regions of the world.  
Japan had confidence in the issue of acid deposition as a subject of regional 
environmental cooperation due to its scientific accumulation over several decades, as 
discussed in the knowledge section above. At the same time, the success of the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) in 1979 provided 
Japan with more confidence about the successful development of regional environmental 
cooperation on transboundary air pollution issues. These incidents show that Japan tried 
to adapt to the international surroundings that emphasized environmental concerns and 
regional cooperation to deal with transboundary environmental problems. 
Yet given the historical context of East Asia, Japan’s will and confidence seems 
to have yielded suspicion among other countries in the region as to Japan’s political 
motivations for creating a regional network. These suspicious neighboring countries did 
not seem to initially welcome Japan’s initiative for regional environmental cooperation, 
although both China and the ROK adapted themselves to the international surroundings 
                                                          
68Available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 
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for boosting regional cooperation and viewed joining the EANET as a means to achieve 
other ends of their own.  
As mentioned above, even though China did not accept any responsibility for its 
contribution to causing transboundary acid rain in the region, it “acknowledged in1992 
that its pollution might have contributed to the transboundary problem” (Komori, 2010, p. 
17). It is argued by Korean delegates that China had changed its position because of 
Japan’s investment in building the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental 
Protection in China, which was established in 1992.69 Also, when China decided to 
participate in the network not as an observer party but as a full member of EANET in 
1998, it seemed like a diplomatic gift at the 1998 summit meeting between China and 
Japan. 
Korean participants claimed that the ROK also agreed to participate in EANET in 
exchange for Japan’s agreement on the ROK’s initiative for NEASPEC (North-East Asia 
Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation). NEASPEC was the first 
comprehensive regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia among six member 
countries and which, unlike EANET is an issue-specific regional cooperative initiative, as 
discussed in chapter 2. The NEASPEC was created by the Korean government in 1992 to 
create a role for the ROK as an international and regional actor through initiating the 
regional environmental cooperation.  
Thus, it can be argued that all three countries of Japan, China, and the ROK have 
taken the adaptation process of socialization because the creation of EANET was based 
                                                          
69 This might be regarded as a structural leadership of Japan through providing China with the 
economic incentives. However, unlike the hegemonic powers, Japan was not coercive because of 
both historical responsibilities for regional air pollution and its colonialization in East Asia. This 
is why Japanese leadership cannot be regarded as a structural leadership.  
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not primarily on an environmental concern of these countries, but rather by their 
particular political and practical concerns. Participation in EANET activities was a means 
for each to achieve other objectives than an end to the acid deposition issue itself. Japan’s 
motive for initiating this regional environmental initiative was mostly the request of the 
international community to spread the successful European experience and the Japanese 
willingness to become a responsible international actor as befitting its economic 
superpower status. It is difficult to assert that other member countries, particularly China 
and the ROK, have changed their fundamental causal understanding of acid deposition. 
Rather, both China and the ROK have found their own political reasons to participate in 
EANET. No learning process of socialization has been observed in the participation of 
these three member countries. 
Along with these external international negotiation circumstances in Europe and 
Northeast Asia, the participation patterns of delegates to the international meetings of 
EANET also show the adaptation processes of socialization. Bureaucratic rotation 
systems in East Asia have led countries to take the adaptation process rather than learning 
process. Bureaucratic systems in East Asia allow public officers to hold the same position 
for only a limited time in order to prevent corruption and increase creativity. The ROK 
usually rotates the positions of its public officials every year or at most every 1.5 years, 
and Japan uses a similar rotation with a little more flexibility in the duration of positions, 
but still at most every 2 years. China seems to allow public officials to stay a little longer 
than do the ROK and Japan.  
Appendix II, which contains the list of delegates to the Intergovernmental 
Meetings of EANET between 2001 and 2010, shows these patterns of participation by 
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delegates. Most member countries have changed their delegates to the Intergovernmental 
Meetings very frequently. One Japanese delegate to the EANET meetings pointed out 
one of the difficulties that EANET has been facing, noting that “a biggest problem for 
Japanese dialogue with Korea is that Korean bureaucracy is changing too frequently. 
Thus very frequently, counterparts have to suspend the on-going discussions and start 
from explanation on previous history/discussions to Korean newcomers.”70 
There are two groups of delegates to these meetings: (a) governmental officials, 
mostly from ministries of the environment and (b) scientists, mostly from national 
research centers and universities. The bureaucratic rotation system has been directly 
applied to governmental officials, and the officials of most member countries have 
changed at least every 2 or 3 years.  
The ROK tends to send one or two governmental officials from the Ministry of 
Environment to the Intergovernmental Meetings, who change almost every year. Jae-
Moon Yang, Deputy Director of the Air Quality Policy Division in the Ministry of 
Environment, attended three consecutive IG meetings between 2003 and 2005, the only 
Korean governmental official who remained in the group of Korea delegates for more 
than 2 years. Jae-Hyun Lee, Director of the Air Quality Policy Division in the Ministry of 
Environment, attended the IG6 in 2004 and came back to the IG12. As mentioned in the 
previous discussion of EANET’s achievements, the high-level meetings have enhanced 
the formal form of collective action of EANET member countries. Director General 
Lee’s participation also showed how seriously and formally the Korean government 
treated the EANET and the 2010 Instrument. However, the high-level officials 
                                                          
70 Interview with Professor Katsunori Suzuki on April 23, 2010. He was one of founding 
members of EANET while working at the Japanese Environmental Agency.  
 
  
141 
 
participated in the IG12 Intergovernmental Meeting just for a short period of time to read 
their scripts to represent their governments regarding the Instrument. It is hard to imagine 
that his second visit to the Intergovernmental Meetings might have led him to the 
learning process of socialization. Of course, during his rotation within the Ministry of 
Environment, he must have become familiar with various environmental concerns of the 
Korean government. At the same time, the 6-year gap and the difference in his role as an 
EANET delegate between his two visits undoubtedly affected his learning process 
regarding the changing EANET issues and objectives.  
Many Japanese governmental officials from the Ministry of Environment and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have changed every year. Japan has sent three to five 
delegates in total to each Intergovernmental Meeting. Only a few officials attended more 
than two Intergovernmental meetings over 10 years. Reiko Sodeno, Deputy Director of 
the Global Environmental Issues Division of the Ministry of the Environment, attended 
three consecutive meetings between 2006 and 2008, and Toshihisa Kato, an official of 
the Global Environment Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attended four 
consecutive meetings between 2007 and 2010. One may wonder whether the 1-year 
difference in Japan’s pattern of rotation would make a difference in the amount of 
learning that took place.  
China shows a pattern similar to Japan’s. China has tended to send two to five 
delegates in total to the Intergovernmental Meetings annually. Among them, 
governmental officials from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the former State 
Environmental Protection Administration of China, have changed every year or two. 
Only one governmental official attended more than two Intergovernmental Meetings. 
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Fang Li, the Deputy Director of the Division of General Affairs in the Department of 
International Cooperation at the State Environmental Protection Administration of China, 
attended three consecutive IG meetings between 2003 and 2005. Other officials have 
attended at most two IG meetings.  
Lao PDR, Russia, and Thailand are exceptions to this pattern of participation. Lao 
PDR has sent two governmental officials from the Science Technology and Environment 
Agency (STEA) between 2003 and 2006, and from the Water Resources and 
Environment Administration since 2007. One delegate, Sisouphanh Luangrath, has 
participated in a consistent manner, attending six of eight meetings. Russia has also 
tended to send the same delegates to the IG meetings. The Russian Federal Service for 
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring in the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment has sent two officials to the IG meetings, and one delegate, Veronika 
Ginzburg, has participated in eight IG meetings over 10 years. Thailand has sent three or 
four governmental officials from the Pollution Control Department in Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment, and one delegate, Supat Wangwongwatana, participated in 
all the IG meetings between 2001 and 2010. This consistency is not common among the 
other 10 member countries.  
In order to overcome difficulties that have originated from the bureaucratic 
rotation system, countries have adopted various organizational measures. For example, 
one of the Korean governmental officials stated that the transfer of duties has been 
systemized within the Ministry of Environment to create some consistency despite the 
annual change of positions.71 All predecessors are required to hand over their job 
                                                          
71 Interview with Gyu Il Kim, Deputy Director of the Climate and Air Quality Policy Division at 
the Ministry of Environment in the ROK on December 23, 2010. 
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description for the position, including the development and challenges that they have 
experienced. Yet this transfer process might also lead governmental officials to stick to 
their predecessors’ learning and understanding of the cooperative mechanisms and not 
give successors much time to think critically on their own regarding the participation of 
their countries in the international meetings or to play different and more constructive 
roles for the international cooperative mechanisms. The job descriptions prepared by the 
predecessors for succeeding officials might become a set of instructions or directions for 
participation of new officials in the international meetings.  
In general, it can be assumed that 1- or 2-year terms would be too short for the 
governmental officials to take the learning process of socialization through a critical 
assessment of their countries’ participation in and contribution to the EANET activities. 
This can make the legacy of previous meetings, such as controversial points or 
competitiveness among member countries, continue rather than being solved due to the 
“instructions” passed by the predecessors. Participants might be so busy with adapting to 
the international settings and the national participation trends. As a result, few behavioral 
changes can be driven through the adaptation process of socialization.  
The other group of delegates to the Intergovernmental Meetings has consisted of 
scientists. Unlike the frequent changes in national delegates from ministries of 
environment, scientist delegates have engaged in the Intergovernmental Meetings as well 
as SAC meetings in a more consistent manner. China has sent at least one scientist 
delegate to the Intergovernmental Meetings from national research centers such as the 
China National Environmental Monitoring Center (CNEMC) and Chinese Research 
Academy of Environmental Sciences (CRAES) since 2004. Wang Ruibin, Director of the 
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Department of Air Quality Monitoring in the CNEMC, attended four Intergovernmental 
Meetings over 10 years. Moreover, China has sent him to the SAC meetings eight times 
over 10 years along with relatively new researchers from CNEMC.  
The ROK has sent one or two scientist delegates to Intergovernmental Meetings 
from universities and national research centers. A Korean scientist delegate, Seog-Yeon 
Cho, a professor at the Environmental and Civil Engineering Division of Inha University, 
has attended seven Intergovernmental Meetings over 10 years and ten consecutive SAC 
meetings. The other SAC participant from the ROK, Jin-Seok Han, Director of the 
Atmospheric Chemistry Division of the National Institute of Environmental Research 
(NIER), was also present at six SAC meetings between 2001 and 2010.   
Japan has not sent any scientist delegates to the Intergovernmental Meetings, but 
has sent same three scientists to the SAC meetings for 10 years. Unlike other member 
countries that send governmental officials mostly from ministries of the environment, 
Japan has sent at least one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs every year rather 
than having scientists represent Japan at the IG meetings. In addition, Japan began to 
send specialists in international environmental negotiations. Norichika Kanie, Associate 
Professor at the Department of Decision Science and Technology of the Tokyo Institute 
of Technology, and Yukari Takamura, Professor of Law at Ryukoku University, have 
joined the group of Japanese delegates to the IG meetings since 2007. The greater 
participation of the MOFA in Japan and the professionals in international negotiations 
indicate that Japan has paid considerable attention to structuring EANET as an 
international institution rather than merely focusing on joint monitoring like other 
participating countries.     
 
  
145 
 
Japan has sent at least three scientists to the SAC meetings every year, and the 
three key scientists have participated in SAC meetings very consistently. Dr. Hajime 
Akimoto attended 8 SAC meetings, Tomoyuki Hakamata 7 SAC meetings, and Hiroshi 
Hara 10 consecutive SAC meetings. The changes in their affiliations have not affected 
their attendance, which shows that the Japanese government has a preference for relying 
on particular scientists rather than certain research institutes for the advisory mission for 
EANET.  
The more consistent participation patterns of scientist delegates to the IG 
meetings and SAC meetings show that participating scientists have had enough time to 
engage in the learning processes of socialization than have governmental officials. Even 
though the governing body is the Intergovernmental Meeting and the national focal 
points72 of EANET are officials from ministries of environment, these scientist delegates 
have played the role of key resource persons to consult with the governmental officials 
who newly join the EANET delegates. They thus have provided new delegates with their 
understanding of other countries’ intentions on specific occasions as well as changes in 
and struggles of EANET activities. For example, the ROK started to change its attitude 
toward the EANET from being passive to being more active in 2009. According to one of 
the Korean delegates to the IG 12, 
It is a transition period for all three countries [China, Japan and the ROK]. China 
and the ROK have been opposing to the development of EANET. However, in 
2009, the Korean attitude changed to be more prospective for EANET, and thus 
China started to take a wait-and-see attitude rather than opposition. In fact, the 
interests in transboundary pollution have been increased due to the limitations of 
domestic measures in improving environmental quality. Therefore, countries in 
the region seem to recognize that they need to develop more active international 
                                                          
72 For the list of National Focal Points of EANET, see http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/nfp.html.  
 
  
146 
 
cooperation rather than simply sharing technology and discussing compensation 
for the environmental degradation.73   
 
However, it is unclear whether the communication among governmental official 
delegates and scientist delegates of member countries has been substantial. To some 
extent, it is true that both scientist delegates and political delegates from the same country 
within East Asia communicate with each other because the political delegates might 
acknowledge the professional expertise of scientist delegates based on their longer terms 
of service and the scientific focus of the cooperative mechanisms. However, the 
adaptation processes of the governmental official delegates, given their short terms of 
service in their relevant positions because of bureaucratic rotation systems, have been 
affected by the limited interaction with scientist delegates from other countries as well as 
with their national scientist delegates. 
In addition to the limited communication between delegates from the same 
member countries, the communication and interaction with delegates from other 
countries might have been too limited to influence or be influenced by other delegates, 
particularly political delegates, from other countries. This lack of channels of 
communication between the two groups of international delegates has led to little 
learning process of socialization. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and 
socialization have affected extent of collective action regarding acid deposition. EANET 
                                                          
73 Interview with Lim-Seok Chang on August 17, 2009 at the National Institute of Environmental 
Research in ROK. 
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has developed into the most formal and concrete collective action among the various 
regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in which Northeast Asian countries have 
participated. It concludes that political leadership is the only variable positively 
associated with this highly formal and concrete collective action. Japan’s much greater 
financial contributions to the EANET budget have enabled EANET to enhance capacity 
building and the quality of monitoring data in a practical sense. Paradoxically, however, 
the dominant structural leadership of the Japanese government also has become an 
obstacle to EANET’s movement toward legally binding agreements.   
The lack of shared and new scientific knowledge regarding acid deposition among 
the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation process of socialization that they 
have taken fail to show that EANET’s highly formal and concrete form and degree of 
collective action are attributable to shared scientific knowledge and the learning process 
of socialization. This chapter does not support the second hypothesis that the greater the 
commonly shared knowledge among participating countries in regional environmental 
cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action 
found in the region. The adaptation process of socialization also does not seem to support 
the third hypothesis that participating countries in regional environmental cooperation 
efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional 
cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization.   
However, the examination of these last two variables has not been in vain because 
it reveals the social mechanisms between these variables to some extent and helps explain 
why EANET has not advanced to become a legally binding cooperative mechanism. As 
socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay between sets of 
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independent variables, this study intended to examine the hypothesized social mechanism 
between the other variables of political leadership and knowledge, which is that the 
stronger the political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the 
more likely participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of 
socialization and thereby create the most formal and concrete modes of collective action.   
First, the hypothesized social mechanism between political leadership and shared 
scientific knowledge is half-proven. Strong political leadership alone did not lead 
participating countries to engage in the learning process of socialization, and the lack of 
shared scientific knowledge can contribute to the adaptation process of socialization 
among participants in EANET activities. 
Second, the lack of shared and new scientific knowledge can explain the other 
side of the coin that EANET has not proceeded to develop a legally binding regime 
despite its considerable efforts for 2 decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese 
scholars had accumulated enough knowledge concerning the extent and causes of acid 
deposition to lead the Environment Agency of Japan to choose acid deposition as the 
most appropriate issue in which Japan could initiate regional environmental cooperation. 
However, scholars have not discovered the significant adverse consequences of acid 
deposition that might motivate member countries to take firm policy initiatives. The lack 
of proven negative impacts of acid deposition has made member countries reluctant to 
push for institutional development into a more regulatory regime.  
Regarding socialization, external pressures for developing regional environmental 
cooperation in East Asia and internal organizational characteristics have led the 
participating countries in EANET to take the adaptation process of socialization. 
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Responding to those external pressures, all three of the countries of China, Japan, and the 
ROK have found their own political reasons to create and participate in EANET activities 
rather than finding a clear need for solving adverse environmental impacts of acid 
deposition. Japan developed its willingness to initiate a regional cooperative mechanism 
in order to become a responsible international actor. China seemed to have achieved what 
might be considered side payments for participation in the EANET monitoring activities, 
and the ROK seemed to have gained Japanese participation in a ROK-initiated 
cooperative mechanism, NEASPEC, through pledging to participate in EANET.  
Along with these political calculations, the East Asian countries also have been 
led to take the adaptation process of socialization by their bureaucratic rotation systems, 
which allow governmental officials to serve in a particular position within their 
organizations for only a limited number of years. As a result, governmental officials are 
too busy adapting themselves to the national participation patterns through understanding 
“instructions” passed by the predecessors to do much independent thinking or learning on 
their own. This adaptation process has been strengthened by a lack of communication 
between political delegates and science delegates from the same country and between 
delegates from other countries.  
Yet the lack of new scientific knowledge and the adaptation rather than learning 
process of socialization among participating countries cannot explain why EANET has 
developed into the most formal and concrete collective action among regional 
environmental cooperative mechanisms. However, they can help explain why EANET 
has been stuck in the UNEP’s second category over the course of 2 decades of 
cooperation efforts regarding transboundary acidification issues.  
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CHAPTER 4 
TRIPARTITE DIRECTOR GENERAL MEETING (TDGM) ON DUST AND 
SANDSTORMS (DSS) 
 
Picture 4.1. Koreans wear dust masks in Seoul on March 19, 2011 after the announcement of the 
national yellow dust advisory. Adapted from Yonhap News Agency. 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/20/52/0301000000AEN20110320000400315F.
HTML.  
 
Introduction 
Seasonal Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) carry fine particulate matter, aerosols, 
ozone, and heavy metals through southeasterly wind and cause significantly negative 
consequences on human health (In & Park, 2003). To deal with DSS, China, Japan, and 
the ROK initiated joint research under the Tripartite Director General Meeting (TDGM) 
on Dust and Sandstorms at the Tripartite Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 
2007. Mongolia has participated in working group meetings since the 2009 ad hoc 
working group meeting in Shenyang, China. 
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The Korean government, as the initiator, points out three important reasons for the 
creation of this Joint Research on DSS (MOEK, 2007c). First, even though the joint 
research program is a research-oriented cooperative body, it is the first governmental-
level, multilateral cooperative mechanism in Northeast Asia agreed upon at the 
ministerial (TEMM) and directors-general level (TDGM). Thus, this body can garner 
higher-level political commitments from each government. Second, the Joint Research 
program can be an important channel for policy dialog among governments and experts. 
Third, the Joint Research program is expected to play the role of an incubator that helps 
the region boost its multilateral cooperative mechanisms for DSS monitoring and 
construct a network for early warning and forecasting.   
Despite the Korean government’s positive contributions to creating formal 
regional cooperation on DSS through TDGM, a qualitative analysis of the data indicates 
that TDGM has been working as a formal cooperative mechanism through the 
involvement of ministries of environment of the three countries and agreement on the 
Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee and the Working Groups for Joint 
Research on DSS, but it has neither developed concrete obligations that participating 
countries are required to fulfill nor reached any legally binding agreements. Thus, it is 
argued that TDGM has largely been a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation 
and useful measurement data for the region as TDGM has produced few research 
outcomes that would lead participating countries of the region to fashion any practical 
policies to deal with environmental degradation caused by DSS. 
Of the three variables discussed in the hypotheses—political leadership, scientific 
knowledge, and socialization—the only variable positively associated with the highly 
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formal collective action is political leadership. The moderate but dominant structural 
leadership by the Korean government has enabled participating countries in the region to 
structure their cooperation. The ROK’s role as the only financial contributor to the 
TDGM has led China to participate in joint research through TDGM.  
Yet, the lack of shared scientific knowledge about DSS among the participating 
countries of TDGM and the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization in 
which they engage explain why TDGM remains in the UNEP’s second category of 
focusing on science without advancing to the highest category of legally binding 
cooperative mechanisms. Even though the Korean government expects the role of these 
regional efforts through TDGM to be an incubator for constructing a network for early 
warning and forecasting, as mentioned above, the organization’s joint research for half a 
decade in Northeast Asia has produced few broader effects or benefits, such as bringing 
about specific policy outcomes.  
In order to understand how TDGM has achieved the current extent of cooperation, 
this chapter investigates the roles played by political leadership, shared scientific 
knowledge, and the socialization processes. In the following sections, the background and 
development of regional cooperative mechanisms on DSS are examined. This is followed 
by a discussion of how the region has responded to its concerns about DSS through 
participation in TDGM activities.  
 
Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) 
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DSS74 occur when large quantities of dust and fine sand particles are blown away 
from the ground by strong winds. Dry, loose surfaces and strong, persistent winds are 
prerequisites for DSS. DSS arise when meteorological conditions and soil surface 
properties interact. Four types of climatic conditions are associated with DSS: cold waves, 
cyclone weather, atmospheric thermo-instability, and sharp changes in weather elements. 
The surface properties that are the most critical determinants of DSS are surface 
roughness length (highly related to land use and cover), soil texture, and moisture content 
(ADB, 2005, p. 64). According to ADB, “6.5 meters/second (m/s) is regarded as the 
threshold wind velocity to initiate a dust outbreak provided that the soil surface is dry” 
(ADB, 2005, p. 9). Dust storm strength is measured in terms of ground particle matter 
concentrations such as PM10 and dust height distributions from various remote sensors 
(Wang et al., 2011).  
DSS are transboundary environmental problems that have been globally observed.  
The Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer sensor on the Nimbus 7 satellite has identified 
the major dust source in the Northern Hemisphere as a broad “dust belt” extending from 
the west coast of North Africa through the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and into 
China (Wang et al., 2011, p. 6369).  It is known that North Africa is a source of dust 
deposition in Southern Europe and that Saharan dust is transported westward over the 
Atlantic Ocean and becomes the main source of dust in the world (UN, 2001). India, 
Pakistan, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula also contribute to global dust, as they bring 
about Arabian Sea dust deposition (UN, 2001).   
                                                          
74 Other terminology sometimes used to refer to DSS includes “Sand and Dust storms (SDS)” 
(Wang, Steinb, Draxlerc, Rosad, & Zhanga, 2011) and “yellow sand” (Jho & Lee, 2009). 
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DSS in Northeast Asia are “a phenomenon of wind-borne soil and mineral 
particles raised thousands of meters into the air in the arid and semi-arid regions inland 
China, such as the Takla Makan and Gobi deserts and the Loess Plateau” (MOEJ, 2008, p. 
2), which are in the “mid-latitude Desert Zone (N 40-45°E 90-120°)” (ADB, 2005, p. 9).  
 
Figure 4.1. DSS originating source areas. Adapted from “Dust and Sandstorms,” by MOEJ, 2008, 
p. 2. http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/dss/pamph/pdf/full.pdf  
 
 
Picture 4.2. Dust storms attacking a village near the Gobi Desert. Adapted from “Governing 
Trans-boundary Pollution in Northeast Asia,” by Yoon, 2013, p. 13.  
 
The ADB specifies that  
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the geographic area covered includes part of continental Asia (PRC, the Korean 
peninsula, and Mongolia) and the neighboring islands of Japan…. However, the wind and 
weather patterns of the DSS force may originate in the Russian Federation to the north 
and west and from Kazakhstan to the west of the PRC and Mongolia. The DSS impact 
may be felt in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in North America. 
(2005, p. 60) 
 
Moreover, satellite imagery and model calculations have shown that the North 
Pacific Ocean and the North American continent are influenced by DSS that originate in 
Northeast Asia and are carried by prevailing westerlies (Wang et al., 2011, p. 6368). A 
recent study concluded that “32% of total emitted dust…is suspended in the atmosphere 
or subject to long-range transport” (Li, Han, & Jhang, 2011, p. 3954). 75 It shows that 
“while dry deposition dominates total deposition of dust near source regions” such as 
North and Central China and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, “wet 
deposition plays a more important role in the intermediate pathway of dust transport and 
the far downwind areas,” including “northeast China, the Korean Peninsula, the west 
Pacific and Japan” (Li et al., 2011, p. 3962). 
The number of dust storms in China (Table 4.1) and Mongolia (Figure 4.2), two 
source countries in Northeast Asia, illustrate the increasing frequency of DSS. 
Table 4.1  
Record of Strong Dust Storms in China, 1950-2001  
                                                          
75 This study utilized a Regional Air Quality Model System (RAQMS) to “investigate the spatial 
and temporal distributions of PM10 concentration and soil dust aerosol over East Asia in March 
2010” (Li et al., 2011, p. 3954).  
Year(s) Average occurrence of DSS a year 
1950s 5 
1960s 8 
1970s 13 
1980s 14 
1990s 23 
2000 12 
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Note: Adapted from “Dragon Dust: Atmospheric Science and Cooperation on Desertification in 
the Asia and Pacific Region,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 6: 433-461, by Wilkening, 2006, p. 
438.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Number of dusty days in Mongolia. Adapted from “Analysis of Dust Storms 
Observed in Mongolia During 1937-1999,” Atmospheric Environment 37: 1401–1411, by 
Natsagdorja, Jugdera, & Chung, 2003, p. 1409.  
 
The increasing frequency of DSS with their transboundary characteristics has 
resulted in severe damage in Northeast Asia, including a few intense events that affected 
Northeast Asia considerably. The following provides a vivid illustration of the damage of 
some of these events: 
The DSS on 5 May 1993 directly affected 1.1 million square kilometers in the 
PRC, which resulted in human casualties (i.e., 85 deaths and 246 injuries) and 
destruction of 4,412 houses, 120,000 livestock, and 373,000 hectares of crop land. 
The direct economic cost of this DSS within the PRC alone was more than 
CNY550 million (about US$66 million at 2002 exchange rate). The two most 
severe DSS events in decades took place in March and April 2002. They swept 
across Mongolia and hit 18 provinces in the PRC, the Korean peninsula, and a 
large area of Japan. . . . The DSS in early April 2002 was so severe that Mongolia 
had to close its international airport in Ulaanbaatar for three days. Also, the 
Republic of Korea had to close their primary schools and cancel more than 40 
flights departing from Gimpo Airport in Seoul. Satellite images of DSS events . . . 
. have revealed that impacts of strong DSS are not limited to the region, but 
reached as far as North America across the Pacific Ocean. (ADB, 2005, p. 61) 
 
2001 32 
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The increasing frequency of DSS has also been observed in the ROK (Figure 4.3). 
Regarding effects of DSS, one study states that between US$ 3-5 billion of financial 
damage is incurred each year due to “respiratory & mucous membrane diseases, retarded 
growth of crops, difficulties in outdoor activities” caused by DSS in Korea (Kim, 2007). 
In addition, some Korean food processing industries and industries that use precision 
machines and electronics, both of which require clean conditions, have reported damages 
due to DSS contamination (Kim, 2007).76 
 
Figure 4.3. Number of dusty days in ROK. Adapted from Korea Meteorological Administration, 
2013. http://www.kma.go.kr/weather/asiandust/observday.jsp.  
 
The increasing frequency of DSS has been observed in Japan as well (Figure 4.4). 
The total number of days of DSS observation at 108 Japanese meteorological observation 
points “had rarely exceeded 300 days annually before the late 1980s in Japan,” but it has 
often exceeded 300 days per year since 1988 and reached “an especially high number of 
                                                          
76 In contrast, some studies argue that little evidence exists to prove that DSS causes damage to 
precision machinery and electronics.  
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recorded observations of approximately 700 to 1,200 days in three years from 2000 to 
2002” (MOEJ, 2006, pp. 1-2). High concentrations of atmospheric aerosols have been 
reported from various sites, although, compared to the ROK and China, Japan has 
observed low dust levels.  
 
Figure 4.4. Number of dusty days in Japan. Numbers represent the days when any station in Japan 
observed DSS between 1967 and 2009, targeting the 67 stations that had been active for the 
whole period. Adapted from Japan Meteorological Administration, 2013. 
http://www.data.kishou.go.jp/obs-env/cdrom/report/html/4_2_1.html  
 
 
 
Development of TDGM 
The Korean government took the initiative for this joint research program under 
TDGM based on its continuous bilateral efforts to deal with DSS concerns since the early 
1990s. At the summit meeting between China and the ROK in June 1994 in China, both 
governments first started to discuss DSS as one of the major topics on its agenda (MOEK, 
2007a, p. 5). Following this meeting, ministers of science and technology agreed in 
November 1996 to carry out the joint study on DSS, and the actual joint study was 
launched in 1997. Since then, various bilateral cooperative programs have been 
developed between China and the ROK to establish joint measurements of DSS and a 
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data sharing system.77 China and Japan have also developed a variety of bilateral 
cooperative programs to deal with DSS. Japan has implemented various Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) projects to combat desertification. ODA projects include 
support for water resource conservation, reforestation and forest conservation, 
agricultural development, capacity building and education, and research on 
desertification (MOEJ, 2000).   
Along with these bilateral efforts to combat DSS, international concerns about 
desertification started to lead the states in Northeast Asia to realize a need for creating 
regional cooperative mechanisms beyond bilateral cooperation in order to tackle DSS 
issues more efficiently. Since the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification78 
(UNCCD) was enacted in 1994, Northeast Asian countries have diversified their bilateral 
cooperative efforts, but at the same time they have strengthened their multilateral 
cooperation, as discussed below.  
Even though UNCCD was established in 1994 to stop the anthropogenic 
deforestation and desertification caused by excessive development through providing 
developing countries with financial and technical assistance, the international level 
discussions progressed from the early 1970s through the early 1990s. For example, under 
the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the first All-African 
Seminar on the Human Environment was convened in 1971 and “made specific 
recommendations for steps to be taken to combat the spread of deserts in Africa” 
(UNCOD, 1978). Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Desertification 
                                                          
77 For more information on bilateral cooperative programs between the ROK and China, and 
between the ROK and Mongolia, see Table 4.2.  
78 Desertification is defined as “the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the 
land, and can lead ultimately to desert-like conditions” (UNCOD, 1978). 
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(UNCOD) adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (PACD) in 1977 for all 
regions of the world, not only Africa. The PACD presented “a set of recommendations 
for initiating and sustaining a co-operative effort on the scale required to combat 
desertification” (UNCOD, 1978).  
Even so, in 1991 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concluded 
that the problem of land degradation had intensified despite several local examples of 
success. Thus, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, named desertification as one of the greatest 
challenges to sustainable development. As a result, the UNCCD was established in 1994 
at one of the Rio Conventions, along with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
It seems that these international discussions have educated the Northeast Asian 
countries about the existence and extent of the problem. Since UNCED, Northeast Asian 
countries have developed numerous bilateral cooperative mechanisms to tackle 
transboundary DSS issues. This bilateral cooperation has mainly focused on forestation 
on desert areas in China and Mongolia, both of which have been identified as source 
countries. In fact, the ROK has supported several plantation projects to plant trees for 
erosion control in China. Moreover, the ROK and China have conducted various joint 
research projects. For example, they conducted joint research on methods for combating 
desertification in Ulbanbuhe and Kubuchi between 1996 and 2002. This research studied 
sand dune fixation based on sand-carrying volume, aerial seeding based on coverage and 
growth rate, and selection of drought resistant trees based on survival and growth rates. 
Another joint research project in Dengkou conducted between 2002 and 2005 examined 
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tree selection and desertification control, focusing on soil amelioration and the selection 
of drought-resistant grass species. Joint research between the ROK and Mongolia has 
also studied sand dune fixation with straw and stone, vegetation establishment tests, and 
tree nurseries (J. Kim, 2007). Despite these impressive examples of the development of 
bilateral cooperation, bilateral initiatives have tended to be limited to some specific field 
and national boundary areas, even though DSS poses a transboundary environmental 
problem on a regional scale (ADB, 2005). In addition to bilateral cooperative programs, 
inspired by the international discussions on desertification at UNCCD, Northeast Asian 
countries have also created various multilateral research programs, including the joint 
project on Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (RETA 
6068) between 2003 and 2005, and Joint Research conducted under the Tripartite 
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms at the Tripartite 
Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 2007. Before discussing the development 
of TDGM, the following section considers international contributions made by 
international organizations to developing understanding DSS issues in the region between 
2003 and 2005.  
The RETA 6068 Project was collaboration between various international agencies 
and Northeast Asian countries that was designed to serve as a cornerstone for regional 
cooperation. The governments of China and Mongolia requested international assistance 
to tackle DSS in the early 2000s. In 2002, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved 
“the regional technical assistance for Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in 
Northeast Asia (RETA 6068, the Project) to support the establishment of a regional 
cooperation mechanism and framework to guide and coordinate the interventions to 
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combat DSS concerns” (ADB, 2006, p. 1). Since ADB was coordinated, the UNCCD 
Secretariat, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific 
(UNESCAP), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have partnered 
to process and implement this cooperative project.  
These three UN agencies drafted a project proposal seeking financial support 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a response to ADB’s request for regional 
technical assistance that originated as a concept paper in May 2002. As a result, RETA 
was financed by the ADB between 2003 and 200579 on a grant basis, with US$500,000 
funded by the Japanese government’s Japan Special Fund and US$500,000 by the GEF. 
To implement this project, the four participating governments—China, Japan, the ROK, 
and Mongolia—made in-kind contributions in the form of human resources, such as 
counterpart staff, professional services, and national experts, and of office facilities (ADB, 
2005; NEASPEC, 2009; MOEJ, 2008).  
The RETA 6068 Project was conceptualized as an entity that would produce a 
master plan that could guide regional collaborative activities for both the prevention and 
control of DSS in Northeast Asia. This regional master plan consisted of two components. 
The first component was intended to establish “a regional network for monitoring, early 
warning, and forecasting of DSS” through “strengthening the monitoring capacity in the 
two DSS source countries” (ADB, 2005, p. 6). The second component was designed to 
implement three activities: “(i) the selection of sites for nine demonstration projects . . . , 
(ii) the identification of best practices for the demonstration projects for DSS prevention 
                                                          
79 The Project was slated for completion by June 30, 2004; however, this date was extended to 
February 28, 2006 because of “(i) the postponement in project commencement due to the 
outbreak of SARS in 2003, and (ii) the requests for translation and publication of the Master Plan 
in the national language of all the four participating countries” (ADB, 2006, p. 4) 
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and control, and (iii) the development of an investment strategy including 
recommendations on sustainable financing mechanisms for the promotion and 
dissemination of best practices in addressing the causes of DSS” (ADB, 2005, p. 7).  
In 2005, ADB published the findings  of RETA in three volumes: Regional 
Master Plan for the Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia; 
Establishment of a Regional Monitoring and Early Warning Network for Dust and 
Sandstorms in Northeast Asia; and An Investment Strategy for the Prevention and 
Control of Dust and Sandstorms through Demonstration Projects. The Master Plan has 
been “endorsed by the governments of participating countries through various official 
statements including the Communiqué of the Tripartite Environment Minister Meeting” 
(ADB, 2006, p. 2). According to Jho and Lee, this project has been “meaningful in that it 
provided the basic framework for building the first regional cooperation scheme with the 
aim of countering yellow sand in Northeast Asia” (2009, p. 51).  
 In addition to the RETA project, several international meetings proved to be 
catalysts for the creation of TDGM, as shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Timeline of TDGM Creation 
Year Meetings Locations Theme 
December 2006 8th TEMM China 
Agreeing to create TDGM and 
Joint Research on DSS 
January 2007 7
th China-Japan-ROK 
Summit Meeting 
Philippines Recognizing DSS as a common 
issue in the region 
March 2007 1st TDGM ROK 
Agreeing to create 
organizational structure for the 
Joint Research 
September 
2007 
2nd TDGM Japan 
Agreeing on the Terms of 
Reference of the Steering 
Committee (SC) 
December 2007 9th TEMM Japan Finalizing members of the SC 
December 2008 1st SC Meeting Japan Agreeing on the Terms of 
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Reference of the Working 
Groups and Joint Research Plan 
for 2008-2010 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, China, Japan, and the ROK acknowledged the urgency of 
addressing the threat DSS posed to the region and agreed to strengthen countermeasures 
under TEMM at the Eighth Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) held in 
Beijing, China in December 2006, and the Seventh Summit Meeting between China, 
Japan, and the ROK, held in the Philippines in January 2007 (MOEK, 2009a). 
The Ministers recognized that dust and sandstorm in Northeast Asia was posing 
common concerns for countries in this region and agreed to work together to reduce the 
damage caused to possible human health and the environment in this region. They 
recognized the necessity of capacity building and monitoring data sharing in order to 
promote a monitoring network in Northeast Asia region. In this regard, they welcomed 
the efforts to develop the outputs of the ADB-GEF DSS regional technical assistance 
(RETA) project. Also, they concurred in holding a director general meeting before the 
next TEMM to discuss concrete measures including the establishment of a joint research 
group (TEMM, 2006). Based on these international discussions, the three governments 
agreed to create the first regional cooperative mechanism dealing with DSS, the Tripartite 
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms, at the Eighth TEMM in 
2006. The objectives of TDGM were identified in a 2007 meeting report:  
Participants shared the view that DSS is one of the most critical environmental 
issues in Northeast Asia and that they must take urgent actions against DSS in a 
cooperative manner. They reconfirmed the importance of the regional monitoring 
and early warning network in Northeast Asia in order to mitigate environmental, 
economic and social impacts of DSS in the region, and that they would continue 
to cooperate in establishing the network by sharing information with each other. 
(TEMM, 2009e, p. 1) 
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TDGM’s Achievements and Limitations 
TDGM presents mixed characteristics of the formal mode of collective action due 
to its firm organizational structure but lack of financial arrangements, and it has 
demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint research on DSS. First of 
all, the TDGM established three organizational entities: Steering Committee, Working 
Group I, and Working Group II. Each entity has met annually (see Table 4.3). The 
Steering Committee was composed of governmental officials and experts from each 
country, while Working Groups I and II were composed of officials and experts from 
national research institutes, such as the Meteorological Administration and the Forest 
Service. 
Table 4.3 
Meetings of TDGM and Entities Associated with Joint Research  
Year TDGM Steering Committee Working Groups 
2007 1
st / ROK - - 
2nd / Japan 
2008 3rd / ROK 1
st / Japan (January) 1st / ROK 2nd / ROK (July) 
2009 4th / China 3rd Ad hoc meeting / China (June) 2nd / Japan (September) 
2010 5th / NA 4th 3rd / ROK 
2011 6th / NA 5th 4th / China 
2012 7th / China 6th 5th / Japan 
2013 8th / Japan 7th / Japan (Feb) 6th / ROK 
Note: Adapted from “Joint Communiqué of TEMM,” by TEMM, 2010, p. 31; TEMM, 2013e, p. 
3. 
 
The objectives of each body of TDGM have been clarified in the Joint 
Announcement that was formally adopted by Directors General of China, Japan, and the 
ROK. Along with the Joint Announcement, the Terms of References of the Steering 
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Committee and the two Working Groups have clearly defined the division of labor 
among these three organizations within the TDGM Joint Research project.  
The Joint Announcement adopted at the first TDGM meeting in March 2007 held 
in the ROK indicates that the three participating countries agreed on the organizational 
structure of the TDGM, as well as on the establishment of a Steering Committee and two 
Working Groups (Working Group I & Working Group II) that would perform joint 
research on DSS in Northeast Asia. According to the Joint Announcement, the “the 
Steering Committee will include determination of the two working group activities, 
coordination of relevant departments and agencies at national and regional levels, 
exchange of information, and exploring financial resources” (TEMM, 2009a, p. 2). The 
Steering Committee’s responsibilities are clearly stated in its Terms of Reference, and 
include providing “general guidance for establishing and implementing the project plan 
of the Joint Research Group,” determining “the direction of each working group's 
research plan and activities, and support them,” and reporting “the result of joint research 
to the TDGM on DSS” among others (TEMM, 2009b, p. 1). The 2007 Joint 
Announcement contained the proposal that Working Group I (WG1) focus on DSS 
monitoring and early warning systems, while Working Group II (WG2) investigate 
methods for preventing and controlling DSS (MOEJ, 2007b).  
Although this solid organization structure has made TDGM a formal mode of 
collective action regarding DSS, its unclear financial arrangements have not. Instead, the 
Joint Announcement emphasized the need for external financial assistance from 
international organizations rather than from participating countries. It stated that the 
Directors General of China, Japan, and the ROK recognized the importance of the 
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immediate implementation of the proposed second phase of the ADB-GEF Project, 
including securing project funds, and asked “GEF to provide necessary financing for the 
regional monitoring and early warning network on DSS” (TEMM, 2009a, p. 2).  
 The Terms of References (TORs) also failed to specify the financial contributions 
required from each member country.  The TOR of the Steering Committee meetings 
merely stated that all expenses for holding meetings “shall be covered by the Chair 
Country (TEMM Host Country) and the traveling expenses, including accommodations, 
shall be born by each country” (TEMM, 2009b, p. 2). The TOR of the Working Groups 
stated that expenses for holding meetings “shall be covered by the host country, and the 
traveling expenses shall be borne by each country” (TEMM, 2009c, p. 2). Nothing was 
mentioned regarding specific financial contributions from member countries.  
Since the TORs were drafted, no country has taken the initiative to raise the issue 
of financial arrangements for joint research that would provide a core fund similar to 
EANET’s. In particular, China has not shown a willingness to contribute to financing the 
joint research. On the contrary, it has requested financial support from the other 
participating countries from the beginning. For example, at the first meeting of the 
Steering Committee, China requested “positive consideration for financial support by 
Japan and Korea” for the “effective implementation of the joint research activities” when 
the participating countries agreed that “exchange of DSS related policy and existing 
research findings for the implementation of the Joint research would be started regardless 
of the status of financial arrangement, while exploring financial mobilization such as 
from international organization is also important” (TEMM, 2009d, pp. 1-2). Few efforts 
have been made to establish solid financial structures.  
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In addition to having the limited extent of formal mode of collective action, 
TDGM has demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint research on 
DSS. Even though participating countries have determined what information to share 
while conducting joint research projects, they have not developed specific guidelines for 
data collection. For joint research projects, action plans and timelines are roughly 
designed by the participating countries at the working group meetings without further 
discussion of the shared and specific research methods that will be used.   
At the meetings of the two working groups, the participating countries have 
proposed joint research projects and introduced their pre-existing DSS-related research to 
one another at the annual meetings. For example, at the 2008 meetings of the WG1 and 
the WG2, participating countries agreed to launch joint research projects. The action plan 
of the WG1’s project included four items: (a) determining the type of data that would be 
shared; (b) holding a joint conference; (c) conducting a joint field campaign; and (d) 
writing an annual report (MOEK, 2008). Regarding data sharing, the participating 
countries of WG1 agreed to share “meteorological conditions for DSS occurrence, PM 
physical properties & compositions, [s]atellite data, [m]odel results, and [l]idar data” 
(ibid., p. 22-23). Although they agreed to share “any necessary information,” they failed 
to adopt common measurement methods (ibid., p. 23).  
The participating countries have also discussed QA/QC activities for the joint 
research. Indeed, the Third Meeting of WG1 for the Joint Research on Dust and Sand 
Storms, “China and Korea reported on the joint QA/QC activities recently conducted by 
CMA and KMA” separately (TEMM, 2011, p. 2). In addition, the Japanese participants 
of the Fourth Meeting of the WG1 presented “the QA/QC activities for SPM monitoring 
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and pointed out the technical problems in SPM monitoring” (TEMM, 2012).80 Although 
the three participating countries attempted to establish commonly shared methods and 
indicators for DSS monitoring through these discussions at working group meetings, they 
have not been able to formalize common QA/QC criteria like those of EANET. 
The participants of the working groups have acknowledged the importance of the 
lack of common monitoring methods that would enable countries to compare data, but 
they have not solved this problem. At the fifth meeting of WG1 for Joint Research in 
November 2012, a Japanese participant Hitoshi Yoshizaki pointed out that “information 
sharing based on a similar template would contribute to forming common understanding 
among participants” (TEMM, 2013d, p. 1).  
Therefore, it can be argued that TDGM has developed a certain degree of formal 
collective action through agreement at the ministerial level, but a lesser degree of formal 
financial arrangements when compared with those of EANET. Additionally, TDGM has 
not established concrete forms of collective action, such as monitoring with common 
indicators and methods, as EANET has. The following sections explain why Northeast 
Asian countries have developed this limited degree of DSS-related regional cooperation 
through TDGM.  
To summarize, TDGM presents mixed characteristics of the formal mode of 
collective action. It is notable that the objectives of each body of TDGM have been 
clarified in the Joint Announcement that was formally adopted by Directors General of 
China, Japan, and the ROK, and the division of labor among those organizational entities 
has been clearly defined in the Terms of References of the Steering Committee. However, 
                                                          
80 SPM (Suspended Particulate Matter) are “finely divided solids or liquids that may be dispersed 
through the air from combustion processes, industrial activities or natural sources” (OECD, 1997). 
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the lack of financial arrangements for the TDGM activities has reduced the formal 
characteristic of collective action. In addition to the limited extent of formal collective 
action, TDGM has demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint 
research on DSS as shown in little development of specific guidelines for data collection 
of the joint research.  
 
Political Leadership 
This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political 
leadership exercised by individual participating countries in regional environmental 
cooperation efforts, the more formalized and the more concrete the collective action in 
the region will be. This study aims to investigate whether stronger political leadership 
taken by any country in the region, regardless of its materialistic power, increases the 
likelihood of developing more formal and concrete collective action.  
Structural Leadership in TDGM 
As described in chapter 1, unlike most leadership literature that maintains that 
structural leadership comes from a state’s ability to wield economic and political power 
commensurate with its material resources, this study assumes that any state can seek to 
exercise leadership if it is willing. The typologies of structural leadership previously 
mentioned assume that structural leadership is not grasped by willing countries but 
determined by the international community or powerful countries that shoulder most of 
the considerable costs of cooperation. However, this study argues that the states of the 
region can exert structural leadership based on their issue-specific national goals that are 
changeable through international interaction rather predetermined. Structural leadership 
 
  
171 
 
thus may be exercised not only by powerful countries, but by any willing country, 
including those with few material resources. To investigate which countries exert 
structural leadership, this dissertation analyzes the material contributions that 
participating countries make to regional environmental cooperation as a proxy variable 
and regards spending as evidence of structural leadership given that states wanting to 
exercise or already exercising structural leadership would expend more financial 
resources than other countries to ensure successful regional cooperation.  
As described above, no specific financial arrangements have been made since the 
establishment of joint research programs within TDGM. From its inception, participating 
countries have requested that international organizations continue financing various 
projects related to DSS. The most critical issue for the TDGM in 2007 seemed to be 
implementing the project for Establishing a Regional Monitoring and Early Warning 
Network for Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia. In fact, in June 2007, the Directors 
General submitted a letter signed by the three ministers to GEF and ADB requesting 
immediate approval of the second phase of the ADB-GEF Project (MOEJ, 2007a). In 
addition, the 2007 Joint Announcement of TDGM stated that “three countries request 
GEF to provide necessary financing for the regional monitoring and early warning 
network on DSS” (MOEJ, 2007b, p. 2). The initial focus of TDGM seems to have been 
acquiring support for assistance from various international organizations and maintaining 
funding for previously begun international research projects.  
Under these circumstances, the ROK has exerted moderate structural leadership 
through making more financial contributions than other participating countries since 
TDGM originated. Neither China nor Japan has exhibited any firm leadership on DSS 
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issues. However, the ROK’s moderate contribution has led the program to have 
insufficient funding because no country has been willing to step forward and pay the 
necessary money.  
Thus, the TDGM has focused on securing financial support and research funds 
from international organizations. In TDGM’s working group meetings for joint research, 
the participants have tended to present their plans for requesting international funding for 
research in the upcoming years (for example, see TEMM, 2013b). Regarding this 
financial dependency on external sources, a Korean delegate to the Seventh Steering 
Committee Meeting in 2013, professor Suh-Yong Chung, pointed out “the importance of 
self-sustainability of activities toward solving the issues” (TEMM, 2013b, p. 4). After 
Chung’s presentation, participants discussed a potential problem:  the previous 
“GEF/ADB project had not been continued with a follow up project, and therefore the 
matter should be discussed more carefully as a follow-up option after the completion of 
the current tripartite joint action plan” (ibid.). 
As previously noted, the TOR of Steering Committee for Joint Research on DSS 
states that for expenditures and finances of joint research, the chair country (i.e., TEMM 
host country) must cover the costs of holding the Steering Committee Meeting and that 
each country bears the financial responsibility of covering its traveling expenses to 
international meetings. In a joint research project, “Analysis of Selected DSS Cases and 
Capability Building for Dust and Sandstorms Monitoring,” WG1 stated that each country 
was responsible for its own research and development expenses for joint research projects 
between 2008 and 2010.  
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WG2 presented more specific information regarding budget sharing and the 
division of labor among three countries for its joint research projects conducted between 
2008 and 2010 in its “Identifying Successful Factors and Developing an Advanced Model 
for Ecological Restoration of Area.” WG2 agreed on a total budget in the first year of 
around US$75,000 (MOEK, 2008, p. 32). The ROK proposed contributing around 
US$55,000 toward the total budget, and China around US$20,000, although the ROK 
planned to provide China’s share of US$20,000 and to cover its travel expenses to 
support China’s participation in the joint research. In situations in which other countries 
have lacked the funding necessary for participation in the Joint Research of DSS, the 
ROK has been the only resource provider and has thus exercised structural leadership. It 
is arguable that the financial configuration established by WG2 shows Korea’s structural 
leadership to the extent that the scale of its financial contributions far outweighs those of 
other countries. 
Although Japan has born its own travel expenses unlike China contributed its 
share, exactly how much Japan expended to participate in this joint research remains 
unknown. It is likely that Japan would have utilized resources from its own existing 
research projects, including researchers from various research institutions that had 
conducted research on similar topics. Japan might not have allocated additional funds 
solely for this project.81  
Japan has expressed a relative lack of interest in regional cooperation efforts 
partly because DSS has not been a significant environmental issue within its borders. 
There are several reasons for Japan’s passive participation in the TDGM Joint Research, 
                                                          
81 This opinion has been made based on interviews with researchers who are involved in the LTP 
initiated by the ROK, as discussed in the next chapter.  
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contrary to its dominant contributions to EANET as described in the previous chapter. 
Since 1994, when the Basic Environment Plan was enacted, Japan has maintained its 
leadership role as a key resource provider for regional environmental cooperation. In 
general, however, Japanese “leadership raises suspicions in the region, due to its history 
of military invasions of neighboring countries; and Japan itself seems reluctant to step out 
in front” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84). Moreover, Japan is “cautious and passive when it comes to 
government-level multilateral cooperation” in Northeast Asia because it regards the 
multilateral framework as a “form of development aid” that is redundant with its already 
being “active in utilizing unofficial channels of cooperation through the Green Aid Plan” 
(Jho & Lee, 2009, p. 66).  
Japan’s political caution and sponsorship of its Green Aid Plan have encouraged 
reliance upon direct bilateral cooperation with countries in the region. In fact, the Japan-
China Friendship Center, established by Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
program, has undertaken cooperative programs since 1996 together with Japan’s National 
Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) (MOEK, 2007c).  For example, the Japan-
China Friendship Center and Japan’s NIES conducted research into the evolution and 
transportation of DSS between 1996 and 2000, into the transport mechanisms of DSS that 
originated in Northern China, and into the environmental impact of dust aerosol between 
2001 and 2003. In addition, funded by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science, and Technology, Japan’s Meteorological Agency, and the Chinese Academy of 
Science, Japan launched the Aeolian Dust Experiment on Climate Impact project in 2000 
and studied the climatic impact of aerosol radiative forcing.  
 
  
175 
 
In addition, compared to the ROK and China, Japan has hardly felt the impact of 
DSS. In fact, the Kyushu area (Nagasaki), which is close to China, has observed only 
low-level dust aerosol phenomena, whereas the Tokyo area (Tsukuba) observed only 
trace levels of dust aerosols in April 2002 (Table 4.4). In contrast, it was reported that 
dust concentration at the ground surface level in Beijing exceeded 1mg/m³ and that dust 
aerosol blown to Beijing was observed several hours later in ROK. The Kyushu area in 
Japan, however, recorded only 0.1-0.2mg/m³ during this time.82  
Table 4.4  
Occurrence of Low Level Dust in Nagasaki and Tokyo  
 Nagasaki Tokyo 
Year No. of days DSS observed 
Max 
concentration of 
SPM (mg/m³) 
No. of days DSS 
observed 
Max 
concentration of 
SPM (mg/m³) 
2001 15 0.306 0 - 
2002 20 0.705 0 - 
2003 1 0.099 0 - 
2004 11 0.152 0 - 
2005 11 0.178 0 - 
2006 6 0.296 1 0.13 
2007 11 0.582 4 0.167 
2008 6 0.446 0 - 
2009 5 0.152 3 0.131 
2010 11 0.898 4 0.898 
2011 7 0.316 2 0.156 
Note: Adapted from “Past Records of DSS in Japan,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2011. 
http://www.env.go.jp/air/dss/past/index.html. (In Japanese)  
 
Likewise, China has expressed little interest in regional environmental 
cooperation, even though it is a source country and thus directly and seriously affected by 
DSS. This seeming apathy may be due to the fact that DSS has existed for thousands of 
                                                          
82 For an overview of DSS observations in Japan, see 
http://www.env.go.jp/press/file_view.php?serial=5960&hou_id=5225 
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years and is thus not a new issue for China. China seems to regard DSS as a natural 
phenomenon rather than an environmental crisis, as is discussed below in the knowledge 
section. In addition, China has also pursued bilateral cooperation with Japan and the 
ROK because bilateral cooperation “might enable it to have more leverage in negotiations” 
(Yoon, 2006, p. 85). Japan’s preference for bilateral cooperation with neighboring 
countries, particularly China, over multilateral cooperation has coincided with China’s 
preference of bilateral cooperation over multilateral cooperation.83  
Instrumental Leadership in TDGM 
In addition to providing structural leadership, the ROK has exerted instrumental 
leadership around DSS-related issues. As explained in chapter 1, actors who exercise 
instrumental leadership function as agenda setters, who shape the forms that issues take; 
popularizers, who draw attention to the issues; policy inventors, who bring innovation to 
the table; and brokers, who make deals and line up support options through negotiations. 
As in the case of EANET, participants in the joint research program exercise instrumental 
leadership through becoming agenda setters and popularizers rather than policy brokers 
because EANET and TDGM have not established any regulatory policy measures. The 
Korean participation in various TDGM joint research meetings illustrates the ROK’s 
instrumental leadership that is in some ways similar to Japan’s display of instrumental 
leadership within EANET.  
The Research Plan 2008-2010 highlights the ROK’s role as an instrumental leader. 
Agreed to by WG2 in 2008, the plan indicated what information each participating 
                                                          
83 Unlike China and Japan, the ROK has promoted environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia 
with a “strong incentive to pursue binding environmental cooperation that would impose some 
constraints on its two powerful neighbors’ unilateral interpretation of international agreement” 
(Yoon, 2006, p. 84). 
 
  
177 
 
country was required to provide for joint research during its first year of TDGM 
membership. China was expected to (a) “provide relevant information on ecosystem 
restoration projects,” (b) “review restoration projects,” (c) “select the demonstration 
region (sites), and the field survey of the status,” and (d) “review vegetative restoration 
technology in practices” (MOEK, 2008, p. 31), and Japan was expected to (a) “provide 
the concerned project reports,” (b) “take part the joint field survey (provisional),” (c) 
“provide useful information and lesson learnt at the field through the activities of on-
going Japanese projects,” and (d) “suggest the ideas on entire research process and data 
analysis” (ibid.). Whereas China and Japan were tasked with reviewing the existing 
research, the ROK played the role of program coordinator and focused on the 
development of common tools for future research. The ROK was required to (a) “make a 
check up list for field survey,” (b) “select study sites and perform joint field survey,” and 
(c) “develop a monitoring and assessment method for ecosystem restoration projects” 
(ibid).  
The ROK’s instrumental leadership was further displayed through its involvement 
in choosing a joint research project. At the First WG1 Meeting in 2008, the participating 
countries agreed to adopt the suggestions put forth in “Identifying Successful Factors and 
Developing an Advanced Model for Ecological Restoration of Area” after 
accommodating all the concerns of other countries, particularly China. The ROK 
delegates to WG1 proposed that the three participating countries jointly monitor DSS in 
Baekdu Mountain, known in China as Changbai Mountain, situated on the border 
between the DPRK and China. China declined this proposal, maintaining that Baekdu 
Mountain was an inappropriate location for DSS monitoring because foreign research 
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institutes were not allowed to bring monitoring equipment into China (MOEK, 2008). 
Japan also submitted plans for two research projects, but China and the ROK objected to 
both. For both projects, Japan proposed sharing only the monitoring data acquired 
through its own existing monitoring projects and equipment: the Aeolian Dust 
Experiment on Climate Impact project collaborated on by Japan’s Meteorological 
Agency and the Chinese Academy of Science, and the NIES’s LIDAR (Light Detection 
And Ranging).84 China and the ROK rejected both of Japan’s proposals because their 
own participation in the projects would have been difficult in using Japan’s devices for 
monitoring. It is interesting to note that Japan demonstrated similar desire to adopt 
Japanese-made devises for the collection of monitoring data both in EANET and TDGM 
joint research projects.   
Despite Korean efforts to structure research activities, the Joint Research of the 
TDGM remains under development without producing specific outputs. As mentioned 
above, the Working Groups of the Joint Research program started to discuss developing 
common methods of monitoring in 2010. Japan proposed to “discuss the QA/QC 
practices of each country regarding PM10 measurements” and, at the Third Meeting of 
Working Group I for Joint Research in 2010, participants approved Japan’s proposal and 
“exchanged views on QA/QC practices regarding LIDAR and visibility measurements as 
a study item following PM10” (TEMM, 2011). As explained in the previous chapter 
about EANET, QA/QC activities are critical for gathering data from various countries 
that each use different methods and tools. This Japan’s initiative for QA/QC activities 
might be an indicator of Japan’s initial attempts to exert instrumental leadership based on 
                                                          
84 LIDAR is “a remote sensing technology that can distinguish DSS particles which cannot be 
seen with the naked eye from other atmospheric pollutant particles” (MOEJ, 2013). 
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its extensive experiences within EANET. Its attempt to exert such leadership on the issue 
of DSS is quite recent.  
In short, the ROK has played an important role in developing regional 
cooperation through exerting structural leadership involving financial contributions and 
instrumental leadership involving activities proposed for future development. However, 
the ROK’s limited structural and instrumental leadership and Japan’s newly-born 
instrumental leadership still have a long way to go if more specific rule-based 
cooperation is to develop. 
Directional Leadership in TDGM 
Directional leadership can be described as the ability to drive “intellectual capital 
or generative systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in 
institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 298) through the power of ideas, norms, and 
knowledge (Selin, 2012). Thus, social persuasion would play an important role in 
influencing and shaping the perceptions of other participants in demonstrations of 
successful domestic policy. All three countries have taken various domestic measures to 
build infrastructure in order to prevent, or at least lessen, damage from DSS. The ROK’s 
establishing several legal frameworks for DSS early warning and forecast seems to best 
demonstrate such taking of domestic countermeasures.  
The ROK introduced a legal framework in its “Comprehensive Measures for 
Prevention of DSS Damage” and “Framework Plan for National Safety Management” 
plans for dealing with DSS “at the level of disaster management.” These measures aim to 
strengthen standards for DSS early warnings (Table 4.5) and improve DSS forecasting 
(Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.5 
ROK’s Standard Forecast Regarding the Intensity of DSS 
Category Predicted Density 
Weak DSS When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be less 
than 400㎍/㎥ 
Strong DSS When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be about 
400~800㎍/㎥ 
Exceptionally 
Strong DSS 
When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be greater 
than 800㎍/㎥ 
Note: Adapted from “Current Status,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012b. 
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_cha_air_pol_dus_status.   
 
Table 4.6 
DSS Special Announcement Issuing Process and Behavior Guideline in ROK  
Category Issue Standard Behavioral Guideline 
DSS 
Information 
1 hour average PM-
10 density of 
over300㎍/㎥, 
Predicted 
continuation of 
over 2 hours 
• Children, the elderly, and persons with 
respiratory disorders recommended to limit 
outdoor activity 
• Kindergarten and elementary school students 
recommended to limit outdoor activity (physical 
education classes, field trips, etc.) 
• General public (junior and high school students 
included) recommended to limit strenuous 
outdoor activity 
DSS Warning 
1 hour average PM-
10 density of 
over400㎍/㎥, 
Predicted 
continuation of 
over 2 hours 
• Children, the elderly, and persons with 
respiratory disorders recommended to cease 
outdoor activity 
• Kindergarten and elementary school students 
recommended to cease outdoor activity (PE, 
field trip, etc.) 
• General public (junior and high school students 
included) recommended to cease strenuous 
outdoor activity and limit other outdoor activity 
DSS Alert 
1 hour average PM-
10 density of 
over800㎍/㎥, 
Predicted 
continuation of 
over 2 hours 
• Children, the elderly, and persons with 
respiratory disorders recommended to remain 
indoors 
• Kindergarten and elementary schools suspend 
outdoor activity (PE, field trip, etc.), and student 
protection measures, such as early dismissal and 
school closure are recommended 
• General public (junior and high school students 
included) recommended to avoid outdoor 
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activity and to remain indoors 
• Outdoor sports games recommended to be 
stopped and postponed 
Note: Adapted from “Current Status,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012b. 
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_cha_air_pol_dus_status.   
 
The ROK has also attempted to expand its number of monitoring stations and 
share observation information with source countries regarding early-warning 
development to strengthen DSS monitoring and research (J. Kim, 2007), possibly 
implying that DSS has affected Korea to such an extent that the Korean government has 
come to position DSS as a high-profile environmental concern. According to Masataka 
Nishikawa at the Laboratory of Intellectual Fundamentals for Environmental Studies, 
Environmental Analytical Chemistry Section, National Institute for Environmental 
Studies (NIES) in Japan, the ROK “is known as the only country to have set up standards 
on concentration of DSS for forecasting advisory and warning levels.”85 
The ROK’s active stance reflects its instrumental leadership on DSS. In addition 
to demonstrating directional leadership through introducing policy measures for setting 
standards on DSS concentrations for forecasting advisories and warning levels, the ROK 
seems to have exercised directional leadership through its role in building organizational 
structures and creating research plans within the joint research program. For example,  
Korean experts86 and governmental officials (MOEJ, 2007a) drafted and proposed the 
Terms of the Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee and Working Groups for Joint 
Research on DSS.  
 
                                                          
85  Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa on March 8, 2011. 
86 Among others, Suh-Yong Chung, an associate professor of Law and International Relations in 
the Division of International Studies at Korea University, helped draft the TOR.  
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Knowledge 
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that a region will develop more 
formal and more concrete collective action if participating countries in its environmental 
cooperation efforts develop greater commonly shared knowledge. This section argues 
that scientists in the region continue to have significant uncertainties regarding the causes 
and consequences of DSS because different countries embrace different monitoring 
standards. Furthermore, China, which has registered the largest number of experts on the 
UNCCD’s Roster of Experts, has shared little of its monitoring information due to the 
bureaucratic rivalry among various institutes involved in DSS monitoring. Before 
discussing variances in the monitoring methods of the three participating countries, the 
following section examines the development of scientific knowledge about DSS in 
Northeast Asia, focusing on international research projects operating through UNCCD 
and ADB/GEF.  
The accumulation of knowledge through the UNCCD activities has rarely led 
Northeast Asian countries to build commonly shared scientific knowledge in the region 
because the UNCCD has not provided enough scientific information about the causes and 
consequences of desertification. L.L. Stringer criticized for “its absence of scientific and 
institutional benchmarks and indicators for monitoring the international impact of the 
convention on the overall condition and extent of the world’s drylands” (Stringer, 2008, p. 
2067).  For example, the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification87 had not met 
expectations by the early 1990s, according to Bauer and Stringer, in that desertification 
                                                          
87 Its Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (PACD) resulted from “political discussions 
following direct scientific input,” and “provided the UNEP with a general mandate to organize 
and coordinate action with a view to eventually controlling desertification worldwide by the year 
2000, as well as 28 specific recommendations on what needed to be done” (Bauer & Stringer, 
2009, p. 250).  
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“had not been insufficiently prioritized within national development plans and legislation” 
(2009, p. 250).  
Because the UNCCD’s “negotiators deliberately referred to ‘knowledge’ as a 
broader concept, not to privilege science but to allow space to be created to incorporate a 
wider range of cognitive resources” and “drew so heavily on chapter 12 of Agenda 21--
‘Managing Fragile Ecosystems: Combating Desertification and Drought’--there was little 
room for maneuver over issues such as defining desertification” (Bauer & Stringer, 2009, 
p. 252). According to Bauer and Stringer, media and policy circles sidelined the scientific 
community throughout the negotiation process because they blamed it for the “world’s 
failure to solve the desertification problem after the earlier, more scientifically informed 
UNCOD” (2009, p. 253).88 The role of scientific knowledge in the organization remains 
insignificant even today. 
To date, the UNCCD process has lacked an efficient operational mechanism to 
process and channel practical and scientific expertise for political decision 
makers. Ultimately, this results in minimal ideational interplay and inhibits cross-
institutional learning. This is because the COP has failed to tap the information 
potentially available from the scientific community, which in turn has been unable 
to draw the attention of the Parties to the scientific aspects of the issues on their 
agenda. Accordingly, there have been calls for the provision of independent 
scientific policy advisory services from outside the immediate UNCCD process, 
referring to the role of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
vis-à-vis the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) as a promising model. (Bauer & Stringer, 2009, p. 254) 
 
Science had little influence on the development of shared knowledge about the 
causes of DSS in Northeast Asia. The project on the Regional Master Plan for the 
                                                          
88 Bauer and Stringer argue that there are several reasons for this scapegoating: the lack of ability 
of science to “provide quick-fix solutions to urgent problems” or “simple solutions that can be 
easily transferred between biophysical and institutional contexts, thus presenting a problem of 
scale”; the tendency of scientific research to be “rarely definitive and final”; and the selective use 
or interpretation of scientific research for political purposes (2009, p. 253). 
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Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (2003-2005) also 
highlighted the lack of common understanding of DSS among countries. Even today, 
there is no agreed-upon definition, terminology, or perception of DSS phenomena and no 
common monitoring method or similar capacity for monitoring. The upstream countries 
in the source areas consider DSS a natural phenomenon that has existed for thousands of 
years, whereas the downstream countries see it as a problem of air quality.  
Furthermore, the definition of DSS varies, depending on both monitoring method 
and threshold value. Moreover, needs and expectations are different not only among 
countries but also among agencies within individual countries (ADB, 2005). The ADB 
project urges Northeast Asian countries to build optimization and flexibility with step-by-
step approaches to formulate a feasible program for a proper regional monitoring and 
early-warning network. Yet the master plan did not contribute to shared scientific 
knowledge about DSS. 
This absence of shared scientific knowledge in Northeast Asia has resulted not 
only from the few contributions of these two international cooperative mechanisms, but 
also from bureaucratic rivalry in the monitoring of DSS, particularly in China. Common 
methods of monitoring DSS do not exist among countries in the region even though 
monitoring is the first step that each country must take toward an understanding of 
environmental issues. Once monitoring indicators are determined,89 surface- and satellite-
based observations will produce results that will be used for DSS source identification 
and impact assessment, including health and economic loss, for short-term forecasting 
                                                          
89 Two kinds of indicators are used for DSS monitoring. The first is atmosphere indicators, which 
include meteorological parameters, wind, visibility, etc., and ambient atmosphere (TSP/PM10, 
vertical profile by LIDAR). The second is ground surface, which includes land use/cover change 
and soil attributes (ADB, 2005). 
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through data sharing in real time and forecasting models, and for long-term forecasting 
through tracing annual trends in DSS outbreaks. Early warnings on DSS, then, can be 
achieved based on the results of monitoring. Thus, it is ironic that although monitoring 
produces the information necessary for making early warnings possible, it is the activity 
that countries disagree about most. 
The DSS monitoring situation in China is complicated. Even though many 
Chinese governmental agencies and institutions maintain monitoring stations that collect 
data for DSS forecasting and early warnings, there is little cooperation among these 
institutions, and access to the data required by modelers and forecasters is not always 
available. To varying extents, at least four institutions at the central government level 
have been directly involved in DSS monitoring, forecasting, and early warnings: the 
China Meteorological Administration (CMA), the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP, formerly SEPA), the State Forestry Administration (SFA), and the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS). Each has developed its own individual network, as “each 
institution strives to be self-sufficient in data gathering” (ADB, 2005, p. 69), which 
highlights a general lack of cooperation among these institutions.  
Each of these Chinese institutions uses different databases for monitoring and 
allows different scopes of data availability. The CMA collaborated with the National 
Satellite Meteorological Center to use databases of GMS images, and with the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to use images for the DSS 
density map and visibility. MEP uses data from its own 43 monitoring sites for PM10, 
TSP, and Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). 90 The Ministry of Land and Resources 
                                                          
90 LIDAR is radar that use laser light instead of radio waves. A remote sensor can measure a DSS 
passing above from the ground. “The laser light emitted from the ground is scattered by fine 
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uses databases based on Landsat TM integrated with ground surveys, land use maps, 
ecological environment maps, land degradation maps, vegetation maps, soil maps, and 
other data in its focus on land degradation and salinization. The data the Ministry of Land 
and Resources obtain are for internal use only. The State Forestry Administration 
acquires data based mainly on ground surveys, using Landsat TM images that focus on 
desertification. This organization’s primary data and database are also designated for 
internal use only.91 CAS uses a database based on Landsat TM images to monitor 
desertification evolution and trends in Northern China and provides multiple levels of 
data availability. The 1:200,000 and 1:500,000 scale maps are for internal use only, 
whereas the 1:4,000,000 scale maps are published and available for public use (ADB, 
2005, p. 70). 
Some institutions have collaborated with other Chinese institutes. For example, 
the “SFA and CMA have set up a consultative mechanism for prediction and forecasting 
of DSS events and early warning by combining land surface field observation 
information (land use, vegetation and land degradation dynamics, soil structure and 
moisture) provided by positioning monitoring stations and information on weather 
condition” (ADB, 2005, p. 74). This consultative mechanism has been considered a great 
success in improving the accuracy of DSS prediction and forecasting. Despite this 
development, data sharing among Chinese institutions remains limited. Such bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
particles in the air. By measuring the scattered laser light, the vertical distribution of DSS 
particulate concentration, and the change with time, can be determined. By using polarized laser 
light, an estimation of the non-spherical character of airborne fine particles can be determined. 
The shapes of DSS particles are not spherical comparing with atmospheric pollutant particles,  
therefore with this method it is possible to distinguish DSS from atmospheric pollutants” (MOEJ, 
2008, p. 7). 
91 The State Forestry Administration’s statistical data are open for public use. 
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rivalry may have prevented Chinese scientists from building domestic epistemic 
communities.   
Japan has also faced a lack of coordination that has hindered the growth of its 
knowledge base regarding DSS. In Japan, the major obstacle seems to be the involvement 
of so many types of organizations that play a part in monitoring DSS. Multiple 
governmental institutions play a role in DSS monitoring: the Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA), Ministry of the Environment of Japan (MOEJ), and the National Institute 
for Environmental Studies (NIES). JMA, an external agency of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport of Japan, maintains an extensive network of meteorological 
stations throughout the country and monitors DSS based on visibility at 113 
meteorological sites. In January 2004, JMA began releasing forecasts on DSS aerosol 
dust and has provided information about DSS aerosol distribution that could affect 
people’s transportation and daily activities. The Ministry of the Environment of Japan 
also maintains a network of air monitoring stations. The Atmospheric Environment 
Regional Observation system (AEROS), also referred to as Soramamekun, has 1,541 
stations in the network that collect PM10, TSP, and other data from LIDAR monitoring 
(ADB, 2005, p. 75).   
Whereas governmental agencies have dominated DSS monitoring in China, 
governmental research institutions and universities have played a substantial role in 
studying the meteorological and climatic phenomena of DSS in Japan. Governmental 
agencies provide research institutions and universities with financial support and work to 
raise public awareness about DSS in Japan. To address the participation of various types 
of organizations in DSS, “the ministries and agencies involved in DSS issues established 
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a coordination meeting in February 2005” for “liaison and coordination among 
government agencies in Japan” (MOEJ, 2006).  
In the ROK, the Ministry of Environment (MOEK), Korea Meteorological 
Administration (KMA), and National Institute of Environment Research (NIER) are 
involved in DSS monitoring throughout the country. Like China and Japan, the ROK is 
equipped with high-tech LIDARs. Located along the ROK’s west coast, LIDARs are 
operated by KMA and NIER to measure periodic DSS (ADB, 2005, p. 77). 
Despite these efforts from all three countries, Northeast Asia has not created a 
common monitoring system. As Masataka Nishikawa points out,  
On their own online systems, Japan uploads PM7, and Korea and China have 
uploaded PM10 data. They can share information, but they cannot compare. All 
three countries have their own LIDARs, but it is hard to establish same 
mechanism.92  
 
Nishikawa raises the topic of a more recent challenge to information sharing:   
 
The Chinese 2007 Meteorology 13 prohibited researcher from giving any 
information to other countries. The only exception for this law is the agreement 
between Ministers of Environment, for example, TEMM. Under the TEMM, 
Meteorological Agencies and Ministries of Environment in Korea and Japan work 
together. However, for China, only the Ministry of Environmental Protection is 
participating under TEMM, no participation from the Meteorological Agency. 
This brings about high demand from Japan and Korea for more information from 
China.93  
 
                                                          
92 Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa, Section leader of the Laboratory of Intellectual 
Fundamentals for Environmental Studies, Environmental Analytical Chemistry Section at 
National Institute for Environmental Studies in Japan, on March 8, 2011. 
93 Ibid. The Meteorology 13 seems to be under the Administrative Regulations on Meteorological 
Data Sharing” which China Meteorological Administration (CMA) issued. The Meteorology Law 
of China came into effect on January 1st, 2000 “to regulate the meteorological activities on a legal 
basis” and to hold “meteorological departments responsible for discharging administrative 
management functions” (CMA, 2012). 
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Each country has amassed its own understanding of DSS over time because the 
DSS phenomena has existed for thousands of years even though it has increased 
significantly in recent years. Furthermore, no common understanding of the causes and 
consequences of DSS exists among participating countries due to their diverse methods 
of monitoring its different aspects. As a result of the lack of substantial knowledge about 
desertification that persists within UNCCD, countries have relied upon their own 
understandings and experiences on this issue, which has resulted in a great deal of 
controversy and disagreement over various aspects of DSS.  
Although, as explained earlier in this chapter, “the scientific consensus is that the 
main sources of dust are the Taklamakan and Gobi desert regions” (Wilkening, 2006, p. 
444), a great deal of uncertainty remains about the specific areas from which dust 
originates and the possible causes of the increased frequency of dust sandstorms, such as 
climate change or human-induced desertification. Another area of controversy is source-
receptor relationships of DSS (Wilkening, 2006).94 First, the extent to which Mongolia 
contributes to overall dust emissions is an important issue and area of controversy. If 
Mongolia is a significant source of the dust that spreads over China, then China would 
have more incentive to engage in cooperation with Mongolia to tackle desertification 
problems. Second, the atmospheric pathways of dust transport are uncertain. There seem 
to be two main paths of long-range transport of dust: “(1) an eastward route from the 
                                                          
94 For desertification, China identifies human factors rather than natural factors as the major 
causes of desertification in its National Action Program of the UNCCD. The program states that 
along with climatic variation, human activities, such as “population growth, the pressure from 
economic development, poor awareness of the importance of the protection of ecosystem, over-
grazing, over-cutting of fuelwood, deforestation and destruction of vegetation caused by 
reclamation on steppe, desert steppe and pasture land, inappropriate farming system on slope and 
the degradation of vegetative,” have accelerated desertification in China (China National 
Committee for the Implementation of the UNCCD, 1996, p. 3). 
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Mongolian Plateau region over Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the Pacific 
Ocean, and (2) a north-then-eastward route over the Tianshan Mountains and Lake 
Balkhash to about 50°N before turning eastward toward the Pacific Ocean” (Wilkening, 
2006, p. 444). 
 In addition to uncertainty over the causes of increasing DSS, there has been little 
common understanding of its consequences. China, Japan, and the ROK have each 
developed its own knowledge regarding different aspects of DSS’s effects. Nishikawa, a 
participant in the Joint Research of TDGM, states that “Japan has the most advanced 
knowledge on health effect of DSS. Korea is very good at financial estimation of DSS 
effects. China has developed the most knowledge on the protection of agriculture and 
forest.”95 Regarding each country’s different areas of focus, he claims that Japan 
privileges “pure science” to the point that it lacks the broader understanding of DSS 
possessed by the ROK and China: 
Regarding DSS, among three countries, Korea is the most active state, particularly 
dealing with impact assessment. In fact, Korea is the only country to have set up 
standards on concentration of DSS for forecasting advisory and warning levels. It 
is because Korea suffers from damage for health, industry, and traffic. In fact, 
Korea is the only country to have measured financial effects of DSS. Scientists 
study in order to prevent health damage to the public. Policy makers study how to 
achieve more with little investment. Thus, countries should calculate financial 
aspects. Korea has the strongest perception on DSS. Japanese scientists tend to 
admire pure science without calculating how much economic damage would be 
caused by pollution. Korea and China are good at calculating in terms of money 
regarding environmental adverse impact.96 
 
The Special Committee on dust and sandstorms in Japan has also recognized Japan’s lack 
of understanding regarding the impact assessment of DSS:  
                                                          
95 Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa on March 8, 2011. 
96 Ibid. 
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The interrelationships between DSS events and socioeconomic activities will 
become more complex as productivity in Northeast Asian region grows 
significantly. In future, forecasting in the field of economic and production 
activities will be an important component of the evaluation of the effects of DSS 
events. This field of study has already been launched by a Korean research group, 
and Japan should closely follow the progress of this research initiative. (MOEJ, 
2006) 
 
The TDGM meetings have also paid little attention to the costs of tackling DSS. 
At the First WG2 Meeting for Joint Research on DSS in 2008, the three countries 
presented their existing research to share their research results (TEMM, 2008). Based on 
the summary of the existing DSS research of these three countries, it seems that no 
country had specified the economic costs of implementing measures to abate DSS. The 
ROK presented its current research on planting trees and establishing pasture lands to 
combat desertification, which explained how tree species were selected and how the 
growth of plants in desertificated areas was measured. China introduced its past as well 
as current research projects, including research on the integrated control model, technical 
approaches of Eco-Asset Assessment, biodiversity conservation, and vegetation. Japan 
shared its research on “Desertification control and restoration of ecosystem services in 
grassland regions” and “Community-Based approaches for countermeasures in DSS” in 
DSS source areas. Both of these studies focused on developing support for people living 
in desertificated areas.  
Unlike the individual countries themselves, the ADB tried to figure out the total 
cost for DSS mitigation measures, based on budgets of various Chinese projects. China’s 
10th and 11th Five-Year Plans between 2001 and 2010 presented its strategies for DSS 
prevention and mitigation projects in specific counties, such as the Inner Mongolia 
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Autonomous Region (ADB, 2005, p. 170). For example, the “Law on Desertification 
Prevention and Treatment,” issued in January 2002, stated that “government at all levels 
are responsible for the control of desertification and the central government should 
increase investment and create more favorable policies” (ADB, 2005, p. 172). In 
attempting to determine the cost aspect of DSS, ADB has emphasized the importance of 
measures that are available at reasonable costs over large source areas. According to its 
2005 research, the total capital cost of the projects in the Hulunbir, Xilingol, Ordos, and 
Alashan areas of China were US$81,446,670, based on budgets allocated for these 
projects. Other than these project-based cost estimates, the report notes that “cost 
effectiveness, replicability, sustainability and technical ease of implementing the 
interventions and control measures has yet to be demonstrated on a scale that is 
commensurate with the area of land that needs to be treated in the DSS source areas” 
(ADB, 2005, p. 165). Yet without developing a common understanding of the causes and 
consequences of DSS, it will be difficult for the region to launch proactive research on 
costs of measures necessary for abating DSS.  
 
Socialization 
This section tests Hypothesis 3, which is that participating countries in regional 
environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective 
action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a 
process of socialization. As mentioned in chapter 1, through both the adaptation and 
learning processes of socialization, international actors can change their behaviors in 
response to new events. Through the adaptation process, international actors do so 
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without making fundamental changes in their beliefs about underlying values and causal 
mechanisms, whereas through the learning process, they do so by raising questions about 
fundamental and implicit theories. Thus, more significant behavioral changes can be 
made by international actors who have a chance to examine their original values through 
the learning process of socialization. 
The following sub-sections investigate which of the two processes of socialization, 
adaptation and learning, the participating countries have engaged in. To determine the 
socialization processes, this study qualitatively assesses the participation patterns of 
member countries in two ways: (1) whether the participation of countries in the region 
has been prompted by not intrinsic but indirect concerns about particular transboundary 
air pollution issues; (2) whether the delegates to international meetings have been 
allowed to have enough time to take the learning process of socialization. As mentioned 
in chapter 1 and 3, regarding the first way, it is considered that countries have engaged in 
the adaptation process of socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to 
participate in regional environmental cooperation on the acid rain issue; it is considered 
that countries have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found 
intrinsic motivations for their regional cooperation. Regarding the second way, it is 
considered that delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation process of 
socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings for only a 
short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning process of 
socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an extended 
period in a consistent manner.  
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For the first criteria of the participation patterns, this subsection investigates the 
international context that Northeast Asian countries faced before and while initiating their 
regional environmental cooperation regarding transboundary pollution. The 
implementation of the UNCCD signals a shared recognition that desertification and land 
degradation are global issues. Deserts in Asia are expanding in various countries, such as 
China, India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Syria, Nepal, and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. The UNCCD has successfully reminded the international community of the 
condition of Asia, which in terms of the number of people affected is the continent most 
severely impacted by desertification and drought.  
Even though two source countries in Northeast Asia, China and Mongolia, have 
established their own National Action Plans as required by the UNCCD because they are 
in the process of desertification,97 their participation in the international discussions 
partly seemed to have been driven by two political concerns: getting technical and 
financial assistance from developed countries and changing international reputation on 
their air quality. First, both China and Mongolia had particular national interests in the 
technical and financial assistance that they would receive through the participation in the 
UNCCD activities. According to ADB, “political commitment and increase in budgetary 
allocations to desertification control on the part of the central government in each country 
and technical and financial assistance from a number of donor agencies” have enabled 
China and Mongolia to generate good practices and mitigation approaches (2005a, p. 4-
                                                          
97 Even though Japan and the ROK have not established National Action Plans because they are 
not in the process of desertification, both countries submitted national reports to the UNCCD 
because Article 26 of the UNCCD stipulates that each party must submit a report on the domestic 
measures taken to implement the Convention. (For the national report of Japan, see MOEJ, 2000; 
for the national report of the ROK, see UNCCD, 2006a.) 
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2).98 They have pursued “financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance” and 
relied on “help from outside organizations such as UN organizations, foreign aid agencies, 
and foreign foundations to beef up its scientific capability” (Wilkening, 2006, pp. 443-
444). In particular, according to Wilkening, Mongolia’s stagnant economy has brought 
“limited technological capacity in areas such as silviculture; a shortage of trained 
personnel; underdeveloped policy and legal structure relative to land use management; 
and a weak scientific capacity to forecast and give early warning of dust storms” (ibid., p. 
443). 
Second, China needed to change its poor reputation on its air quality through 
cleaning Beijing’s air of dust in order to hold the 2008 Beijing Olympics. According to 
Wilkening, the “Olympics are a coming-of-age event for China similar to the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympics for Japan and the 1988 Seoul Olympics for South Korea. However, dust and 
dust storms could dirty the event” (2006, p. 443). In fact, Beijing failed to win the 
Olympics in its first bid partly due to its air pollution.  
Japan also had political motivations in participating in the international 
discussions on desertification through the UNCCD. As mentioned in Table 4.4 above, 
Japan has been subject to few dust concentrations due to its geographical location, 
“downwind of the typical dust trajectories” and “its greater distance from the source 
regions” than the ROK (ibid., p. 448). Despite its little environmental impacts of 
                                                          
98 Mongolia, in particular, has pursued “financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance” 
and relied on “help from outside organizations such as UN organizations, foreign aid agencies, 
and foreign foundations to beef up its scientific capability” (Wilkening, 2006, pp. 443-444). 
According to Wilkening, Mongolia’s stagnant economy has brought “limited technological 
capacity in areas such as silviculture; a shortage of trained personnel; underdeveloped policy and 
legal structure relative to land use management; and a weak scientific capacity to forecast and 
give early warning of dust storms” (ibid., p. 443). 
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desertification and DSS, Japan has been the “the second largest donor country to the 
UNCCD” since it became a party of the Convention in 1998 (UNCCD, 2006b, p. 3). 
Japan explicitly stated its preference to ODA for environmental cooperation to practice 
its “partnership” for developing countries, based on the philosophy of “human security” 
as follows: 
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Japan 
announced the policy for environmental cooperation mainly through its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), entitled the "Environmental Conservation 
Initiative for Sustainable Development (EcoISD), as a revision of former 
Initiative, the "Initiatives for Sustainable Development toward the 21st Century 
(ISD) ". The philosophy of EcoISD consists of “Human Security”, “Ownership & 
Partnership”, and “Pursuit of Environmental Conservation & Development”. 
Environmental problems threaten the survival of human beings, so it is important 
to tackle them from the viewpoint of “Human Security”. It is vitally important 
that developing countries assume primary responsibility and role for tackling such 
problems through their own “Ownership” and that the various stakeholders in the 
international community work together in a spirit of “Partnership”. (UNCCD, 
2006b, p. 3)  
 
As Wilkening argues, “this seemingly incongruous support” of Japan has partly resulted 
from “the desire to curry favor among developing nations and the desire to export its 
expertise in forestry” (2006, p. 448).  
The ROK seems to have genuine concerns for the international efforts on dealing 
with desertification because it has been subject to large dust concentrations due to its 
geographical location as “the closest downwind region along the typical atmospheric 
trajectories from the China-Mongolia dust source regions” without its own desert areas 
(Wilkening, 2006, p. 446).  
Thus, it can be argued that China and Japan among the three countries have taken 
the adaptation process of socialization because the creation of a regional cooperative 
mechanisms, TDGM, was based not primarily on an environmental concern of these 
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countries, but rather by their particular political and practical concerns. Participation in 
TDGM activities was a means for each country to achieve other objectives than an end to 
DSS issue itself. Little learning process of socialization has been observed in the 
participation of these three member countries. 
In addition to these external international negotiation circumstances in Northeast 
Asia, this subsection examines the internal process of socialization through the 
participation patterns of delegates to international meetings, showing the way in which 
delegates to international meetings and negotiations have engaged in social interactions.  
This sub-section investigates the interconnectedness of participants of TDGM and ones 
of the UNCCD activities. This section argues that it is doubtful that the UNCCD 
activities enhanced the learning aspect of the socialization process among Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean Chinese experts in TDGM activities due to little interconnectedness 
of TDGM and UNCCD.   
As stated in the above discussion of TDGM’s development, the UNCCD seems to 
have awakened Northeast Asia to the necessity of regional cooperation regarding DSS 
through urging countries to conduct several research projects related desertification, but it 
did not create direct contributions to consolidating regional understanding of DSS issues 
due to the lack of participation of scientists, involved in UNCCD research activities, in 
the TDGM activities. Even though the UNCCD was created in response to concerns 
about African drought, Asian countries started to develop their own tools through 
participating in the UNCCD. As of May 2012, 194 countries and the European Union had 
become parties to the UNCCD. As shown in Table 4.7, all Northeast Asian countries 
signed and ratified the convention in the mid-late 1990s: China (1994/1997), Japan 
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(1994/1998), Mongolia (1994/1996), and the ROK (1994/1999). Given that China and 
Mongolia were the only two countries that had experienced significant desertification 
problems, they were the first countries in the region to adopt the UNCCD. 
Table 4.7 
Ratification of the UNCCD as of 2012 
Country Ratification Dates Out of 195 Parties 
Mongolia September 03, 1996 42nd 
China February 18, 1997 64th 
Japan September 11, 1998 139th 
ROK August 17, 1999 159th 
Russian Federation May 29, 2003 187th 
DPRK December, 29, 2003 191st 
Note: Adapted from “Update on Ratification of the UNCCD,” by UNCCD.  
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/convention/ratification-eng.pdf ) 
 
In addition to China’s having adopted UNCCD soon after its formation and 
participated in the submission of the National Action Plans to UNCCD, the large number 
of Chinese experts listed on the roster of experts for DSS illustrates China’s active 
participation in UNCCD as well as its concern about desertification.  As of September 
2011, China boasted the largest number of experts on UNCCD’s Roster of Experts, 234 
out of 1,995 from 93 parties, almost 12% of the total number of experts, compared to 
Japan, 48; Mongolia, 3; and the ROK, 21 (UNCCD, 2011b). Article 24, paragraph 2, of 
the UNCCD99 states that the “Conference of the Parties shall establish and maintain a 
roster of independent experts with expertise and experience in the relevant fields” based 
on “nominations received in writing from the Parties, taking into account the need for a 
multidisciplinary approach and broad geographical presentation.”  
                                                          
99 Visit http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/Pages/Text-Part-IV.aspx#art24.  
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To implement its National Action Plans, China guaranteed that it would put into 
place, at various levels, measures designed to mitigate desertification.100 The Chinese 
government set up the China National Committee, composed of 16 ministries and 
commissions in the State Council of China for its implementation of these plans.101 The 
participation of 16 Chinese ministries of State Council in the China National Committee 
for implementing the UNCCD (CCICCD) may have diversified domestic measures,  
The Chinese National Focal Points for DSS are affiliated with the State Forestry 
Administration, helmed by Tuo Liu, Director General of the National Bureau to Combat 
                                                          
100 According to the China National Action Plan to Combat Desertification, China has set up three 
phases to combat desertification: the first between 1996 and 2000, the second between 2001 and 
2010, and the third between 2011 and 2050. These phases coincide with the schedule of the China 
National Economic and Social Developmental Plan. Each phase has different strategic objectives 
in terms of the magnitude of the area covered for rehabilitating lands affected by wind erosion, 
controlling lands affected by water erosion, revegetating degraded steppe and rangelands, treating 
salinized land, and establishing artificial plantation. To fulfill these objectives, China planned to 
launch several research centers such as National Desertification Monitoring Center and Early 
Warning System, National Training Center on Desertification, and National Research and 
Development Center on Desertification. It also planned to conduct numerous projects throughout 
the three phases, including 18 key projects to combat desertification caused by wind erosion; 
various projects to combat desertification caused by water erosion; 9 projects to achieve soil and 
water conservation at the middle reaches of the Yellow River and comprehensive watershed 
management of the upper reaches of Guanting, Miyun and Panjiakou Water Reservoirs; and 
various projects for controlling vegetative degradation and soil salinization. 
101 At the central governmental level, China developed desertification combating projects that 
were consistent with the National Industry Policy Outlines within the National Economic and 
Social Developmental Plan. The government also prepared the annual budget and encouraged 
low-interest-rate loans for projects involving ending desertification. It also included these 
research projects in its National Science and Technology Development Plan. China has 
promulgated several policies, laws, and regulations for the National Action Plan. These laws 
include a Forestry Law, Soil and Water Conservation Law, Water Law, Mineral Resources 
Management Law, Grassland Law, Land Management Law, Environment Protection Law, and 
Wild Life Protection Law. The government also established food security measures and social 
guarantee measures. The former guarantees food in areas affected by desertification disasters, and 
the latter guarantees dissemination of information to combat desertification at the root level, 
provision of alternative livelihoods for farmers affected by desertification, and support for the 
resettlement of farmers living in areas with fragile ecosystems. Local governments have also 
taken measures to implement the Local Action Programmes to Combat Desertification under the 
guidance of the National Action Plan to Combat Desertification at the local level through 
encouraging scientific research, high-level education, and technological extension and 
dissemination.  
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Desertification, and Jia Xiaoxia, Director of CCICCD.  As Appendix III shows, none of 
the participants in TDGM meetings, including meetings of the Steering Committee or 
WG1&2, have been affiliated with the State Forestry Administration. Furthermore, none 
of the 234 Chinese experts listed on the UNCCD’s Roster of Experts in 2011 has 
participated in TDGM meetings. None of the names of the 20 different delegates to 
various meetings of TDGM, including Steering Committee meetings in 2008 and 2013, 
WG1 meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, and a WG2 meeting in 2008, are 
included in the roster of Chinese experts for UNCCD.102 As such, little learning process 
of socialization has been allowed to Chinese scientists.  
Compared with China, the participants in UNCCD from Japan and the ROK enjoy 
somewhat better but not enough relationships with and the participants in TDGM. As 
shown in Appendix III, two of the 20 different Japanese delegates to TDGM meetings 
held in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 are included in the list of the roster of experts 
for UNCCD: Ken Yoshikawa, Professor at Okayama University, and Masao Mikami 
from Meteorological Research Institute of the Japan Meteorological Agency. Yoshikawa 
attended the WG2 meeting in 2008 and the WG1 meeting in 2013. Mikami attended only 
one meeting, WG1 in 2008. As a result, the Japanese delegates have had little chance to 
engage in the learning mode of socialization due to their sporadic attendance at these 
international meetings.  
The ROK’s attendance paints a picture similar to Japan’s. Only one out of 26 
different Korean delegates to TDGM meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 is 
                                                          
102 The lists of participants are available in these years only through TEMM websites and MOEK 
data sharing websites. TEMM has not updated meeting reports regularly. For more information, 
see 
http://www.temm.org/sub08/view.jsp?code=tm_jwg1&page=1&search=&searchstring=&id=36.  
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included in the roster of Korean experts for UNCCD: Yowhan Son of Korea University, 
who attended in 2013. No Korean delegates to the TDGM meetings have had an 
opportunity to work with the Korean experts at UNCCD, which has resulted in a lack of 
access to the learning method for Korean participants. 
Similarly to the interconnectedness between national experts for UNCCD and 
delegates to the TDGM meetings, the participation patterns of delegates to the TDGM 
also exhibits the adaptation processes of socialization. As shown in the case of EANET, 
bureaucratic rotation systems in East Asia have led participating countries to engage in 
the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization. As in the case of EANET, 
there are two groups of delegates to the TDGM meetings: (a) governmental officials, 
usually selected from ministries of the environment for Steering Committee meetings, 
and (b) scientists or researchers, most often selected from universities and national 
research centers, such as meteorological agencies. Because, as stated above, information 
about attendees of Steering Committee meetings is not kept up to date, these figures may 
not be completely accurate regarding the frequency with which governmental official 
delegates change.  
Even so, the lists of participants in the Steering Committee meetings in 2008 and 
2013, also available in Appendix III, show that none of the Chinese, Japanese, or Korean 
delegates to the two Steering Committee Meetings attended the meetings in both years. 
Six Chinese delegates to the TDGM meetings (five for the Steering Committee meetings 
and one to a WG1 meeting) were from the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Other 
delegates to TDGM meetings were from the China National Environmental Monitoring 
Center (CNEMC), Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences (CRAES), 
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China Meteorological Administration (CMA), Liaoning Environment Monitoring Centre, 
and China-ASEAN Environmental Cooperation Center.   
Japan is the only participating country that has sent the same delegates from the 
Ministry of Environment to the WG1 meetings for 2 consecutive years. Shintaro Fujii 
attended WG1 meetings in both 2009 and 2010, and Hitoshi Yoshizaki attended WG1 
meetings in 2011 and 2013. Thus, it can be argued that few opportunities have been 
available for participants to take the learning rather than adaptation because the turnover 
rate of bureaucrats and diplomats is so high. 
Unlike the frequent changes in national delegates to the Steering Committee 
meetings, the other group of delegates to the meetings of the working groups of TDGM, 
the scientists, has shown more consistent participation patterns. A few Chinese scientist 
delegates have attended WG1 and WG2 in consecutive years and have had opportunities 
to engage in the learning process. Xiaochun Zhang from the China Meteorological 
Administration attended the WG1 meetings for 3 consecutive years between 2009 and 
2011. Additionally, three Chinese delegates attended WG1 meetings for 2 consecutive 
years.  
Japanese scientist delegates have tended to exhibit even more consistent 
participation patterns than China. Three Japanese delegates attended WG1 meetings for 4 
consecutive years: Masataka Nishikawa from Japan’s National Institute for 
Environmental Studies (NIES), Nobuo Sugimoto from NIES, and Takashi Maki from 
Meteorological Research Institute of the Japan Meteorological Agency. Korean scientist 
delegates have shown participation patterns consistent with those of the Japanese. 
Youngsin Chun has attended WG1 meetings in the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, as 
 
  
203 
 
well as one Steering Committee meeting in 2013. Sumin Kim from KMA also attended 
WG1 meetings held in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, and Eun-Hee Lee from KMA has 
attended three WG1 meetings in 3 consecutive years.  
As such, all three countries have allowed several scientist delegates to 
consistently attend the TDGM meetings and to have enough time to engage in the 
learning processes of socialization, whereas the governmental official delegates have not 
had the same opportunities. The political delegates may have consulted those scientist 
delegates who have built professional expertise through the scientific focus of the Joint 
Research of TDGM and longer terms of service. However, as the case of EANET 
illustrates, it is unclear whether the consistent patterns maintained by scientist delegates 
have helped governmental officials participate in the learning processes of socialization. 
The governmental official delegates, who have had only short terms of service due to 
bureaucratic rotation systems, are limited in the amount of interaction they can have with 
scientist delegates and thereby have taken the adaptation rather than learning processes of 
socialization.   
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and 
socialization have affected the collective action of the countries in the region most 
affected by DSS. This chapter argues that TDGM has largely proven a failure in terms of 
generating broader cooperation and useful measurement data for the region. The TDGM 
has produced few research outcomes that might induce participating countries of the 
region to draft any practical policies to deal with environmental degradation caused by 
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DSS. Furthermore, a consideration of the various levels and degrees of collective action 
in the three cases examined by this dissertation reveals that the Joint Research under 
TDGM has developed a lesser degree of collective action than EANET due to its failure 
to establish solid financial arrangements and concrete collective action associated with 
joint research, even though it has realized formal collective action at the governmental 
level. The involvement of the ministries of environment of the three countries and their 
agreement on the Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee and the Working 
Groups for Joint Research on DSS have led TDGM to become a formal cooperative 
mechanism, yet TDGM has neither developed concrete obligations that participating 
countries are required to fulfill for the joint research program nor reached any legally 
binding agreements.  
This study concludes that political leadership is the only variable positively 
associated with highly formal collective action. The ROK’s political leadership, based on 
moderate but dominant financial contributions to the Joint Research of TDGM, has 
enabled participating countries in the region to structure their cooperation. Specifically, 
the financial assistance the ROK extended to China for the Joint Research on Prevention 
and Control of DSS has allowed China to participate in the joint research of TDGM. 
However, it is evident that the political leadership exerted by the ROK within the TDGM 
is much weaker than that by Japan within EANET in terms of the magnitude of its 
financial contributions in a year (in U.S. dollars, Japan’s roughly $400,000 contributions 
for the secretariat and another $400,000 for the network center dwarf the ROK’s 
$75,000). The ROK’s limited exercise of leadership in TDGM seems to explain the 
organization’s lesser degree of formal and concrete collective action.  
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This chapter’s findings do not support the second hypothesis, which predicts that 
countries in the region will achieve more formal and concrete collective action if they 
build greater commonly shared knowledge. The lack of shared scientific knowledge 
about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM cannot explain why TDGM has 
succeeded in establishing the formal mode of collective action through creating the first 
governmental-level, multilateral cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS 
issues in Northeast Asia in a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present.  
The third hypothesis, which predicts that it is more likely that participating 
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts will create formal and concrete 
collective action through regional cooperation if they take the learning rather than the 
adaptation process of socialization, cannot also explain the formal mode of collective 
action of TDGM.  
Yet the examination of these two variables—shared scientific knowledge and 
socialization processes—reveals the social mechanisms between these variables and 
contributes to an explanation for why TDGM has not developed into a legalized 
cooperative mechanism and instead continues to focus on science. As became evident in 
the EANET case, political leadership alone has not led participating countries to engage 
in the learning process of socialization. The lack of shared scientific knowledge among 
regional scientists, especially about the causes of DSS and the consequences directly 
related to economic loss driven by DSS, has not motivated the countries participating in 
TDGM to develop a more regulatory regional regime. Along with the lack of knowledge, 
the lack of overlap or interconnectedness between national experts for UNCCD and 
delegates to the TDGM meetings, and the too-frequent turnover among governmental 
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officials and diplomats because of bureaucratic rotation systems has led countries in the 
region to engage in the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization.  
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CHAPTER 5  
JOINT RESEARCH ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR 
POLLUTANTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA (LTP) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with regional efforts focusing on identifying the diffusion of 
emissions of specific transboundary air pollutants such as SO2 and NOx through the Joint 
Research on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP). A joint 
research project among China, Japan, and the ROK, the LTP was initiated by the 
National Institute of Environment Research (NIER) of the ROK. It aims to “understand 
the state of air quality in Northeast Asia, laying a foundation for research on long-range 
transports, to develop the scientific basis for environmental decision-making, and 
ultimately to improve air quality in Northeast Asia” (TEMM, 2010, p. 37). Experts in 
monitoring and modeling, and governmental officials from these three countries, have 
held annual meetings for the LTP project since 1995. The 2010 Tripartite Environment 
Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan (TEMM) agreed that these 
meetings have helped the participants reach “a common understanding on a worsening of 
air quality in the region” through “conducting joint research on LTP monitoring and 
modeling as well as emission inventory” (2010, p. 37).  
The participating countries agreed to carry out ground monitoring and aircraft 
observation and to review the gridded emission data for SO2, NOx, and Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC) at their First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999 (Secretariat of 
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Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 4). As shown in Figure 5.1, China chose 
Dalian and Xiamen, Japan chose Rishiri and Oki, and the ROK chose Gangwha, Taean, 
and Gosan103 as their monitoring sites based on the Terms of Reference of LTP adopted 
at the First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Locations of monitoring sites for LTP. Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s 
Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of 
Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 13.  
 
Despite two decades of continuous effort, however, LTP, like EANET and 
TDGM projects, has been largely a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation and 
producing useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional 
environmental regime. Unlike EANET and TDGM, however, LTP has established neither 
formal nor concrete forms of collective action in the region. The LTP participants have 
                                                          
103 The ROK changed its monitoring sites from these three locations to Gosan and Dukjeok at the 
Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005. 
 
  
209 
 
reached no agreement about the program’s organizational structure, whereas the 
participants of EANET and TDGM created joint announcements specifying their 
structures in their early years, 2000 and 2007, respectively. Due to the lack of formal 
characteristics of cooperation, the participating governments have been reluctant to 
endorse the annual reports presented by the Secretariat of the Working Group for LTP, 
and therefore no research results have been officially published. Another reason the 
research findings have not been endorsed is that the Chinese and Japanese governments 
appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many scientific research projects in which they 
are engaged.  
In addition to this lack of formal mode of collective action, LTP has established 
few concrete forms of collective action. It has developed neither common methods for 
monitoring essential items nor shared modeling programs for its modeling research 
activities. The failure to move from joint research to more substantive forms of 
environmental policy cooperation can be explained by the absence of all three of the 
previously identified factors that contribute to meaningful regional cooperation: the 
absence of political leadership, the inability to mobilize scientific research results for 
creating shared knowledge, and the absence of learning as a socialization process. 
The following sections examine the limited extent of LTP’s political leadership, 
shared knowledge, and socialization activities, especially in comparison to the greater 
success of EANET and TDGM. This chapter thus considers possible reasons for the LTP 
program’s having developed the least extent of collective action. This relative failure is 
puzzling given that the ministries of environment of all the three countries have affirmed 
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their commitment to LTP program as well as EATNET in their joint communiqué of the 
TEMM: 
Regarding air pollution, the Ministers noted that acid deposition is still a serious 
problem in the region and reaffirmed their commitment to promoting the activities 
of the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) and joint 
research on Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP). 
The Ministers stressed the importance of information exchange, capacity building 
and joint research and showed great expectation for the future development of 
EANET and LTP. (TEMM, 2006) 
 
Development of LTP 
In 1995, the government of the ROK organized an international workshop titled 
the First Northeast Asian Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants which was 
held in Seoul. At this workshop, participants from China, Japan, and the ROK agreed to 
“launch a working group composed of government officials and experts from each of the 
three countries to support a joint research on LTP” and to “establish an interim secretariat 
at the National Institute of Environmental Research in Korea for supporting LTP 
organization and affairs of the working group” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP 
Project, 2010a, p. 3). Two working group meetings were held in the following years to 
prepare for a full-fledged launch of the joint research (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 
List of LTP Meetings 
Year Working Group Meetings 
Sub-Working Group 
Meetings Location 
1995 Northeast Asian Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants Seoul, ROK 
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1996 1st Expert Meetinga - Seoul, ROK 
1997 2nd Expert Meeting - Seoul, ROK 
1999 - 1st  Seoul, ROK 
2000 3rd Expert Meeting 2nd Seoul, ROK 
2001 4th Expert Meeting 3rd Seoul, ROK 
2002 5th Expert Meeting 4th  Gyeongju, ROK 
2003 6th Expert Meeting 5th  Jeju, ROK 
2004 7th Expert Meeting 6th  Xiamen, China 
2005 8th Expert Meeting 7th  Seogwipo, ROK  
2006 9th Expert Meeting 8th  Daegu, ROK 
2007 10th Expert Meeting 9th  Busan, ROK 
2008 11th Expert Meeting 10th  Unknown, ROK 
2009 12th Expert Meeting 11th  Jeju, ROK 
Note: Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s Joint Research on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of Working Group for LTP 
Project, 2010a, pp. 3-7; press releases from MOEK in various years. 
a The full title of the meeting is the First Expert Meeting for Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollutants in Northeast Asia. Since 2000, the LTP has separated the Expert Meetings for 
Long-range transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia into two groups of meetings: 
Working Group Meetings and Sub-Working Group Meetings. For example, the 10th Expert 
Meeting for Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia was divided into the 
10th Working Group and the Ninth Sub-Working Group Meeting. 
 
 At the First Expert Meeting of LTP in 1996, the participating countries agreed to 
perform joint research involving both monitoring and modeling and to upgrade the 
interim secretariat to an official secretariat to support the activities of the working group. 
At the Second Expert Meeting for LTP in 1997, two sub-working groups were created: 
one for monitoring and another for modeling. At the First Sub-Working Group Meeting 
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in August of 1999,104 the participants agreed to launch the Five-Year (September 1999-
December 2004) Plan for the Joint Research to discuss research plans and methods for 
conducting three stages of research and to adopt the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the 
Joint Research.  
The three agreed-upon stages were (a) building an International Co-operation 
Platform for monitoring, modeling, and emission inventory to be accomplished between 
1999 and 2004; (b) focusing on the analysis of LTP monitoring data, development of 
LTP emission inventories, and model evaluation of transboundary transport of sulfur and 
source-receptor relationships of SO2 between 2005 and 2007; and (c) continuing analysis 
of monitoring data and development of emission inventory and moving on to investigate 
the source-receptor relationships of NOx, Ozone, and PM between 2008 and 2012.105 
Each working group consisted of nine members, including three delegates 
(governmental officials, researchers, or professors) nominated by each country. Since the 
two sub-working groups were established at the Second Expert Meeting in 1997, the sub-
working group for monitoring has been led by Japan, and the sub-working group for 
modeling has been led by China and Japan (Chang, 2012).  The National Institute of 
Environmental Research (NIER) in the ROK has served as the secretariat of LTP.  
 
 
                                                          
104 In 1999, no working group meeting was held.  
105 According to Lim-Seok Chang, the LTP deals with anthropogenic particulate matter, 
excluding dust and sandstorms, to avoid duplication of work between the LTP and the TDGM. 
(Interview with Lim-Seok Chang on March 31, 2010.) 
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Figure 5.2. Organization of LTP. Adapted from “LTP Project Assessment and Future Activity,” 
by Lim-Seok Chang, 2012. http://www.iges.or.jp/en/gc/pdf/activity20121207/LIM-
SEOKCHANG.pdf.  
 
LTP’s Achievements and Limitations 
As the organizational chart in Figure 5.2 shows, LTP project has established basic 
organizational settings for monitoring, including which items to monitor and how to 
share the collected data. LTP can be categorized as a formal cooperative program because 
governmental officials and experts from all three countries have participated in the 
meetings. The Working Group includes working-level officials, most from ministries of 
environment, and experts at the national research institutes, such as the National Institute 
of Environmental Research (NIER) in the ROK, the National Institute of Environmental 
Studies (NIES) in Japan, the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences 
(CRAES), and professors in academia. The Working Group was established to play the 
role of governing body. Although the main actors in the LTP programs are drawn from 
the staff of environmental research institutes in the three countries, active involvement by 
Working Group 
Secretariat 
Joint Research 
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Sub-Working 
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officials from the countries’ ministries of environment gives LTP greater status as a form 
of international cooperation than that of a research institution (Chu, 2005; MOEK, 
2009a).106 Furthermore, in February 2000, the LTP project became one of the nine 
projects managed by Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM),107 indicating 
that the LTP project has become recognized as an official cooperative activity rather than 
simply a joint research project conducted by scientists from three countries. 
There are two kinds of monitoring activities: intensive monitoring and long-term 
monitoring. Through its long-term monitoring, LTP collects three kinds of data: existing 
continuous monitoring station data; PM (2.5 or 10), SO2, O3, NOx, and meteorological 
data; and precipitation data (pH, EC, anion, cation, rainfall) (Kim, 2008). The items to be 
measured and periods over which intensive monitoring would take place were agreed 
upon at the annual expert meeting. For example, the participants in the 10th Expert 
Meeting in 2007 agreed to measure specific air pollutants: SO2, NO2, PM10, and ionic 
components (O3 and PM2.5 optional). They also agreed to conduct intensive monitoring 
from May 20 to May 29, 2008, and from October 9 to October 18, 2008. 
In 2012, the LTP Secretariat made a presentation on “LTP Project Assessment 
and Future Activity” at the Better Air Quality (BAQ) Conference in Hong Kong. The 
Secretariat argued that LTP has contributed to creating research plans and capacity 
building on transboundary air pollutants and to enabling central compilation of 
                                                          
106 For China, the organization is the Ministry of Environmental Protection rather than the 
Ministry of Environment. 
107 The nine projects are (a) Korea/China/Japan Tripartite Joint Environmental Training; (b) Fresh 
Water Pollution Prevention Project; (c) Korea/China/Japan Environmental Industry Round Table; 
(d) The Tripartite Environmental Education Network; (e) TEMM Web Site; (f) Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP); (g) The Acid Deposition Monitoring 
Network in East Asia (EANET); (h) Tripartite Ecological Conservation in Northwest China; and 
(i) Northeast Asian Center for Environmental Data and Training (MOEK, 2009).  
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monitoring results and regional analysis results based on modeling, fulfilling one of its 
objectives, improving regional understanding on long-range transport of air pollutants. 
Nonetheless, this chapter argues that LTP falls far short of achieving formal 
collective action as defined in this study because it lacks the following three 
characteristics: (a) a clear division of labor within its organizational entities; (b) clear 
financial arrangements for its joint research; and (c) endorsement of the joint research 
reports by member countries. As to the first characteristic, there is little indication of the 
assigned tasks and responsibilities of different units within the organization. Specifically, 
it is unclear whether the Working Group has fulfilled its role as the organization’s formal 
governing body. Although the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the joint research were 
agreed upon at the First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999, the specific duties of the 
separate organizational entities have not been further clarified. In a 2012 presentation of a 
self-evaluation of LTP at the Better Air Quality Conference in Hong Kong, Lim-Seok 
Chang, a key participant from the ROK, pointed out that the responsibilities of the 
Working Group and the Sub-Working Group need to be clarified for the LPT to develop 
further. He also advised that the Working Group should focus on determining the work 
scope and budgetary issues of LTP and that the Sub-Working Group should concentrate 
on research activities, including an examination of the specifics of monitoring and 
modeling. 
Regarding the second characteristic, no financial arrangement has been set up for 
conducting the joint research projects. As will be discussed in the political leadership 
section, little cost sharing has occurred, and the ROK, as the initiator of the organization, 
has shouldered most of the financial burden. Although the Secretariat and the Network 
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Center of the EANET have reported their expenditures each year to the member countries 
at the Intergovernmental Meetings, no such reporting system has been established for 
LTP and none of the three countries has requested or shared financial information about 
their participation in the LTP project at the annual meetings. For instance, even though 
the ROK has provided financial assistance for China to participate in the joint research 
project, it has no information about how China has used this financial assistance because 
there is no forum for discussing the LTP’s financial arrangements. This problem has been 
recently recognized by the Secretariat of the LTP Working Group, which has 
recommended that the Working Group focus not only on the scope of the work to be done 
but also on budgetary issues (Chang, 2012).  
The third of these characteristics, a lack of willingness to endorse research results, 
also demonstrates LTP’s limited extent of formal collective action. Participating 
countries have not endorsed the publication of the annual reports as official, regional-
level announcements, and thus the reports are for internal use only. Nam and Lee contend 
that this “low visibility and limited access to its information for outsiders” has meant that 
“LTP has rarely been a subject for scholarly discussions on atmospheric governance in 
North-East Asia” (2012, p. 2). By agreement, the LTP-related press releases of each 
country include only its own national research results without mentioning those of any 
other country. For example, the ROK’s Ministry of Environment has issued press releases 
that include only the modeling results from the research conducted by ROK researchers 
(MOEK, 2009b).  
In addition to having developed little formal structure, LTP has established few 
concrete forms of collective action. If we consider its stated main objectives, it becomes 
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clear that the LTP project has failed to develop concrete forms of collective action over 
two decades. Those five objectives are the following: 
1. To present and discuss the results of the preceding year of research with a form of 
national report being submitted by each country 
2. To discuss the needs of scientific research required to clarify uncertainties and 
gaps in our knowledge  
3. To improve our understanding on long-range transport of air pollutants in 
Northeast Asia 
4. To contribute to laying a foundation for the research on long-range transports of 
air pollutants 
5. To provide policy-makers with science-based information, aimed to prevent or 
reduce adverse impact on the environment of Northeast Asia. (Secretariat of 
Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 3) 
 
Concerning the lack of formulating concrete forms of collective action, the 
Secretariat of the LTP Working Group has recommended that the Sub-Working Groups  
“examine the specifics of modeling and monitoring” for more consistent research across 
countries (Chang, 2012).  
For instance, the method and frequency of long-term monitoring in the three 
countries vary (Table 5.2). Aircraft measurement is optional and based upon its 
availability in each country rather than fixed measurement periods.  
Table 5.2 
Description of Monitoring Methods for Essential Items 
 
China Japan ROK 
Method Freq. Method Freq. Method Freq. 
Wet 
pH pH Meter D or P 
Glass 
Electrode 
Daily pH Meter Daily 
EC EC Meter D or P 
Conductivity 
Cell Daily EC Meter Daily 
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Precipi-
tation Rain Gauge D or P Rain Gauge Daily Rain Gauge Daily 
Anions IC D or P IC Daily IC Daily 
Cations AAS D or P IC Daily AAS Daily 
NH4+ IC D or P IC Daily UV Daily 
Dry 
SO2 
UV Fluore-
scence 
(Dalian) 
C 
UV Fluore-
scence 
Hourly 
UV Fluore-
scence 
C 
DOAS-open 
Path 
(Xiamen) 
NOx 
Chemilumi-
nescence 
(Dalian) C 
 
Chemilumi-
nescence 
Hourly Chemilumi-
nescence 
C 
NO 
DOAS-open 
Path 
(Xiamen) 
PM mass N/A - TEOM, ß-ray Hourly N/A - 
O3 N/A - UV 
Photometry 
Hourly UV 
Photometry 
C 
PM10 
ß-gauge 
(Dalian) 
C N/A  ß-gauge C 
TEOM 
(Xiamen) 
PM2.5 N/A - N/A  
3 Stage Filter 
Pack System 
- 
CO N/A - N/A  NDIR C 
PM2.5, 
PM10, 
comp. 
N/A - N/A  IC and AA _ 
 
C: Continuous 
D or P: Daily or when precipitation 
N/A: Not Analyzed 
TEOM: Tapered Element Oscillating Microbalance 
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DOAS: Differential Optical Absorption Spectrometry 
Note: Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s Joint Research on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of Working Group for LTP 
Project, 2010a, p. 17.   
 
Furthermore, comparing the research results presented by the various participants 
can be difficult given that monitoring methods and air pollutants are unique to each 
country. This lack of comparability of monitoring results is problematic. According to 
Levy, coordination of national research programs is “the bedrock” of all activities under 
CLRTAP because “it ensures comparability of results across Europe” (1993, pp. 87-88). 
He contends that 
Without standardization of data collection, measurement, and analysis procedures, 
even those countries with an active interest in acidification would be unable to 
pool their results. With harmonized research methods it is possible to make 
comparative assessments of environmental quality, and to make better 
assessments of changes over time. It also enhances the credibility of national 
research in foreign capitals. (Levy, 1993, p. 88) 
 
The participants in LTP meetings from different countries have discussed their 
own research results at the annual meetings, and their research reports have been 
compiled in the annual reports by the secretariat of LTP. Moreover, at the Third Working 
Group and the Second Sub-Working Group Meetings in 2000, the participants agreed to 
“acknowledge all the activities of LTP and identify the need for annual reports in addition 
to LTP meeting proceedings” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 
4). Since then, the participants have presented their individual research results at the 
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annual meetings and discussed the format and contents of the annual reports and the work 
plan.108  
Despite these efforts, the annual reports have become merely a collection of 
national reports submitted to the Secretariat of LTP, who combines and reorders each 
country’s research results according to the previously agreed-upon format and contents. 
Thus, the annual reports do not include any evaluations or comparisons between nations. 
Moreover, the submission of data is voluntary, and the monitoring methods to be used 
and the types of air pollutants to be monitored in long-term monitoring are determined by 
each country because no specific guidelines and requirements have been defined. The 
only common feature of the countries’ monitoring is the use of common units of density 
for a few air pollutants, which was agreed upon in 2004.109  
This is very different from European practices on data sharing through 
Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission 
of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP). As described in chapter 6, EMEP has not only 
succeeded in establishing reliability of monitoring results of participating countries in 
various verification manners but also produced a matrix of emission trajectories with 
which “it is possible to identify where a country’s deposition originates and where its 
emissions finally end up” (Levy, 1993, p. 88). In contrast, as far as modeling is 
concerned, each participating country of Northeast Asia has adopted its own model for 
analyzing source-receptor relationships rather than creating a common model. Because of 
                                                          
108 The expert meetings have been held late in the year, such as October or November, and the 
annual reports have been released early the next year, such as in February or March. 
109 Specifically, the participants agreed to use common units of density of air pollutants--ppb for 
SO2, NOx (or NO2), and O3; µg/m³ for PM--at the Seventh Expert Meeting held in 2004. 
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the lack of standard methods for monitoring and research results for modeling, this 
chapter argues, LTP has developed less concrete collective action than EANET has.  
Largely as a result, there appears to be little common understanding developed 
among the participating countries, even though the modeling results of each country have 
not been that different, as described in the knowledge section later in this chapter. Chan-
woo Kim, Director-General for International Cooperation at Ministry of Environment of 
the ROK, has recognized this challenge and asserted that LTP “should double its efforts 
to produce any meaningful outcome for policy-makers” (Kim, 2009, p. 29). 
Responding to this challenge, participating countries have begun to search for 
answers to the question of how countries can perform a central compilation of monitoring 
and modeling data despite the current lack of organization. The recent Proposal for the 
Future Development of the LTP Project, presented at the 2012 meeting, “suggests 
forming a Science Advisory Committee that consists of authoritative experts from the 
three countries that would be in charge of publishing a comprehensive report for 
policymakers by integrating and analyzing reports by countries” (Nam & Lee, 2012, p. 
10), which bodes well for the future development of LTP activities; however, it is too 
early to evaluate whether the committee can achieve its purpose. 
In relation to the fourth objective of laying a foundation for research on 
transboundary air pollutants, the Secretariat has concluded that LTP has succeeded in 
accumulating and distributing datasets it produces, in publishing national/regional 
reports/clinical manuals and scientific papers on LTP,” and in supporting and developing 
websites and computer software for data interpretation and modeling. For the fifth 
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objective, providing policy-makers with scientific information, the Secretariat has 
determined that the LTP project has enabled policy-makers to learn about estimates of the 
influence and severity of long-range air pollutants in Northeast Asia through their 
national reports. 
 Despite the LTP Secretariat’s insistence that the LTP project has made 
contributions, however, how much it has actually accomplished over two decades 
remains unclear. I would argue that its objectives are not specific enough, particularly 
regarding the scope of the countries’ research and the role of science beyond providing 
policy-makers with “science-based information” that can lead them to act to “prevent or 
reduce adverse impacts on the environment of Northeast Asia.” It is difficult to anticipate 
what kinds of action plan can be drawn based on the LTP joint research, particularly 
regarding the policy-making processes of each country. Some participants in Northeast 
Asian environmental cooperation on transboundary air pollution are not sure of the LTP’s 
objectives, which remain somewhat general. For example, during an interview, one key 
Japanese participant in the EANET expressed uncertainty about the goals of the LTP 
project: “Japan asked Korea of what their next step, but it was not sufficiently clear.. 
What would Korean colleagues be willing to do with LTP?” 110 
A recent scientific paper, “Sulfur Deposition Simulations Over China, Japan, and 
Korea: a Model Intercomparison Study for Abating Sulfur Emission,” (Kim et al., 2012) 
seems to show some progress in the clarification of the LTP objectives and production of 
                                                          
110 Interview with Katsunori Suzuki on April 23, 2010. He has had various occasions to meet the 
LTP participants from Japan and the ROK. 
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shared research results. Unlike the somewhat vague objectives of LTP, this article states 
the objectives of LTP more explicitly: 
The trilateral agreements among China, Japan, and Korea have launched the 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) project, aimed 
at lowering sulfur and nitrogen emissions by setting a target percentage level of 
deposition for each country. To do so, the concept of critical loads was utilized. 
Critical load is the maximum allowable depositions without increasing the 
probability of damage to the soil ecosystem. . . However, the critical loads 
approach requires a simulation based on a high resolution acid deposition model 
in order to diagnose the current acidic loadings for the purpose of maximizing 
cost effectiveness in abating emissions. Toward this end, the primary focus of the 
LTP project was agreed to better understand the capabilities of regional 
comprehensive acid deposition models for quantification of source-receptor (S–R) 
relationships. (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4074)  
 
This might be the first explicit statement of LTP objectives that indicates a 
specific role of science and direction for LTP research activities. Along with clarifying 
the objectives of LTP, this scientific article (Kim et al., 2012) contributes to the 
development of shared views on modeling activities. Even though the participants of the 
three countries have performed model inter-comparisons since 2007 and agreed to 
calculate source-receptor relationships for total nitrate with the Method III of EMEP in 
2008, they have not produced research results upon which they can agree; therefore, the 
recent publication of this paper (Kim et al., 2012)  jointly authored by 21 researchers 
from Northeast Asia (most of whom have attended annual expert meetings of LTP as 
representatives of each government), is significant.  
A senior researcher at NIER, the Secretariat of Working Group for LTP project, 
states that: 
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Scientific research has been conducted for the future, when China changes their 
attitudes and becomes more cooperative on regional environmental cooperation. 
Science tries to prepare for the answers to the future questions that China might 
raise for the evidences of transboundary pollution. As of now, there is no 
organization to put the transboundary concerns on the table except the TEMM 
which has no regulatory power in practice. We need to create the table for us to 
discuss transboundary pollution issues. (Interview with Lim-seok Chang on 
August 17, 2009)  
 
Finding “answers to the future questions that China might raise for the evidences of 
transboundary pollution” may result in the evolution of shared knowledge about source-
and-receptor relationships on transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia. 
 This paper (Kim et al., 2012) might serve as a cornerstone for the development of 
common understanding among China, Japan, and the ROK about transboundary air 
pollutants in Northeast Asia. Although it is uncertain whether this scientific research 
paper can represent the accomplishment of the LTP objectives,  this jointly authored 
article could be a late but essential starting point for developing common ground for 
further policy initiatives, particularly in a situation in which there has been no official 
publication of the joint research results.  
To summarize, LTP has developed little formal collective action because of the 
lack of a clear definition of the functions of the Working Group as the governing body 
and of the financial responsibilities of individual countries and has developed only a 
small degree of concrete collective action because of the varying research methods 
employed by participating countries and lack of specific guidelines for performing joint 
research. Although the participation of governmental officials and experts from national 
research institutes and academia in its annual meetings demonstrate that LTP has been 
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recognized as an official international mode of cooperation (Chu et al., 2005), LTP has 
faced many challenges in its attempts to build formal and concrete collective action. The 
following sections examine how the three factors - political leadership, shared scientific 
knowledge, and socialization - have affected the least development of formal and 
concrete collective action in the LTP project among the three regional cooperative 
mechanisms that this dissertation deals with.  
 
Political Leadership 
 This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political 
leadership exercised by individual participating countries in regional environmental 
cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete the collective action in the 
region will be. This study aims to investigate whether stronger political leadership taken 
by any country in the region, regardless of its material power, increases the likelihood of 
developing more formal and concrete collective action.  
Since the inception of the LTP project, the ROK, as its initiator, has exerted the 
most significant political leadership. The ROK has exerted extensive structural leadership 
through making dominant financial contributions and hosting most of the annual expert 
meetings of LTP. It has also exercised a small amount of directional leadership through 
its delivery of a variety of monitoring activities, such as aircraft monitoring. However, no 
country has wielded instrumental leadership within the organization. Despite the 
participation of governmental officials from the ministries of environment, most 
participants have tended to be scientists, who have focused on developing scientific 
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projects rather than crafting structures of LTP or on applying diplomatic skills in 
international meetings. Neither China nor Japan has shown any interest in exerting any 
form of leadership for LTP. These two countries might consider LTP as a scientific 
research organization rather than an international cooperative effort.  
Structural Leadership in LTP 
 As stated in the previous chapters, this dissertation assumes that any state in the 
region could exercise any form of political leadership if it were willing to do so, 
regardless of its material power. Based on this assumption, this study regards political 
leadership as independent of rather than predetermined by a state’s material capabilities. 
This contention differs from the realists’ assertion that political leadership can only come 
from the most powerful country and be exercised by the international structure or the 
powerful countries themselves.  
The structural leadership of LTP can be investigated in terms of two aspects: 
contributions toward its financing and meeting venues. In this, the LTP’s structural 
leadership resembles that of TDGM in the sense that the ROK government has 
shouldered the majority of the costs. Without the assignment of specific financial 
responsibilities, the ROK has provided the dominant financial contributions to supporting 
the joint research and meetings, and also travel expenses for meeting participants from 
China.  
Even though LTP is a joint research program, member countries have not reached 
any official form of financial agreement similar to EANET’s Decision on the Further 
Financial Arrangement for EANET. The Terms of Reference (TOR) is the only shared 
document that affirms the organizational structure of LTP, and thus, as mentioned earlier, 
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it has no forum similar to the intergovernmental meetings of EANET at which to discuss 
financial issues and report expenditures for the joint research. As the initiator, the ROK 
government has been the only financial contributor to the joint project, providing around 
US$600,000 a year between 2000 and the mid-2000s and around US$1,000,000 in 2007 
for joint research. The ministry of environment in the ROK expected the Korean 
government to spend US$950,000 in 2011 and US$1,450,000 a year between 2012 and 
2014 (MOEK, 2009a). China and Japan have not added funding for LTP activities to the 
LTP budgets. On the contrary, the ROK government has provided China with 6% of the 
LTP total budget to assist China in its research.  
Although Japan has allocated US$10,000 a year to the LTP’s activities, it is used 
only to reimburse its own scientists for travel costs incurred to attend the various LTP 
meetings beyond that provided by the NIER. As a senior researcher in charge of the LTP 
projects in Japan emphasized, however, “even this amount of budget is included in the 
budget for domestic monitoring, rather than being recognized as separate for LTP.”111  
  The vast difference in expenditures made by Japan (US$10,000 a year) and the 
ROK (around US$1,000,000) for LTP clearly demonstrates that the ROK has exercised 
considerable structural leadership. This making of a dominant contribution by one 
participating country resembles the financing of EANET, in which Japan has contributed 
more than 94% for the Secretariat and 99% for the Network Center, and of TDGM, in 
which the ROK was the only financial source for joint research on the prevention of DSS 
in Working Group II. The commonality among all of these cases is that the initiating 
country makes the largest financial contribution. This dominant structural leadership 
                                                          
111 Interview with Keiichi Sato, a senior researcher at the Atmospheric Research Department and 
Data Management Department of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) on February 8, 
2011. 
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exerted by one member country is quite different from the financing of the Cooperative 
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), as will be discussed in chapter 6.  
In addition to its dominant financial role, the ROK has also provided most of the 
meeting venues of LTP. As Table 5.1 shows, all meetings except the Seventh Expert 
Meeting have been held in the ROK. The Seventh Expert Meeting was the only meeting 
hosted by China, supported by the SEPA. It thus appears that not only the financing but 
the organizational efforts have not been shared equally by all participating countries.  
Based on the financial contributions and the provision of meeting venues, the 
ROK’s structural leadership of LTP has not been shared by the other two countries. 
Unlike China’s various domestic efforts to reduce its emissions, its participation in LTP 
has not been that strong; rather, it has been the recipient country of financial support for 
the joint research. Nor has Japan paid any significant amount of attention to LTP, 
although it has made a minor gesture toward sharing the financial burden. The ROK 
seems to be the only country that has exercised structural leadership and displayed formal 
interest and concrete action in strengthening LTP activities. Thus, it can be argued that 
the ROK’s significant political leadership has not driven formal and concrete collective 
action in the LTP project.  
Directional Leadership in LTP 
 As defined earlier, directional leadership is the ability to provide other member 
countries with a direction for their participation in international cooperation. There are 
two paths to exerting directional leadership. States can either generate intellectual capital 
or provide substantive solutions based on knowledge, thereby changing the perceptions of 
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risks and particular information, or they can present a good example of policy 
implementation for other countries to follow through unilateral policy implementation 
related to certain issues. Providing an example of success can increase other countries’ 
perceptions of what is both desirable and possible.   
 Because LTP is a joint research project without well-established policy goals, as 
previously described, it does not offer examples of participating countries taking the 
second path to directional leadership. As this leaves only the first path, increasing 
influence through knowledge, this study analyzes the amount of monitoring data that 
each country contributes to the annual reports. As shown in Table 5.3, participating 
countries have submitted significantly different types and amounts of information 
regarding monitoring results. Although for some categories, the number of reports has 
been the same across countries, the length and detail of information in those reports (as 
measured by pages) has varied considerably. 
Table 5.3  
Contributions of Each Country to Monitoring Data, in Number of Pages  
  Item of Measurement  China Japan ROK 
Annual 
Reports   2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 
Long-term 
Monitoring 
Gaseous 
measurements  2 1 3 3 7 3 
Particulate 
matter 1 1 2 3 2 1 
Surface 
meteorology 
Not 
submitted  
Not 
submitted 4 3 3 2 
Precipitation 2 2 7 6 2 2 
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Intensive 
Monitoring 
Gaseous 
measurements  
Not 
submitted  N/A 2 2 8 3 
Particulate 
matter 7 6 9 8 42 5 
Surface 
meteorology 
Not 
submitted  
Not 
submitted  5 4 5 2 
Precipitation Not submitted  N/A 2 1 1 N/A 
Satellite data 
and remote 
sensing 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A 
Aircraft 
measurement  N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 N/A 
Total Pages Contributed 9 10 29 30 80 18 
 
 China has reported very limited monitoring results, while Japan has made 
moderate contributions to the annual reports in terms of the specificity of information in 
its research. The ROK has exhibited more effort in preparing its national reports for the 
LTP project, substantially increasing the contents of its results in the 2010 annual report 
compared to those in the 2005 report. Most of this increase can be attributed to the 
intensive monitoring of particulate matter and aircraft measurement. The ROK was the 
only country that conducted aircraft measurements after the countries agreed at the 
Twelfth Expert Meeting in 2009 to conduct aircraft observation as an option for 
monitoring activities, depending on their monitoring capabilities and “situations of the 
participating countries” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 7). For 
China and Japan, conducting aircraft measurements might exceed their capabilities or 
willingness since it requires using complicated equipment, time performing data analysis, 
 
  
231 
 
and expenditures. This excerpt from the ROK’s report displays the complexity involved 
in aircraft measurements:  
 The aircraft used for measurements was Chieftain (PA31-350) made by Piper Co. 
In the cabin of aircraft, GPS (GARMIN, GPS II) was installed to monitor the 
longitudes, latitudes and altitudes. To analyze the concentration of SO2, NOx and 
O3, the equipments by THERMO Co. were set up. Ambient air was introduced 
into the cabin of the aircraft through a stainless steel tube connected to the inlet of 
a bottom of the airplane and into gas analyzers, which were automatically saved 
in a computer data logger for each 5 seconds. (Secretariat of Working Group for 
LTP Project, 2010a, p. 133)  
 
 The Japanese consider their participation in LTP monitoring activities 
supplementary to those they conduct for the EANET. A Japanese participant in LTP 
revealed that to prepare their national report for LTP, the Japanese use their EANET 
monitoring results for the long-term monitoring. For the intensive monitoring of LTP, the 
Japanese tend to ask EANET’s monitoring sites in Japan to send equipment rather than 
keeping them in their own institute.112 Japan thus duplicates some areas of work for LTP 
and EANET rather than investing extra effort and resources in building monitoring 
capacity specifically for LTP activities, which may explain why it has not conducted the 
optional aircraft measurements. According to Levy, one of benefits of collective research 
programs is that “they foster research efforts in countries that might not otherwise 
undertake them” (Levy, 1993, p. 88). However, LTP does not seem to have fostered 
Japan’s research efforts through LTP’s research activities. 
                                                          
112 Interview with Keiichi Sato. 
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 Since 2002, China has participated in long-term monitoring at three sites in 
Dalian and two sites in Xiamen; since 2003, it has also participated in the 10-day semi-
annual intensive monitoring program held in Dalian in the spring and in Xiamen in the 
fall (Meng & Yang, 2012). However, China’s sharing of monitoring results has been very 
low, as can be seen in the missing information and lack of elaboration in the annual LTP 
reports in Table 5.3.  
 On the other hand, the ROK’s 2009 aircraft measurement may offer new 
possibilities for the measurement of transboundary air pollutants. In fact, these aircraft 
measurement results have already helped the region better understand how the air stream 
affects the transportation of air pollutants through tracking the air stream and back 
trajectory analysis by region. The ROK’s 2009 flight measurements during the intensive 
monitoring period found that long-range air pollutants were transported in various 
patterns (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 140). This ROK stand-
alone measurement might serve as an excellent example of the development of 
measurement methods for monitoring transboundary air pollutants in the region. If so, it 
can be argued that the ROK has exerted directional leadership for LTP, particularly 
regarding monitoring. Some might argue that the ROK’s aircraft measurements reflect a 
lack of Korean directional leadership since no other countries have adopted this practice. 
However, because aircraft measurement is a relatively new practice, it might be too early 
to deem the ROK’s initiative a failure. If the data derived from the aircraft measurement 
is used in an efficient way, the ROK might become an exemplar of a country that has 
tried an expensive measurement method resulting in advancements in monitoring. 
Instrumental Leadership in LTP 
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 As discussed earlier, instrumental leadership consists of using negotiating skills 
during institutional bargaining processes. Countries with instrumental leadership function 
as agenda setters for certain issues, popularizers of issues to which they draw attention, 
inventors of innovative policy options, or brokers of various negotiation deals. As LTP 
has had a limited negotiating agenda for policies due to its focus on research rather than 
policy development, no participants in the expert meetings seem to have pursued 
instrumental leadership. No country has exerted instrumental leadership in regards to 
research activities.  
 For example, when participants at the 10th Expert Meeting in 2007 agreed to 
prepare a manuscript describing model results of deposition and concentration of 
transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, none 
of the countries showed any notable level of instrumental leadership. Participants agreed 
to exclude the sensitive source-receptor relationship, even though it is the most critical 
issue of the LTP project. No country has stepped up to lead the way in bringing the issue 
of source-receptor relationships into the joint research.   
 As stated in chapter 2, participating countries have been more willing to extend 
the scope of air pollutants, geographical areas, and time periods for the LTP’s monitoring 
joint research project than for EANET’s monitoring activities. At the Sixth Expert 
Meeting in 2003, the participants agreed to carry out a model simulation for March and 
July of 2002 cases; to assess source-receptor relationships for sulfur in five regions, 
including North Eastern China (Region 1), Central Eastern China (Region II), South 
China (Region III), the ROK (Region IV), and Japan (Region V); and to conduct model 
intercomparison (Figure 5.3). Since then, the experts for modeling have attempted to 
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expand their studies on sulfur deposition. At the Seventh Expert Meeting in 2004, the 
participants decided to extend the area to be included in the LTP model domain from 20-
50° N latitude and E 115-150° longitude to 20-50° N latitude and 100-150° E longitude 
to better simulate the long-range transport process.  
 
Figure 5.3. Five regions for model simulation in LTP. Adapted from “Joint Research Project on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in North East Asia: Progress and Outcomes,” by 
Jeong-Soo Kim, 2008, p. 18. 
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/airpollution/PDF/S3_18am_JeongSoo_Kim(NIER)_LTP.pdf. 
 
 The countries also agreed to include 4 more months of model simulation (January, 
April, August, and October of 2002) at the Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005, and an 
additional 6 months (February, May, June, September, November, and December of 
2002) to include the full year for calculating concentration and deposition at the Ninth 
Expert Meeting in 2006. At the 10th Expert Meeting, the participants finally agreed to 
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compile all of the results of the simulation for 2002 and to perform model inter-
comparison. In addition to the source-receptor relationship for sulfur, countries agreed to 
examine the source-receptor relationship for total nitrate for 4 months (March, July, 
October, and December of 2006) at the 11th Expert Meeting in 2008. 
 As explained in chapter 3, China’s objection to the extension of the scope of 
EANET has circumscribed Japan’s intention to exercise instrumental leadership. China 
has stressed the step-by-step process on the issue of extending EANET’s scope in terms 
of substances to be monitored and activities to be performed. In the case of LTP, the 
potential for extending the scope of air pollutants for monitoring was addressed in the 
opening remarks by Suk-jo Lee, Director General of Climate and Air Quality Research 
Department at National Institute of Environmental Research in the ROK, at the LTP 
meetings in 2010:  
Up to now, LTP project has focused on sulfur and nitrogen compounds to 
quantify the impact of acid pollutants on the ecosystem. Now, it is the time to 
consider entering a new stage of the LTP project. We confront new challenges of 
short-lived climate forcers such as ozone and particulate, as well as new 
hazardous pollutants of Hg, PAH and POPs. (Secretariat of Working Group for 
LTP Project, 2010b, p. 3) 
 
Unlike their response to EANET, however, China has not expressed opposition to the 
LTP’s ambitions to extend the scope of its research because, as argued in chapter 2, the 
LTP project is more research-oriented, and also because China might consider itself less 
threatened by the ROK’s firm exertion of leadership as compared to its more competitive 
relationship with Japan. The fact that participating countries may be willing to extend the 
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scope of the LTP research project even without any country at the helm is another reason 
to doubt that any of the countries have exercised firm instrumental leadership.  
 In short, the ROK has practiced political leadership within LTP. As the initiator, it 
has exercised structural leadership through making significant financial contributions and 
hosting most LTP meetings over the past two decades. It has also demonstrated 
directional leadership through providing the most effective monitoring data in its national 
reports, as well as developing a new aircraft measurement method. However, no country 
seems to have pursued instrumental leadership, as seen in the failure to address the 
sensitive issue of the source-receptor relationship that would allow for more 
understanding about transboundary air pollutants.  
 
Knowledge 
 The main objective of LTP is to accumulate scientific knowledge to provide 
greater understanding of long-range transport of air pollutants in Northeast Asia and 
science-based information to policy-makers to help them design policies that will reduce 
adverse effects of air pollutants on the regional environment. This section examines why 
the cooperative joint research LTP has conducted over the past two decades has brought 
little common understanding on the topic   
 Each country used its own model for conducting research on source-receptor 
relationships of SO2 for 2003 and NOx-related deposition for 2006. China used the 
Community Multi-scale Air Quality (CMAQ) regional air quality model, Japan used the 
Regional Air Quality Model (RAQM), and the ROK used the Comprehensive Acid 
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Deposition Model (CADM). These three models were used to run a simulation for the 
same period, domain, and emission data to identify air pollutants’ trajectories.  According 
to former Secretary of LTP, Ilsoo Park, “It would be good to have a common model like 
Europe. However, it might be better to regard the medium results of different models as 
more appropriate results. As three countries apply same emission data, the modeling 
results have been similar.” 113 Since the countries first agreed to perform model inter-
comparison at the 10th Expert Meeting in 2007, participants have “attempted to 
investigate the sensitivity to model variability arising from different model types, 
assumptions, and meteorological parameterizations including microphysics, cloud 
schemes, and other surface boundary forcing parameterizations” (Kim et al., 2012, p. 
4086). As part of the LTP project, two scientific articles compared these three models, 
focusing on sulfur deposition simulations for the year 2002 (Kim et al., 2012) and on the 
sulfur concentrations over Northeast Asia (Kim et al., 2011) to examine the models’ 
discrepancies. Both articles confirm that there are “lower aggregated uncertainties 
between the three models” (Kim et al., 2011, p. 399).  
 The three chemical models calculate “concentrations of chemical species in the 
gas phase, ion concentration in cloud droplets and rainwater, and amounts of wet and dry 
depositions” (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4075). The only parameters shared by the three models 
were the emission rates for SO2 and NOx, obtained from the national reports for the LTP 
project. This model inter-comparison study revealed “overall similarity between models” 
(Kim et al., 2012, p. 4083). The ensemble average of total sulfur depositions over the 
                                                          
113 Interviewed on March 29, 2010 
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three countries for 2002 revealed “only a small deviation (5-7%) among the three models,” 
and “nearly identical sulfur deposition patterns” (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4083).  
 Before the recent publication of these two articles, little common understanding 
on transboundary air pollutants existed among the three countries. As noted earlier, 
annual LTP reports have been published by collating national reports presented at the 
annual expert meetings, and these reports have not been adopted as official international 
findings. Thus, the joint research of LTP appears to be unlike the 1970s OECD study that 
became a cornerstone for CLRTAP and concluded that “air quality in any European 
country is measurably affected by emissions from other European countries” and that “if 
countries find it desirable to reduce substantially the total deposition of sulphur within 
their borders individual national control programmes can achieve only a limited success” 
(Semb, Eliassen, & Dutchak, 2004, p. 9).  
 That these articles, drafted by multiple LTP meeting participants, have been 
published does point toward the expansion of shared knowledge on transboundary air 
pollutants in Northeast Asia. Yet this is a very recent phenomenon, and more importantly, 
it remains uncertain whether this academic version of research will be accepted by three 
governments as official findings. It is doubtful if countries would understand the 
similarities of the rest of research results as shared understanding among countries just 
because this model inter-comparison study showed the overall similarity between models 
on the accumulated total sulfur deposition.  
 Furthermore, the source-receptor relationships calculated by the three different 
models have yielded some controversial results among member countries (see Table 5.4 
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and Table 5.5). Northwesterly March winds favor long-range transport from the continent 
in general, and wet deposition in downwind regions in particular, along with high 
precipitation. In contrast, the continent’s influence on downwind countries lessens 
because the synoptic pattern in summer is “characterized by a subtropic high over the 
ocean south of Japan and low pressures over most of continent, combined with cyclones 
moving northward over west Pacific ocean” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP 
Project, 2005, p. 212). Equipped with this knowledge, the three countries pay particularly 
close attention to the contribution rate of source to receptor for sulfur and nitrate 
depositions.  
 Tables 5.4 and 5.5 compare the research results of the three countries and show 
the models’ significantly different results. The sulfur depositions in the downwind 
regions, Region IV (the ROK) and Region V (Japan), vary in each country’s research 
results. According to the ROK’s modeling research results, 8.3% of sulfur deposition in 
Region IV is attributable to sulfur emissions from Region III (South China), while the 
Japanese model attributes only 3% and the Chinese model only 0.1% to that source. For 
the total nitrate depositions in the downwind regions, the ROK modeling research results 
indicate that 23.3% of nitrate deposition in Region IV is due to the nitrate emissions from 
Region III, while the Japanese and Chinese model results indicate only 7% and 12.8%, 
respectively. That the most sensitive issue of source-receptor relationships of the 
transboundary air pollutants has not been commonly understood among countries might 
explain why they agreed to exclude the source-receptor relationship section from 
published modeling results of the sulfur concentration and deposition in Northeast Asia in 
a peer-reviewed journal.    
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Table 5.4 
Sources and Receptors for Total Sulfur Deposition in March 2002 (%) 
Source          
receptor 
Region I Region II Region III Region IV Region V 
 C J K C J K C J K C J K C J K 
Region 
I 
74.7 73 62.6 4.3 4 36.9 1.5 1 0.1 10.3 6 0.1 10.3 9 0 
Region 
II 
24 26 1.3 92 91 91.2 18 20 7.3 14.5 10 0.2 14.5 16 0 
Region 
III 
1.2 1 0 3.5 5 26.3 80.4 76 73.2 3.8 3 0.1 3.8 3 0 
Region 
IV 
0.1 0 3.7 0.2 0 38.2 0.1 3 8.3 69.2 80 49.1 69.2 11 0.3 
Region 
V 
- 0 12.2 - 0 36.4 - 0 9.6 2.2 1 20.1 2.2 61 19.9 
Note: C stands for research results from China; J for research results from Japan; K for research 
results from ROK, revised from Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2005. 
Table 5.5 
Sources and Receptors of Total Nitrate Deposition in March 2006 (%) 
Source          
receptor 
Region I Region II Region III Region IV Region V 
 C J K C J K C J K C J K C J K 
Region 
I 
37.7 39 35.9 2.6 2 60.3 1.1 1 1.5 10.7 11 1.5 10.1 13 0.9 
Region 
II 
49.8 55 8.3 70.9 61 69.7 29.7 19 16.1 55.3 64 2.2 33.7 55 3.6 
Region 
III 
0.3 4 2.0 20.2 37 26.4 56.5 80 70 4.3 16 0.3 4.07 10 1.3 
Region 
IV 
1.8 1 14.9 0.6 0 29.9 0.1 0 5 12.8 7 
23.
3 
10.7 7 26.8 
Region 
V 
0.3 0 17.6 0.2 0 24 0.1 0 3.3 5.6 2 
11.
8 
33.3 15 43.2 
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Note: C stands for research results from China; J for research results from Japan; K for research 
results from ROK, revised from Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010. 
 
 Despite these differences in results, according to Nam and Lee, “the value 
disparity among the countries has been in fact narrowed compared to the past” (2012, p. 
6).114 Based on the most recent annual report from 2012 of the LTP project, Nam and Lee 
tried to show discrepancies among the three countries’ modeled average values over 
February, May, June, and November of 2006 for the source-receptor relationships for 
total nitrate dry and wet depositions (Figure 5.4). 
 
 
                                                          
114 For specific degrees of discrepancies of different research projects on the source-receptor 
relationships, see Kim, 2007. 
Contribution from Region I
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
I II III IV V
Receptor Region
Pe
rc
en
t
ROK study
Japanese study
Chinese study
Contribution from Region II
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
I II III IV V
Receptor Region
Pe
rc
en
t
Contribution from Region III
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
I II III IV V
Receptor Region
Pe
rc
en
t
Contribution from Region IV
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
I II III IV V
Receptor Region
Pe
rc
en
t
 
  
242 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Relative contribution from sources to receptors for total nitrate dry and wet deposition. 
Adapted from “Reverberating Beyond the Region in Addressing Air Pollution in North-East Asia,” 
by Nam and Lee, 2012, p. 6. 
  
In addition to the disparity between assessments of source-receptor relationship 
for sulfur and nitrate in the five regions since 2003, LTP has not identified the extent to 
which its research activities should be expanded to provide policy makers with science-
based information. Reducing “emissions of acidifying substances usually is accomplished 
by setting ambient-air-quality standards and then specifying specific fuels or technologies 
to ensure that those standards were met” (Clark, Jäger, Cavender-Bares, & Dickson, 2001, 
pp. 32-33). Europe has taken ambitious efforts since the early 1990s to “design ‘effects-
based’ acid rain management strategies that scale emission decreases to estimates of the 
‘critical loads’ of deposition that down-wind ecosystems can tolerate” (Clark et al., 2001, 
p. 33).  
LTP has also discussed the method of critical load related to the impact of long-
range transboundary air pollutants. At the Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005, the participants 
agreed to begin considering the critical load in relation to the impact of long-range 
transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia and “check the capacity of current research 
Contribution from Region V
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
I II III IV V
Receptor Region
Pe
rc
en
t
 
  
243 
 
and potential activities on critical load in each country” (Secretariat of Working Group 
for LTP Project, 2005, pp. 5-6). Until recently, however, no specific research outcomes 
have been shared. This slow development of understanding the critical load in the region 
contrasts with Europe’s speedy development. It took only a decade for the CLRTAP to 
utilize the concept of critical load in its protocols. In the mid-1980s, Scandinavians 
promoted the concept of critical loads which was developed in Canada (Levy, 1993). The 
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions, adopted in 1994, was the first 
protocol which was based on the critical loads approach to identify differentiated 
emission reductions on the basis of the effects of air pollutants. Even though the research 
on critical load appears significant, it might also lead LTP to study the topic endlessly 
without actually providing the region with useful scientific criteria for taking political 
action. For that reason, one ROK participant in the Working Group maintains that 
It is important to determine the scope of the research to identify research phases. 
If we have research objects, it would be good enough to understand the current 
status and its implications of pollutants to achieve scientific goals that could 
provide political momentum for consensus. For example, if we aim to understand 
critical load, it would take 10 more years to achieve scientific goals.115  
 
To summarize, Northeast Asian countries have developed very little shared 
understanding about transboundary air pollutants through the LTP cooperative 
mechanism. Even though LTP is a joint research program of these three countries, each 
country has developed its own model for conducing impact assessment of air pollutants 
in Northeast Asia and calculating the source-receptor relationship for sulfur and nitrate 
                                                          
115 Interview with Jinseok Han on March 31, 2010. 
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depositions. Despite relying on different modeling tools, researchers from the three 
countries agree that source-receptor results for sulfur are “similar among the three models” 
(NEASPEC, 2012d, p. 12). Nonetheless, this similarity of the research results has not 
influenced policy making for dealing with long-range transboundary air pollutants. LTP 
is still hesitant to adopt conclusive formal or official research results, stating that “the 
final result of full year simulation still needs one or two years to become available” 
(NEASPEC, 2012d, p. 12). The ambitious study on the critical load has not produced any 
conclusive research results that call for specific policy options. Given the lack of clear 
research objectives and an agreed-upon scope of research activities beyond some recent 
clarification in an academic journal article, LTP appears to have a long way to go to gain 
the type of shared knowledge necessary to successfully meet its goals.  
 
Socialization 
This section examines Hypothesis 3, which holds that if participating countries in 
regional environmental cooperation efforts adopt the learning rather than the adaptation 
as a process of socialization, they are more likely to create more formal and concrete 
collective action through regional cooperation. Following Ernst Haas’s classification, 
through the adaptation process, it holds, international actors can change their behavior by 
responding to new events without questioning their beliefs about underlying values or 
basic causal mechanisms. In contrast, through the learning process, international actors 
can change their behaviors by engaging in new thinking that reflects a more fundamental 
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process than adaptation because they can question their originally held theories and 
values through learning.  
This section investigates which of the two processes of socialization, adaptation 
and learning, the participating countries have engaged in. To determine the socialization 
processes, this study qualitatively measures the participation patterns of member 
countries through navigating two questions: (1) whether countries are more likely to have 
engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found intrinsic motivations 
for their regional cooperation rather than indirect political concerns; (2) whether 
delegates are more likely to have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they 
have been able to attend international meetings for an extended period in a consistent 
manner. It is found that Northeast Asian countries have taken the adaptation process of 
socialization rather than the learning mostly due to the lack of consistent participation 
patterns.  
Regarding the first measurement of participation patterns, it is difficult to explain 
the political motivations for China and Japan to participate in LTP activities because 
these two countries appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many research projects in 
which the Chinese and Japanese scientists are engaged in, as stated above. The political 
motivations of the ROK’s initiative are not that clear as shown in the discussion of LTP’s 
objectives. One possible explanation might be that the ROK was alarmed by the Japanese 
initiative for the first regional cooperative mechanism in East Asia through the creation 
of EANET. The ROK might have not been comfortable with the Japanese leadership for 
regional environmental cooperation due to its distrust resulting from the legacy of the 
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colonial and World War II eras which has affected “virtually all of these countries’ 
international relations, not just environmental issues” (Wilkening, 2006, p. 445). 
Regarding the second measurement of the participation patterns, this subsection 
analyzes the socialization processes of two groups of participants in the Expert Meetings: 
(a) governmental officials from the three countries, mostly drawn from ministries of 
environment, and (b) scientists from national research institutes and academia. As in the 
cases of EANET and TDGM, the bureaucratic rotation systems have affected 
participation possibilities for public officers in the LTP meetings.  
Governmental officials among the delegates, mostly from ministries of 
environment of China, Japan, and the ROK, hold the same positions for a limited time 
period and are rotated every year or year and a half. In fact, no governmental officials 
from any of the three countries’ ministries of environment attended more than one Expert 
Meeting during 2003, 2009, or 2010, the only years for which information is available 
(see Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6 
Participants in Expert Meetings of LTP (Name /Affiliation) 
 6th Expert Meeting in 
2003 
12th Expert Meeting in 
2009 
13th Expert Meeting in 
2010 
China 
Zelin Wang / MEP 
Gang Li / CNEMC 
Dagang Tang / CRAES 
Jun Yu / MEP 
Bing Liu / CNEMC 
Fan Meng / CRAES 
Xiaoyang Yang / CRAES 
Min Hu / Peking 
University 
Jianjun Li / CRAES 
Youjiang He / CRAES 
Lei Duan / Tsinghua 
University 
Haibo Liu / MEP 
Fan Meng / CRAES 
Min Hu / Peking 
University 
Shuai Wang / CNEMC 
Youjiang He / CRAES 
Yuanhang Zhang / Peking 
University 
Lei Duan / Tsinghua 
University 
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Japan 
 
Wada Tokuya / MOEJ 
Shiro Hatakeyama / NIES 
Tsuyoshi Ohizumi / 
ADORC 
Matsuda Kazuhide / 
ADORC 
Hiromasa Ueda / Kyoto 
University 
Kannari Akiyoshi / 
Independent researcher 
Nobuhiro Kino / MOEJ 
Akinori Takami /  NIES 
Hiroaki Yagoh / ADORC 
Keiichi Sato (ADORC) 
Mizuo Kajino / University 
of Tokyo 
Kazuhiro Yoshikawa / 
MOEJ 
Tsuyoshi Ohizumi / ACAP 
Yayoi Inomata / ACAP 
Akinori Takami / NIES 
Keiichi Sato / ACAP 
Toshihiro Kitada / 
Toyohashi University of 
Technology 
ROK 
Moon-soo An / MOEK 
Seok-jo Lee / NIER 
Il-soo Park / NIER 
Jin-seok Han / NIER 
Tae-young Lee / Yonsei 
University 
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST 
 
Cheon-gyu Park / MOEK 
Lim-seok Chang / NIER 
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST 
Young-jun Kim / GIST 
Cheol-hee Kim / Busan 
University 
Jung-heon Woo / Kunkuk 
University 
Sang-jin Lee / MOEK 
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST 
Young Sunwoo / Konkuk 
University 
Lim-seok Chang / NIER 
Min-do Lee / NIER 
Young-joon Kim / GIST 
Cheol-hee Kim / Busan 
National University 
Jung-hun Woo / Konkuk 
University 
Note: Information based on MOEK, 2003, 2009; Secretariat of Working Group for LTP, 2010. 
Names of 2010 repeaters from 2009 bolded to show lots of moving around in the government 
agencies. 
ACAP: Asia Center for Air Pollution Research in Japan (former ADORC) 
ADORC: Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center in Japan 
CNEMC: Chinese National Environmental Monitoring Center 
CRAES: Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences 
GIST: Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology in the ROK 
KIST: Korea Institute of Science and Technology 
NIER: National Institute of Environmental Research in the ROK 
NIES: National Institute for Environmental Studies in Japan  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, due to the brief period for which governmental 
delegates are seated in the national focal points of the LTP meetings, it can be assumed 
that these participants have put most of their effort into absorbing their predecessors’ 
self-understandings and their perceptions of the other participants, especially those from 
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other countries. Frequent rotation are unlikely to give successors enough time to question 
their understandings, underlying values, or the basic causal mechanisms of regional 
cooperation, processes that would lead to a learning process that move beyond adaptation. 
Because 1 or 2 years are not long enough for governmental officials to engage in such a 
learning process, they adapt themselves to the international settings. This adaptation 
process might create little room for resolving misunderstandings or difficulties among 
participants from other countries, particularly on formerly disagreed-upon issues, such as 
whether to endorse the annual reports of LTP or whether source-receptor relationships 
should be included in a joint research paper. Under these circumstances, few of the 
behavioral changes necessary for the further development of LTP can be expected to take 
place among government participants.  
In contrast, the participation of national scientist delegates has been relatively 
stable as shown, as also shown in Table 5.6. Five of the seven ROK scientists who 
attended the 13th Expert Meeting in 2010 had participated in earlier meetings in 2003 and 
2009. Five out of six participating Chinese scientists and three out of five Japanese 
scientists had attended earlier meetings and participated in research activities in previous 
years. Thus, scientist delegates, who have participated in the learning process through 
more consistent and diverse involvement in the various international meetings, have 
engaged in the learning process of socialization.  
In addition to their relatively continuous participation in the Expert Meetings of 
LTP, the scientist delegates from all three countries have enjoyed greater opportunities to 
meet their counterparts from other countries and discuss transboundary air pollution in 
various cooperative mechanisms than have the governmental official delegates. For 
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example, the North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation 
(NEASPEC) has organized international meetings as a part of its project activities on 
Mitigation of Transboundary Pollution from Coal-fired Power Plants in North East Asia. 
The NEASPEC meetings include International Conference on Transboundary Air 
Pollution in North-East Asia in 2008, Expert Consultation Meeting on NEASPEC 
Activities in the Field of Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia in January 2011, 
and a Workshop on Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia in November 2011 
(Table 5.7).  
Table 5.7 
List of Participants in Meetings Organized by NEASPEC (Name/Affiliation) 
 2008 (in Japan) 
International Conference 
on Transboundary Air 
Pollution in North-East 
Asia 
Jan. 2011 (in ROK) 
Expert Consultation 
Meeting on NEASPEC 
Activities in the field of 
Transboundary Air 
Pollution in North-East 
Asia 
Nov. 2011 (in ROK) 
Workshop on 
Transboundary Air 
Pollution in North-East 
Asia 
China 
Fan Meng / CRAES 
Jun Wang / CEC 
Hezhong Tian / Beijing 
Normal University 
- 
Sheng Chen / MEP 
Fan Meng / CRAES 
Xiaoyang Yang / CRAES 
Youjiang He / CRAES 
Lei Duan / Tsinghua 
University 
Min Hu / Peking 
University 
Xuesong Wang / Peking 
University 
Shuai Wang / CNEMC 
Japan 
Hiroshi Hayami / CRIEPI 
Hiroshi Moritomi / Gifu 
University 
Hirofumi Aizawa /  MOEJ 
Shigehiro Matsuda / 
Tokyo Electric Power 
Jesada Luangjame / ACAP Ken Yamashita / ACAP 
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Company 
Akira Nitta / ADORC 
ROK 
Lim-Seok Chang / NIER 
Cheol-Hee Kim / Pusan 
National University 
Ki-Suh Park / Korea 
Cottrell Company 
Jeong-soo Kim / NIER 
Lim-Seok Chang / NIER 
Heung-Kyeong Park / 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
Seog-yeon Cho / Inha 
University 
Changsub Shim / Korea 
Environment Institute 
Lim-Seok Chang / NIER 
Jong-Choon Kim / NIER 
Seog-yeon Cho / Inha 
University 
Sinae Choi / NIER 
Sang-Woo Kim / Seoul 
National University 
Jung-Hun Woo / Konkuk 
University 
Young-il Ma / Konkuk 
University 
Younha Kim / KonKuk 
University 
Note: Information based on NEASPEC 2008; 2011a; 2011b. 
 
Two out of 11 ROK scientist delegates and five out of 13 Chinese scientist 
delegates to the LTP Expert Meetings in 2003, 2009, and 2010 had attended one of these 
three NEASPEC meetings. This attendance pattern shows that some participants with 
science backgrounds have had first-hand experiences with the LTP and taken time to 
think critically about its roles and limitations. Some of the 21 participants from the three 
countries who authored a recent journal article (Kim et al., 2012) have attended the expert 
meetings of the LTP and the NEASPEC conferences and workshops. Three (Cheol-Hee 
Kim, Lim-Seok Chang, and Shang-Gyoo Shim) of the 11 ROK co-authors attended the 
LTP meetings, and three (Cheol-Hee Kim, Lim-Seok Chang, and Jeong-Soo Kim) of 11 
attended the meetings organized by the NEASPEC. Four (Fan Meng, Youjiang He, Jun 
Xu, and Lei Duan) out of six Chinese authors attended the LTP meetings, and three (Fan 
 
  
251 
 
Meng, Youjiang He, and Lei Duan) attended the NEASPEC meetings. All four of the 
Japanese authors had attended the LTP meetings.  
In contrast to the participation of Chinese and ROK scientists, Japan has sent only 
a few delegates to the NEASPEC meetings. No Japanese delegates to the LTP expert 
meetings had attended the NEASPEC meetings. Only one Japanese delegate participated 
in the meeting in January 2011 and another in November 2011.116  
Thus, it can be argued that the scientist delegates to the LTP expert meetings have 
had a greater opportunity to meet and discuss their research with participants from other 
countries and to understand the developments reported in others’ studies on 
transboundary air pollution. Scientists from the region have more access to 
communication with each other through various scientific meetings than do governmental 
officials who are rotated frequently.  
As mentioned above, the article co-authored by Kim et al. in 2012 demonstrates 
that progress is being made toward solidifying the LTP objectives and addresses the 
significant similarities of the modeling methods among the three countries. Although it 
does not represent an official government-level position on transboundary air pollutants, 
it does prove that scientists from three countries are capable of sharing information about 
transboundary air pollution and that each country’s studies can be considered and 
accepted by other countries in the pursuit of deeper understanding. This progress can be 
attributed to the learning process that scientist delegates to the LTP expert meetings have 
taken in various international settings.  
                                                          
116 Five Japanese delegates participated in the International Conference on Transboundary Air 
Pollution in North-East Asia in 2008, but the relatively large number of Japanese delegates to this 
meeting may have been a result of the meeting’s having been held in Japan, while the other two 
meetings were held in the ROK. 
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In summary, the two groups of participants at the LTP meetings have experienced 
different socialization processes. The group of governmental officials from the three 
countries has taken the adaptation process due to bureaucratic rotation systems that allow 
them to maintain their positions for only a year or so. Meanwhile, the group of scientist 
delegates has taken the learning process of socialization because they have had chances 
to communicate with scientist delegates from other nations through a variety of channels, 
such as international conferences and workshops organized by other regional 
environmental cooperative mechanisms.  
However, as the case of EANET and TDGM showed, it is unclear whether the 
learning process of socialization of scientist delegates through their consistent patterns of 
participation have helped governmental officials engage in the more learning process of 
socialization. The short terms of service of the governmental official delegates due to 
bureaucratic rotation systems have limited the amount of interaction that they can have 
with scientist delegates and thereby have taken not the learning but the adaptation 
processes of socialization.   
 
Conclusions 
This chapter examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and 
socialization have affected the extent of collective action regarding transboundary air 
pollutants. Even though LTP developed as a regional cooperative mechanism through the 
active involvement of governmental officials from ministries of environment of China, 
Japan, and the ROK, it was found that LTP has attained little in the way of either formal 
or concrete collective action. The Working Group has not functioned well as the 
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governing body due to a lack of job clarification and budgetary power. The two Sub-
Working Groups have been unable to agree upon common monitoring and modeling 
methods for joint research. Furthermore, the three countries have used different 
monitoring methods and modeling tools, making it difficult to directly compare research 
results.  
This chapter concludes that political leadership is not positively associated with 
this lack of the extent of formal and concrete collective action, yet the lack of shared 
scientific knowledge regarding transboundary air pollutants among the participating 
countries of LPT and the adaptation process of socialization are positively associated 
with the little development of formal and concrete collective action. Regarding political 
leadership, the slow and limited development of the LTP project as a regional cooperative 
mechanism in Northeast Asia seemed odd because the ROK has practiced significant 
structural leadership of the organization through making dominant contributions for 
financing the joint research activities and hosting more annual meetings than any other 
country. The ROK has also wielded directional leadership through trying a new method 
for monitoring activities, its aircraft measurement for the LTP research.  
It is surprising to see that the ROK’s extensive political leadership for the 
organization’s joint research activities has not produced any formal and concrete 
collective action over the past two decades. Considering comparative magnitudes of 
financial contributions made by leadership countries, the ROK’s structural leadership for 
LTP (US$1,000,000 a year) is significantly less than Japan’s for EANET 
(US$16,000,000 a year). Nonetheless, the ROK’s financial contributions to LTP projects 
can be seen as significant considering the smaller number of participating countries – 
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only three for LTP and 13 for EANET. In addition, its expenditures for LTP are much 
larger than its contributions for the TDGM (US$75,000 a year), which has succeeded in 
achieving formal cooperation in only half a decade, a relatively short period of time. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that political leadership contributes to developing more formal 
and concrete collective action is not supported by the LTP case. 
In contrast, this chapter upholds the hypothesis on shared knowledge that the 
greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating countries in regional 
environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the 
collective action found in the region. The LTP case confirms that the lack of commonly 
shared knowledge among participating countries can explain the limited extent of 
collective action. It also supports the hypothesis on socialization, which asserts the less 
the learning process among participants in regional environmental cooperation efforts, 
the less formal and the less concrete will be the collective action found in the region even 
if a participating country exerts significant political leadership. Thus, little development 
of shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of socialization can explain the 
lack of the extent of collective action in the joint research conducted by LTP.  
This chapter confirms the social mechanisms between these variables that were 
found in the previous two chapters. The case of LTP also shows that strong political 
leadership alone does not lead participating countries to engage in the learning as the 
socialization process. The adaptation process of socialization among participants in the 
regional cooperative mechanisms is attributable to the lack of shared scientific 
knowledge.  
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CHAPTER 6 
NOT LIKE EUROPE:  
COMPARING EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES TO NORTHEAST ASIAN ONES 
REGARDING TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 
 
Introduction 
To better understand Northeast Asian experiences in dealing with transboundary 
air pollution issues, this chapter compares those experiences to Europe’s. To explain the 
differences between the two regions, this chapter analyzes political models that European 
countries have employed to tackle transboundary air pollution problems through 
examining the three major factors examined in the previous chapters: the exertion of state 
leadership, the development of shared scientific knowledge, and adoption of socialization 
processes. 
The chapter argues that unlike Europe, which has achieved positive institutional 
and environmental outcomes in reducing air pollution by developing better air quality 
management mechanisms within regional regulatory regimes, Northeast Asia has failed 
to generate broader cooperation and produce useful measurement data that could lead to 
the creation of a regional environmental regime despite two decades of efforts. The 
previous three chapters have analyzed the varying degrees of collective action or 
negotiated outcomes accomplished by three different cooperative mechanisms, EANET, 
TDGM, and LTP.   
This is the first study to specifically compare Europe and Northeast Asian efforts 
to deal with transboundary air pollution. Most comparative studies in the field have 
focused on economic cooperation, as it has been the most institutionalized area of 
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regional cooperation. Europe has expanded its regional cooperation from economic issues 
to constitutional integration within the European Union, and North America’s regional 
cooperation was also initiated through economic collaboration, including the Automotive 
Pact and the Defense Sharing Agreement in the 1960s, the North American–Canadian 
Free Trade Agreement in 1988, a and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
between Mexico, Canada, and the United States in 1992 (Akaha, 1999, p. 4). The history 
of economic collaboration in the West may explain why most studies on regional 
intergovernmental collaboration in Asia have focused on trade liberalization, trade 
facilitation, and economic cooperation (see for example, Ravenhill, 2001). Although 
numerous studies have focused largely on European successes in environmental 
cooperation, this study compares Europe’s cooperative experiences with those of 
Northeast Asia. 
By examining the differences in those experiences, the findings in this chapter 
can contribute to efforts to improve regional environmental cooperation in other regions 
as well as in Asia. As the previous chapters have shown, Northeast Asia (and in a wider 
sense, East Asia) has developed various environmental cooperative mechanisms 
regarding transboundary pollution even though those mechanisms have not yet succeeded 
in reaching any binding regional agreement. Nonetheless, these regional efforts in 
Northeast Asia have inspired other regions to also initiate environmental cooperation 
regarding transboundary air pollution, including in Latin America since 2007 and in 
Africa since 2008, through the Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum (GAPF), a 
partnership of international organizations and regional air pollution networks.  
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In Africa, these efforts have led to the development of the Eastern Africa 
Regional Framework Agreement on Air Pollution, the Air Pollution Information Network 
for Africa (APINA), and the Clean Air Initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa (CAI-SSA). 
Latin America has established the Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Inter-
Governmental Network on Air Pollution, the Clean Air Initiatives in Latin America 
(CAI-LA), and the Inter-American Network for Atmospheric and Biospheric Studies 
(IANABIS). Given the presence of these cooperative frameworks, a greater 
understanding of the regional environmental cooperation within Northeast Asia as the 
first region outside Europe to adopt cooperation on acid rain and other environmental 
issues can provide other regions of the developing world with specific guidance on what 
lessons can be drawn from the European experience that may be applicable to their own 
regions. 
Summary of the Northeast Asian Experiences 
Based on the findings of the previous chapters, this section examines the political 
models that Northeast Asian countries have taken to deal with transboundary air pollution 
issues. The preceding three case chapters examined the varying forms and degrees of 
collective action developed by the participating countries in terms of their formalization, 
specificity or concreteness, and legalization. Given that none of these cooperative 
mechanisms have developed into regulatory regimes, the rest of this section examines the 
formalization and specificity of their collective action.  
Negotiated Outcomes: Empirical Findings 
This dissertation has examined the hypothesized effects of leadership, shared 
knowledge, and the learning mode of socialization on variations among different 
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regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in terms of their degree of 
formalization, concreteness, and legalization.117  
Based on its analysis of the three modes of leadership—structural, directional, and 
instrumental—within the three regional environmental cooperative mechanisms, this 
study finds that a single participating country has dominated the political leadership of 
each one. In the case of EANET, Japan’s contributions toward the financing of the 
secretariat constituted 94% of the total expenditures of the secretariat and 99% of the 
budget of the network center. In the other two cooperative mechanisms examined, the 
TDGM and the LTP, the ROK has been the dominant financial contributor to joint 
research projects and borne the cost of most annual meetings and the traveling expenses 
of Chinese participants. 
In terms of shared scientific knowledge, Northeast Asia has been struggling with 
a lack of scientific standardization despite continuous research efforts for more than two 
decades. To examine the socialization processes within these cooperative mechanisms, 
this study investigated the external and internal contexts that have shaped cooperation 
around environmental issues in the region. These external contexts included international 
pressures or situations that Northeast Asian countries faced before initiating their regional 
cooperation efforts regarding their own particular environmental issues related to 
transboundary pollution. The analysis of internal contexts included an examination of the 
participation patterns of delegates to the international meetings of the three mechanisms 
and revealed that they have engaged in the adaptation rather than learning processes of 
socialization, primarily because of the bureaucratic rotation systems in China, Japan, and 
the ROK. This study asserts that the frequent turnovers in and inconsistent participation 
                                                          
117 Table 6.2 shows the results of these variables in the three cases along with the European case. 
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of delegates have decreased the chance of developing socialization patterns that could 
enhance international cooperation and encourage behavioral changes by the participating 
states by building personal relationships among representatives. 
Negotiated Outcomes: Analytic Findings 
An analysis of these empirical findings indicates that all three independent 
variables are partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured by 
formal and concrete collective action. Regarding the political leadership, the cases of 
EANET and TDGM provided strong evidence supporting my hypothesis that the stronger 
the leadership, whether structural, instrumental, or directional, exercised by a 
participating country in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the more formal 
and the more concrete will be the collective action developed in the region. That EANET 
demonstrated the most formal organization and of concrete outcomes among the three 
regional cooperative mechanisms are positively associated with Japan’s outstanding 
political leadership. The ROK’s dominant but more modest political leadership within the 
TDGM also appears to be associated with the development of formal but less concrete 
collective action. The hypothesis is not supported, however, by the failure to develop 
formal and concrete collective action on the part of LTP despite the ROK’s significant 
exercise of political leadership.  
The knowledge model was also partly upheld by the three cases. The hypothesis, 
which predicts that the greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating 
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more 
concrete will be the collective action found in the region, was not supported by the 
EANET case because it has achieved the most successful extent of formal and concrete 
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collective action without commonly shared scientific knowledge. The TDGM case did 
not uphold the knowledge model either because the lack of shared scientific knowledge 
about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM cannot explain why TDGM has 
succeeded in establishing the formal mode of collective action through creating the first 
governmental-level, multilateral cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS 
issues in Northeast Asia in a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present. 
However, the LTP case upheld the knowledge model because the lack of shared scientific 
knowledge regarding transboundary air pollutants among the participating countries are 
positively associated with the little development of formal and concrete collective action.  
The data show that despite their continuous monitoring and modeling efforts over 
two decades, scientists in the region have not reduced uncertainties about the significant 
adverse consequences of acid deposition through EANET, the major causes of DSS 
beyond natural phenomena through TDGM, and the shared source-receptor relationships 
of air pollutants between countries through LTP. The lack of a common understanding of 
impacts and anthropogenic causes of atmospheric phenomena has led participating 
countries to prefer voluntary participation over developing the cooperative mechanisms 
into regulatory regimes. The socialization model was also partly upheld by the three cases. 
The hypothesis, which asserts that that it is more likely that participating countries in 
regional environmental cooperation efforts will create formal and concrete collective 
action through regional cooperation if they take the learning rather than the adaptation 
process of socialization, was not supported by the EANET case because the adaptation 
process of the participating countries in EANET cannot explain the most successful 
collective action in terms of formalization and concreteness. The TDGM case also did not 
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uphold the socialization model because TDGM achieved formal mode of collective 
action without the learning process of socialization. However, the LTP case upheld the 
socialization model because LTP did not develop formal and concrete collective action 
with the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization.  
The earlier chapters have shown that external and internal contexts of Northeast 
Asia and the participating countries’ other experiences in global and regional 
environmental cooperation have not led the countries in the region to take the learning 
process of socialization. Responding to external and internal political contexts of the 
region, the countries in the region chose to create and participate in EANET for their own 
political reasons rather than out of a genuine concern for tackling the acid deposition 
problem. For the creation of EANET, Japan chose the issue of acid deposition as a 
subject of regional environmental cooperation because of its enough scientific 
accumulation to lead regional environment, rather than its recognition of the acid 
deposition as a serious environmental problem in Japan. Both China and the ROK also 
recognized joining the EANET as their chance to achieve their own political objectives 
such as Japan’s investment in building the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for 
Environmental Protection in China and Japan’s agreement on the ROK’s initiative for 
NEASPEC. In the process of developing regional cooperation on DSS, China had 
particular political interests such as acquiring the technical and financial assistance from 
the international community and changing its poor reputation on its air quality to hold the 
2008 Beijing Olympics. Japan also had political motivations in participating in the 
international discussions on desertification through the UNCCD such as increasing its 
reputation among developing nations and aiming to export its expertise in forestry. It is 
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difficult to explain the political motivations for the participation of China and Japan in 
the LTP projects because both countries appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many 
scientific research projects in which their scientists are engaged in. One possible 
explanation for the political motivations of the ROK’s initiative might be that the ROK 
was alarmed by the Japanese initiative for EANET and was uncomfortable with the 
Japanese leadership due to its distrust.  
There has also been little interaction between the national experts in the UNCCD 
and delegates to the TDGM meetings and between participants of various NEASPEC 
meetings related to transboundary air pollution and delegates to the LTP meetings. 
Moreover, the frequent turnover among participating governmental officials and 
diplomats because of bureaucratic rotation systems has led countries in the region to 
engage in the adaptation process of socialization by giving participants little physical 
chance to engage in the learning process of socialization. 
Although these three hypotheses are only partly supported by the data, the 
examination of these variables has uncovered two useful insights. First, it has 
demonstrated that strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member 
countries to engage in the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared 
scientific knowledge is positively associated with the adaption process of socialization 
among participants in the cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms.  The 
second is that the lack of shared knowledge and of the learning mode of socialization 
helps explain why all three regional cooperative mechanisms have failed to advance to 
become legally binding cooperative mechanisms.  
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It thus can be argued that knowledge and socialization barriers are key 
determinants of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. Even 
given strong political leadership by a participating country, a region is unlikely to 
develop a legally binding regional environmental regime without shared scientific 
knowledge and engagement in the learning process of socialization.  
Environmental Outcomes 
As noted in the previous chapters, the reduction in airborne pollutants emissions 
in Northeast Asia has not been impressive. Since the beginning of its modernization in 
the mid-19th century, Japan has achieved rapid economic growth as a result of 
industrialization and urbanization. During 1955-64, the economic development of Japan 
was supported by tripled energy consumption, resulting in various air pollution problems 
that peaked in the 1960s. However, Japan’s technological innovation, institutional 
development, and collaboration between government and industry led to a significant 
decrease in SO2 emissions, nearly 40%, between 1974 and 1987 (UNEP, 2001, p. 32). 
Since the first half of the 2000s, Japan’s SO2 and NOx emissions have shown downward 
trends (Figure 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1. Emissions of SO2 and NOx in Japan. Adapted from “Current Situation of Japan and 
the World (1),” Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and the 
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Biodiversity in Japan 2012, by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012, p. 12. 
http://www.env.go.jp/en/wpaper/2012/pdf/03_chpt1-1.pdf.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the ROK has dealt with severe air pollution problems 
since the early 1980s through various domestic measures such as the 1981 Standard for 
Sulfur Content, the 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and the 1988 Clean Fuel Use 
Duty. Particularly owing to the government’s continuous efforts to strengthen fuel 
regulations, the concentration level of SO2 in the major cities of the ROK has been 
constantly improving (Figure 6.2). The emission reductions for NOx are not as significant 
as those for sulfur, but the Korean government emphasizes that NO2 emissions have been 
controlled at a certain level (Figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.2. Concentration levels of SO2 in ROK. Adapted from ECOREA: Environmental Review 
2011, Korea, by Ministry of Environment of Korea, 2012, p. 18. 
http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method=view&docSeq=9728&bbsCode=law_law_paper&currentPa
ge=1&searchType=&searchText=. SO2 annual average air quality standard is 0.020ppm. 
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Figure 6.3. Concentration level of NO2 in ROK. Adapted from ECOREA: Environmental Review 
2011, Korea, by Ministry of Environment of Korea, 2012, p. 19. 
http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method=view&docSeq=9728&bbsCode=law_law_paper&currentPa
ge=1&searchType=&searchText=. NO2 annual average air quality standard is 0.03ppm.  
 
The rapid industrialization and urbanization in China have continued to 
significantly increase energy demand, resulting in large anthropogenic SO2 emissions 
from the combustion of coal. After a relatively stable trend of SO2 emissions in China 
during 1995-1999, such emissions increased by 53% from 2000 to 2006, with an annual 
growth rate of 7.3% (Lu et al., 2010). This change was driven by an increase in fossil fuel 
consumption due to the economic boom during this period. To deal with this increasing 
use of fossil fuels, the Chinese government reaffirmed its commitment to reduce SO2 
emissions in its 11th Five-Year Plan during 2006-2010, relative to the 2005 level and set 
emission reduction requirements that resulted in the wide installation of flue-gas 
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desulfurization (FGD)118 devices in coal-fired power plants in China. Since July 2007, 
the government has encouraged the use of FGD equipment through multiple measures 
such as “the installation of the continuous monitoring systems in all power plants with 
FGD devices, and the implementation of a premium/penalty scheme of electricity price 
that varies with the FGD’s operation rate” (Lu et al., 2010, p. 6316). As a result, even 
though GDP and energy consumption in China continued to grow after 2006, its SO2 
emissions began to decrease due to phasing out small, high-emitting power generation 
units as well as the application of FGD technology.  
In contrast, NOx emissions in China have been constantly increasing due to the 
country’s rapid increase in energy consumption and its soaring number of motor vehicles 
(Figure 6.4).   
 
Figure 6.4. Trends of air pollutants emissions in China. Adapted from “Trend of Energy 
Use and Nitrogen Oxides Emissions in China,” by Tian, 2008. 
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/airpollution/PDF/S2_17pm_Tian[1].pdf.  
 
Despite the lack of regulatory regimes to tackle airborne pollutants problems in 
Northeast Asia, China, Japan, and the ROK have achieved steady decreases in sulfur 
                                                          
118 FGD is a set of technologies used to remove SO2 from exhaust flue gases of fossil-fuel power 
plants and from other emitting processes.  
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emissions resulting from domestic measures taken on their own initiative. Even though 
Japan achieved a nearly 40% reduction of SO2 emissions between 1974 and 1987, this 
figure was not impressive compared to the reductions that have been made by many 
industrialized European countries. Moreover, even though Japan has shown a decrease in 
NOx emissions resulting from domestic measures since the mid-2000s, the increase in 
NOx emissions in China has been high enough to degrade the general state of NOx 
emission conditions in Northeast Asia. The geographical location of China as a source 
makes this increase particularly worrisome given the dominant downwind in the region in 
the spring season.  
In addition to the problems associated with specific air pollutants that both 
EANET and TDGM have focused on, environmental problems related to DSS have also 
increased in the region, as discussed in chapter 4. The frequency and intensity of these 
problems have been worsening for a few decades. Without international regulatory 
regimes, numerous bilateral projects have been so sporadic that they have not produced 
fruitful results, particularly regarding forestation.  
Thus, we can conclude that Northeast Asia has not advanced its management 
system regarding transboundary air pollution in the absence of a regulatory regional 
environmental regime. This result is different than has been the case in Europe, which has 
developed better air quality management with the regulatory regime created by the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). In particular, it 
took only a decade for Europeans to go from recognizing the problem to negotiating a 
binding agreement, whereas Northeast Asian countries are still working for scientific 
understanding and standardization since they started to discuss transboundary air 
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pollution in the early 1990s. It took Europe less than a decade after initiating two key 
joint research projects in 1972 to adopt a framework convention in 1979 and less than 
two decades to adopt binding regulatory protocols in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, 
Northeast Asia did not start its own joint research until the early 1990, and their efforts 
over the past two decades have not culminated in a framework treaty or regulatory 
protocols. To better understand why, the following sections analyze the ways in which 
the differences in the speed of development and the degree of collective action between 
Europe and Northeast Asia can be attributed to political leadership, shared scientific 
knowledge, and modes of socialization. 
 
Summary of European Experiences: CLRTAP 
Unlike most regional cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary air 
pollution in Northeast Asia that fall into UNEP’s second category of such mechanisms 
with permanent structure and a science focus but without legally binding agreements, 
CLRTAP has developed as the most successful regional cooperative structure with not 
only formal and concrete collective action but also legal infrastructure and a policy focus. 
The following subsections introduce the major treaties, briefly explain how well they 
have worked in terms of compliance, environmental emission declines related to 
particular protocols, and the effectiveness of the CLRTAP system in general.  
Development of CLRTAP 
The CLRATP was a framework convention that established “a basis for 
continuing research and information sharing, and policymaking” (Selin & VanDeveer, 
2011, p. 67). The convention itself merely stated that the monitoring activity and 
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information exchange should start with sulfur dioxide without specifying any particular 
pollutants that should be controlled. Since then, eight subsequent protocols have been 
established, six of which are relevant to atmospheric environmental problems associated 
with sulfur, nitrogen, and VOCs. Table 6.1 lists these protocols with a brief description of 
their major provisions and information on signatories and implementation.  
Table 6.1 
CLRTAP and Its Protocols 
1979 CLRTAP: Adopted in Geneva, November 13, 1979; entered into force 
March 16, 1983; 51 parties as of August 18, 2013  
1984 EMEP Protocol: Creates a multilateral trust fund for the long-term 
financial support of EMEP activities; adopted in Geneva September 28, 
1984; 44 parties as of August 18, 2013 
1985  Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary 
Fluxes (First Sulfur Protocol): Adopted in Helsinki July 8, 1985; entered 
into force September 2, 1987; 25 parties as of August 18, 2013 
1988 Protocol Concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides or Their 
Transboundary Fluxes (Nitrogen Oxides [NOx] Protocol): Adopted in 
Sofia October 31,1988; entered into force February 14, 1991; 34 parties as 
of August 18, 2013    
1991 Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic 
Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes (VOCs Protocol): Adopted in 
Geneva 18 November 1991; entered into force September 29, 1997; 24 
parties as of August 18, 2013 
1994  Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions (Second Sulfur 
Protocol): Adopted in Oslo  June 14, 1994; entered into force August 5, 
1998; 28 parties as of August 18, 2013 
1998  Protocol on Heavy Metals: Targets three particular harmful metals—
cadmium, lead, and mercury—and aims to cut emissions from industrial 
sources, combustion processes in power generation and road transport, and 
waste incineration; adopted in Aarhus, Denmark June 24, 1998; entered 
into force December 29, 2003; 33 parties as of August 18, 2013 
1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): Targets 16 particular 
substances including industrial chemicals and byproducts/contaminants; 
adopted in Aarhus, Denmark June 24, 1998; entered into force October 23, 
2003; 33 parties as of August 18, 2013 
1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication, and Ground-Level Ozone 
(multipollutant/multieffect protocol): Adopted in Gothenburg  November 
30, 1999; entered into force May 17, 2005; 25 parties as of August 18, 
2013 
Note: Adapted and expanded from “Institutional Linkages and European Air Pollution Politics,” 
by Selin & VanDeveer, 2011, pp. 68-69. 
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As other researchers have noted, these protocols have “become more complicated 
over time” (Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2011, p. 7) and represent “a steady development” in 
which they have progressively covered “more substances with regulations that are 
gradually becoming both binding and specific and more fine-tuned to ecological and 
economic variations between the countries” (p. 47). The so-called first-generation 
protocols, including the 1985 Sulfur Protocol, the 1988 NOx Protocol, and the 1991 
VOCs Protocol, were based on the flat-rate reduction of emissions of pollutants, which 
meant that all member countries were expected to achieve the same emission cuts. In 
contrast, the second-generation protocols, including the 1994 Second Sulfur Protocol and 
the 1999 multipollutant/multieffect Protocol, “focused on varying national reduction rates 
based on the approach of critical loads—that is, effects in relation to what nature can 
withstand-and cost effectiveness” (Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2011, p. 8). In particular, the 
1985 Helsinki Protocol mandated uniform reductions of 30% in sulfur dioxide emissions 
from 1980 levels by 1993, but the 1994 Oslo Protocol mandated country-specific cuts of 
sulfur dioxide emissions based on the critical loads concept that indicates “regionally-
specific emissions targets below which there would be no observable environmental 
effects from sulfur emissions,” resulting in considerably varying emission-reduction 
targets among countries based on “weather patterns and country sizes and locations” 
(Forster, 2010, p. 5).  
Organization 
 Since its initiation, the LRTAP convention has built “a multilayer organization to 
arrange for the various countries’ participation and to include scientific assessments on 
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the numerous technical and scientific questions of air pollution” (Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 
97).  The Executive Body, composed of representatives of all parties to the convention, is 
the CLRTAP’s final decision-making entity and meets at least annually to review the 
implementation of the convention and to adopt plans. Under the Executive Body, there 
are three main operating bodies: the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) 
Steering Body, the Working Group on Effects, and the Working Group on Strategies and 
Review.119  
The CLRTAP secretariat has only about five full-time positions and organizes 
meetings, prepares annual work plans, and collects information from member states. It 
sends technical emission data to EMEP for compilation in EMEP reports. The EMEP 
Steering Body “oversees the activities of the EMEP programs, including an 
environmental monitoring system and the collection of emission data, measurement of air 
and precipitation quality, and modeling of atmospheric transport and deposition of air 
pollution” (Selin & VanDeveer, 2003, p. 24). The EMEP Steering Body meets and 
reports to the Executive Body on its activities annually.  
Compliance with Regulatory Protocols: Emissions Reductions  
Wettestad has characterized national compliance with those protocols as high 
overall (2011, p. 47). In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, states agreed to reduce sulfur 
emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 30% from 1980 levels by 1993. Compliance 
                                                          
119 The earlier Working Group on Abatement Technologies was dissolved and the Working 
Group on Strategies was renamed the Working Group on Strategies and Review after some major 
restructuring following the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol “in order to extend its responsibility to the 
review of the current protocols and for possible revisions and initiatives” because the main task of 
Working Group on Abatement Technologies was limited to the “preparation of technical annexes 
to the protocols” without concern for integrated assessment modeling (Siebenhüner, 2011, pp. 
102-103).    
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with sulfur emission reduction commitments by many countries, including both some 
Western European and some transition countries in Eastern Europe, was high and in fact 
marked by “substantial overcompliance” (ibid.). As a result, Europe achieved a reduction 
of more than 70% in sulfur emissions between 1980 and 2004 (55Tg to 15Tg) (Vestreng, 
et al., 2007). 
 The Oslo Protocol was conceived of as “a more effective treaty through focusing 
the issue on environmental rather than political objectives, thus increasing participation 
and compliance” (Forster, 2010, p. 5) due to the introduction of differentiated obligations 
based on the concept of a critical load, which is defined as “a quantitative estimate of an 
exposure to one or more pollutants below which significantly harmful effects on specified 
sensitive elements of the environment do not occur according to present knowledge” 
(Levy, 1993, pp. 101-102).  
For the 1991 VOC Protocol, the UNECE argued in a more recent review that 
progress was very good regarding VOC reductions given that emissions had decreased 
41% by 2006 and exceeded the 2010 target of 40% (Wettestad, 2011, p. 49). For the most 
recent 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, Wettestad notes that the 2010 UNECE review 
indicated that emissions of ammonia decreased by 22%, greater than the 17% reduction 
target, and he also argues that  “in the period covered by the Gothenburg Protocol (i.e., 
with a 1990 baseline), by 2006 such emissions had been reduced by 65 percent” (2011, p. 
47).  
There are, however, pessimistic views on the extent of successful compliance of 
CLRTAP. For example, for the reduction in SO2 emissions, it has been suggested that the 
reduction of industrial emissions may be attributable to “economic reasons or during 
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recent years to air pollution control” such as developing technical measures to limit their 
dependence on oil and to switch from coal and oil to gas, nuclear, and biomass as a 
consequence of the 1973 oil crisis, rather than to compliance with the protocols (UNESC, 
2004, p. 162). A more pessimistic view of the Helsinki Protocol’s contributions to the 
reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions is taken by Finus and Tjøtta (2003), who contend 
that they resulted primarily from a non-cooperative abatement policy. According to this 
argument, many countries had already achieved the targeted reduction when they signed 
the agreement, and all signatories not only met the target in 1993 but reduced emissions 
well above beyond the required 30% (Appendix IV).  
 Reducing nitrogen oxides, however, proved more challenging than reducing 
sulfur dioxides. Despite other scholars’ criticism of the Sofia Protocol for adopting only a 
freeze (Levy, 1993), a recent implementation review by UNECE argues that progress in 
NOx reductions has been substantial. NOx levels dropped by average 35% between 1990 
and 2006, a little less than the average target of a 41% cut (Wettestad, 2011, p. 49). In 
comparison to sulfur emissions, it appears that in the case of reductions in NOx 
emissions, “environmental control requirements have played a much more important role 
and other reasons have been of less importance” (UNESC, 2004, p. 162). 
Compliance with Protocol Obligations 
Along with high compliance with emissions reduction requirements, compliance 
monitoring has also been high, even though some countries have failed to report. As the 
organizational entity that manages the monitoring of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, 
ground-level ozone, and other substances, EMEP has coordinated all the monitoring data 
for CLRTAP. According to Lidskog and Sundqvist, EMEP has become a “channel for 
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exchanging standardized scientific information and empirical data” that has enabled the 
“growth and spread of a common knowledge base concerning both the seriousness of the 
acid rain issue and ecosystem mechanisms” (2011, p. 9).  
EMEP measures pollutant levels at about a hundred stations throughout Europe, 
and each participating government also reports emission levels to EMEP. Given EMEP’s 
verification procedures, its data monitoring has reached a high level of reliability; 
according to Levy, “there has never been any suspicion that nations cheat on their 
emissions reports” (1993, p. 89). In particular, measuring sulfur dioxide emissions by 
converting fuel consumption figures is so relatively simple that participating countries 
have high confidence in the EMEP data.120  
In 2007, the Implementation Committee, established at the 1994 Second Sulfur 
Protocol to review implementation of and compliance with the protocol, reported an 
improvement in countries’ compliance with reporting obligations. According to the 
Implementation Committee in its report in 2007, the degree of compliance with protocol 
obligations was good and improving (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011). 
Effectiveness 
 
In terms of effectiveness, Wettestad gave CLRTAP only a “medium” rating in 
comparison to the regime to protect the ozone layer, which has achieved more significant 
behavioral change, and to the climate-change regime, which has achieved little 
behavioral change and seems unlikely to accomplish much productive problem solving in 
the near future (2011). To measure effectiveness of international institutions, scholars 
                                                          
120 When it comes to reporting NOx and VOCs levels, however, the performance of participating 
countries has been poor because CLRTAP “offers few binding and/or stringent emissions 
reduction requirements” (VanDeveer, 2006, p. 39).  
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applied the two perspectives: problem characteristics and problem-solving capacity (for 
example, see Underdal, 1999; Wettestad, 2011).121 Wettestad determined that CLRTAP’s 
high malignity was attributable to its “perhaps not more than medium success” 
(Wettestad, 2011, p. 50). In addition to the malign problem characteristics, its problem-
solving capacity is moderate in terms of its “institutional aspects such as a limited and 
stable secretarial capacity. . . and a consensual decision-making style,” despite some 
flexibility in the consensual requirements which was possible because countries were 
reluctant and had not signed the protocols were holding back the remaining countries 
(Wettestad, 2011, p. 50). 122  
 
Potential Explanations for Differences between Environmental Cooperation in 
Europe and Northeast Asia  
This section defends the structural comparability of the regions. It might be 
argued that the differences between environmental cooperation in Europe and Northeast 
Asia can be explained by that these two regions have experienced different degrees of 
regionalism and that they have achieved different levels of economic development within 
each of the two regions. It sheds light on these two potential explanations and explains 
why this dissertation focuses on the political leadership, knowledge, and socialization 
                                                          
121 As Underdal points out, “a problem may be difficult to solve in two different respects: it may 
be intellectually complex or poorly understood, and it may be politically malign” (1999, 55). 
Thus, an analysis based on problem characteristics emphasize the “fundamental aspects of the 
environmental problems addressed by the regimes,” and an analysis based on problem-solving 
capacity focuses on “a combination of the institutional efforts established and the entrepreneurial 
efforts made to address and solve the environmental or resource problems (Wettestad, 2011, pp. 
42-43). 
122According to Wettestad, this flexibility was possible because countries were reluctant and had 
not signed the protocols were holding back the remaining countries.  
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instead of focusing on the influence of comparative regionalism on regional 
environmental cooperation and the influence of disparity in economic development. 
Comparative Regionalism 
Scholars who argue that environmental cooperation is a dependent variable in the 
development of regionalism tend to highlight the under-institutionalized and disjointed 
features of Northeast Asia, as discussed briefly in chapter 2. Those who claim that 
environmental cooperation is an independent variable for broader regionalism, argue that 
the differences in environmental governance result from different political cultures of the 
regions, characterized in Northeast Asia by a preference for soft agreement, reciprocal 
promises without formal clauses, a “distaste for legalization,” and “consensus-based 
decision making practices” (Yoon, 2013, p. 43).  
The relative lack of cooperative regional mechanisms in Northeast Asia is in great 
contrast to those among European states, who have also established the European Union 
(EU), which Akaha calls “the most developed stage of regional integration in the world to 
date” (1999, p. 31). Akaha attributes the elaborate organizational structure and the timely 
expansion of membership in the EU to a “combination of enlightened political leadership, 
common civilizational background, shared security concern during the Cold War era, and 
common economic interests” (p. 33).123 In contrast, according to Akaha, Northeast Asia 
is characterized by “state-to-state conflicts and rivalries, with nationalism remaining a 
powerful force that commands the loyalty of citizens” (p. 42). As a result of “multiple 
territorial disputes, jurisdictional conflicts, and ethnic animosities,” Akaha argues,  
                                                          
123By “enlightened state intervention” Akaha means the belief that “the state should actively 
remove barriers to trade, investment, and other forms of economic exchange” rather than 
controlling “how the economies of the region interact with each other” (1999, p. 45). 
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The States in the region lack experience in collective problem solving; they are 
suspicious of each other; and they rarely encourage their citizens to engage with 
one another without their direct control or monitoring. As a result, “Northeast 
Asia” remains today a geographic referent rather than a political, much less a 
cultural community. (p. 42)  
 
The uneven power distribution among states in the region, along with the diversity of 
political systems and cultural backgrounds, has resulted in the development of slow, 
deliberate, and incremental processes toward regional cooperation. To encourage greater 
cooperation, Akaha suggests,  
A realistic framework would start with issues that are removed from issues of 
national sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity. Issues of 
economic development, trade liberalization, technical cooperation, environmental 
changes would be more palatable as initial agenda items. Deep integration at the 
level of a common market or an economic union would be distant goals, if ever. 
(Akaha, 1999, p. 45)  
 
Although cooperation on issues of economic development and trade liberalization 
may, as Akaha suggests, appear to be the most promising areas for increased cooperation, 
even that has proven difficult or fragile because of the rivalries among countries in the 
region. As discussed in chapter 1, China and Japan are currently competing for the status 
of the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP. At the same time, Japan’s 
economic challenges have offered the ROK opportunities to improve its economic 
situation. The Yen’s high exchange rate, for instance, is beneficial to Korean exporters 
who compete with the Japanese in the global market. Examples of such competition can 
be seen in the rivalries between Hyundai and Toyota and between Samsung and Sony. 
According to Lee and Moon, the “intensified competition” among Northeast Asian 
countries that “have been moving into more value-added, capital- and technology-
intensive industries” has strengthened a “swarming sparrow” economic pattern marked 
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by “deepening economic competition among regional rivals” rather than a “flying geese” 
model predicated upon “a harmonious intra-industrial division of labor among countries 
in the region” (2008, p. 49). 
An overriding concern for sovereignty has also influenced the development of 
regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the case of China, for instance, the “sovereignty issue 
has always been a central concern of the Chinese government in its diplomatic activities,” 
according to Zhao, and its “historical memories of victimization” in the late 19th century 
and the early 20th century have led to a “deeply rooted fear among Chinese elites” about 
the possible erosion of sovereignty by outsider powers (2011, p. 64). Therefore, “China 
has preferred an informal and soft approach toward regional cooperation to avoid legally 
binding resolutions that could infringe on the sovereignty of member states” (Zhao, 2011, 
p. 64).  
Yet China’s preponderant concern with maintaining its sovereignty has been 
shared by many Northeast Asian countries. Northeast Asian regionalism has emphasized 
“a consensus decision-making process, consultative procedures, voluntarism, and non-
interference in member states’ internal affairs” (Zhao, 2011, p. 65). This so-called soft 
approach “is different from North American and European regionalism where formal 
procedures, rule-making and enforcement are emphasized” (Zhao, 2011, p. 65). Yoon 
describes the relatively informal nature of regional environmental cooperation in 
Northeast Asia as follows: 
While the agreements entail reciprocal promises or actions for implementation on 
the part of the individual parties, none of them contains formal clauses that 
describe the parties’ commitments as binding obligations or legal sanctions for 
non-compliance. Consequently, the interpretation and implementation of the 
agreements are largely up to the governments of the member countries and their 
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practices are not subject to formal scrutiny under the agreements. (Yoon, 2013, p. 
2) 
 
Although this dissertation focuses on the variations among different regional 
environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia rather than on regional 
characteristics in general, it does not disregard regional characteristics in explaining 
regional environmental cooperation, as some factors in that cooperation may be more 
closely related to regional characteristics than to characteristics of the issues themselves.  
Disparity of Economic Development among Participating Countries 
It also might be argued that the differences between Europe and Northeast Asia 
have resulted from different levels of economic development within each of the two 
regions. Certainly, with the exception of Hungary, the gap in economic development 
among European countries when CLRTAP was founded in 1979 or the NOx Protocol 
was signed in 1988 was not very significant, as shown in Figure 6.5. In contrast, 
Northeast Asian countries demonstrate dramatically different levels of economic 
development, as shown in Figure 6.6. It is well-known that GDP per capita of Eastern 
European countries was much lower than GDP per capita of Western European countries. 
However, it would be argued that the difference is not as great as the difference between 
Japanese per capita GDP and Chinese per capita GDP.   
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Figure 6.5. GDP per capita of European countries in 1979 and 1988 in 2013 value of US$. Data 
gathered at the World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4. The 
World Bank did not have data for many Eastern European countries such as Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovak Republic and Ukraine.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. GDP per capita in East Asia (EANET member countries) in 1993 and 2001 in 2013 
value of US$. Data gathered at the World Bank. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4.  
  
The relationship between the environment and development has been exhibited in 
an inverted-U Kuznets curve, which indicates that environmental quality initially worsens 
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1993; Rock, 2002). Grossman and Krueger (1993) estimated that the “turning points” for 
atmospheric concentrations of suspended particulate matter (SPM) and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) were under US$5,000 (in 1985 value). Many studies observed this same pattern 
despite finding different turning points for different air pollutants.124 With the exception 
of most Eastern European countries, the GPD of European countries exceeded US$5,000 
in 1979 when they first reached an agreement on international environmental 
cooperation.  
Some countries in Northeast Asia have demonstrated a similar pattern. In Japan, 
as mentioned above, domestic institutional development and collaborations between 
government and industry began a significant decrease in sulfur dioxide emissions when 
its GDP per capita tipped US$5,000 in 1974. During the ROK’s post-1965 high-growth 
era, “energy consumption increased two times faster than it did for other upper-middle-
income countries,” leaving “little doubt that their early structural shifts in the 
composition of production contributed to rising portions of inverted-U environmental 
Kuznets curves” (Rock, 2002, p. 10). After rising, the pollution intensities of industrial 
activity declined because of shifts in the composition of industrial output as well as the 
introduction of various domestic measures to limit pollution in the 1980s. The ROK’s 
turning point regarding pollution coincided with the year in which it attained a GDP per 
capita of US$5,000. That the GDP per capita of China did not tip US$5,000 until around 
2010 (Figure 6.7) may help explain why it had not been prepared to control air pollution 
and take regional initiatives for decreasing transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia 
                                                          
124 Selden and Song estimated the turning points for these two air pollutants to be US$8,000, but 
they asserted that the turning point estimates for NOx and carbon monoxide (CO) “appear quite 
sensitive to the method of estimation” even though “aggregate emissions of these pollutants also 
appear to peak at moderately high levels of income” (1994, p. 154). 
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to that point. Indeed, the Kuznets curve may predict that China will further develop its air 
pollution measures since its recent turning point. How China’s economic development 
may influence its political leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization regarding 
environmental cooperation will prove an interesting topic for future research. 
 
Figure 6.7. GDP per capita in China, Japan, and the ROK in 2013 value of US$. Data gathered at 
the World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4.  
 
The findings of this dissertation do not rule out the potential influence of varied 
degrees of economic development among the nations of Northeast Asia. Indeed, this 
factor might explain China’s apparent lack of willingness to contribute financially to the 
operations of the TDGM and LTP joint research projects. As discussed in chapter 1, this 
study instead focuses on the political models that each region has established to tackle 
transboundary environmental problems. The following sections investigate whether the 
success of European cooperation through CLRTAP can be attributed to the exertion of 
political leadership, development of shared scientific knowledge, and engagement in the 
learning process of socialization.  
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Political Leadership 
This section examines whether the European case supports Hypothesis 1, that the 
stronger the leadership (whether structural, instrumental, or directional) by a participating 
country (not necessarily a hegemon or the regionally dominant state actor) or a group of 
countries in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the more formal and the more 
concrete the collective action developed in the region will be. As discussed earlier, this 
study assumes that leadership is a necessary component of international cooperation and 
that any country can lead regardless of its material capability.  
 This dissertation has identified three types of political leadership: structural, 
instrumental, and directional. For the purposes of this study, contributions to the 
financing of the regional cooperative mechanisms are treated as evidence of structural 
leadership under the assumption that states will spend more freely to exercise structural 
leadership. Instrumental leadership is demonstrated by “negotiating skills to frame issues 
in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise 
elude participants endeavoring to form international regimes through institutional 
bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 293). Intellectual or directional leadership refers to 
developing substantive solutions based on knowledge and changing perceptions of risks.  
As this section will show, political leadership in the CLRTAP has been shared by 
numerous countries. This is particularly true in the Cooperative Program for Monitoring 
and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP). 
Unlike EANET, TDGM, and LTP, which have been dominated by a single Northeast 
Asian country, the Nordic countries exerted their leadership in the 1970s through 
CLRTAP, and this initial Nordic instrumental leadership coalition “has increased over 
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time, related primarily to the catalytic change in German air policies” (Wettestad, 2011, p. 
51).  
Structural Leadership 
This sub-section investigates the contributions made to the CLRTAP Trust Fund 
or in kind through EMEP to examine which countries have exercised structural leadership 
within CLRTAP. The 1984 EMEP Protocol created a multilateral trust fund for the long-
term financial support of EMEP activities that entered into force on January 28, 1988. 
According to the CLRTAP Executive Body’s 1999 report on contributions for the 
financing of the EMEP Program between 1988 and 1998 (Appendix V), many countries 
shared in the burden of supporting the EMEP and no single country dominated the 
contributions. Between 1988 and 1998, Germany, the Russian Federation, and France 
were the most significant contributors (contribution US$2,639,228, US$2,434,909, and 
US$2,212,388, respectively).125 Several other countries contributed smaller but still 
significant amounts, including the United Kingdom (US$1,649,635), Italy (US$895,136), 
Spain (US$691,451), the European Community (US$596,184), and the Netherlands 
US$594,327). Twenty out of the 39 countries each contributed over US$100,000 during 
this period (UNESC, 1999).126 
Although it could be argued that these financial arrangements resulted from the 
mandatory characteristics of the 1984 EMEP Protocol and the high level of economic 
development of European countries, a closer examination of EMEP’s financial 
arrangements shows that contributions were not mandatory and were marked by extra-
                                                          
125 This data is 12 years old.  I believe it is relevant to comparing because it refers to a similar 
period since conclusion of the initial agreements Northeast Asia today. 
126 The 39 parties include the European Community and two voluntary members (Canada and the 
United States, which had not made any contributions for during this period).  
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budgetary funds, such as in-kind donations, voluntary contributions of non-signatories, 
and arrears on the part of many countries. Member countries participated to different 
extents and contributed varied amounts to the EMEP.   
Several countries made extra budgetary contributions to the Meteorological 
Synthesizing Center–West (MSC–W) and the Chemical Coordinating Center (CCC). 
Norway and the United Kingdom contributed to the MSC–W in 1994 (US$278,660), in 
1995 (US$795,100), and in 1996 (US$811,460). Norway contributed US$1,181,030 and 
the United States donated US$30,000 in 1997. Additionally, Norway contributed 
US$616,292, or 51% of the total expenditures, in 1998. The host institute, the Norwegian 
Institute for Air Research (NILU), made contributions to the CCC in 1994 (US$40,606), 
in 1995 (US$238,920), and in 1996 (US$186,115). In 1998, Belarus and Bulgaria also 
made in-kind contributions to the work of the Meteorological Synthesizing Center–East 
(MSC–E) (UNESC, 1999).  
Along with EMEP, the Working Group on Effects oversees another series of 
research programs, and a lead country operates each International Cooperative Program 
(ICP) on a voluntary basis (Levy, 1993; UNECE, 2013b). There are six ICPs, each under 
the leadership of a certain country: forests (Germany), waters (Norway), materials 
(Sweden), vegetation (United Kingdom), integrated monitoring (Sweden in collaboration 
with Finland), and modeling and mapping (Germany in collaboration with the 
Netherlands). National governments are encouraged to participate in these programs 
voluntarily. Participating countries pay their own research costs, and the lead countries 
provide the coordinating expenses of the research programs (Levy, 1993). Levy notes that 
the voluntary nature of these financial contributions may have led the CLRTAP protocols 
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to become “instruments of normative persuasion instead of as regulatory rules” (1993, p. 
132), arguing that although the protocols’ instruments appeared to be rules, they served 
the function of normative persuasion, which was a key determinant to CLTRAP’s 
success.   
In contrast to these voluntary extra-budgetary contributions, the contributions of 
several countries were in arrears in various years, amounting to a total in cash arrears in 
during 1991-1998 of US$ 464,920.127 Arrears for contributions in kind from the Ukraine 
totaled an additional US$283,445 even though most countries have contributed their 
expected amounts for the financing of the EMEP. Reservations of the positions on the 
mandatory contributions which means delayed payments, made by the biggest 
contributors, including Germany and France, illustrate the limited nature of the 
mandatory contributions to the EMEP Trust Fund. In 1995, “the Executive Body 
approved the use of the United Nations formula for assessments as a basis for the annual 
revision of the cost sharing for the financing of the EMEP programme, starting in 1998” 
(UNESC, 1999, p. 2).128 This decision was made “taking into account the announcement 
of the Russian Federation that from 1998 it would pay its mandatory contribution in cash 
to the Trust Fund” (ibid.).  
However, at the 16th session of the Executive Body in 1998, “Germany reserved 
its position on its 1999 and 2000 mandatory contributions calculated on the basis of the 
                                                          
127 The former Yugoslavia had arrears in cash for 1991, Italy and the former Yugoslavia for 1992, 
Yugoslavia for 1993 and 1994, Italy for 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy and Yugoslavia for 
1996, 1997 and 1998 (UNESC, 1999).  
128 The United Nations scales of assessment are decided by the UN General assembly for all UN 
Member States. EMEP calculates its scale of contributions on the basis of the UN scale of 
assessment. For example, Germany took part in 8.662% of the UN assessment rate in 2004, and 
20.8952% of the EMEP scale of contributions. Based on this calculation, Germany was scheduled 
to contribute US$447,860 in 2007 for the financing of the EMEP programme (UNECE, 2006).  
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United Nations scales of assessments for these years, which would lead to a steep 
increase in Germany’s contributions” (ibid.). In the following sessions of the Steering 
Body, Germany reemphasized its disagreement on the use of the United Nations scales 
for the allocation of EMEP contributions. The reservations have been continued by now. 
The French and German delegations “expressed their reservations regarding the 10 per 
cent increase for the EMEP budget and regarding their contributions for 2008” at the 25th 
session of the Executive Body in 2007 because in their view the current allocation of the 
EMEP budget “represented a disproportionate share of the budget” (UNECE, 2012, p. 5). 
Even though the Executive Body encouraged Germany and France to drop their 
reservations, Germany reaffirmed its reservation with regard to its financial contribution 
for 2009 at the 26th session of the Executive Body in 2008. Again, the Executive Body 
encouraged Germany to give up its reservation as soon as possible.  
In short, the financing of the EMEP program based on the 1984 EMEP Protocol 
has led many member countries to share the financial burden for running the program 
through making contributions as pledged. Even though Germany, the Russian Federation, 
and France were the biggest contributors, most other countries also took responsibility 
based on the United Nations assessment scales. On the other hand, Germany and France 
opposed what they considered to be an excessive share for the EMEP budget. Despite 
their reservations, the EMEP operated on funding from other countries and voluntary 
extra-budgetary contributions of a few countries. Shared responsibility rather than 
reliance on a few dominant countries has buttressed the sound financial conditions of the 
EMEP and other research programs under the Working Group on Effects. It can be 
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argued that the structural leadership of the CLRTAP has been shared by several countries 
rather than exerted by only one or two wealthy countries.  
Instrumental Leadership 
The instrumental leadership of the CLRTAP also has been shared by several 
countries. In the early phases of the CLRTAP, the Nordic countries exerted considerable 
instrumental leadership through active participation in various CLRTAP bodies. 
According to Wettestad, “Nordic negotiators and scientists have over time acquired a 
strong standing within the various CLRTAP bodies” (2004, p. 91). Examples include the 
Norwegian chairman of the Executive Body in the late 1990s and the Swedish chairmen 
of the Working Group on Strategies and the CLRTAP secretariat. Germany has also 
exerted instrumental leadership after the “catalytic change in German air policies” due to 
the domestic forest dieback problem (Wettestad, 2011, p. 51). Wettestad argues that  
German leadership added considerable political weight to the processes in the 
1980s and 1990s and was exercised with continuity at the point in the regime 
development process where several Nordic countries’ interests became much 
more complicated and the initial Nordic leadership coalition broke down (from 
the mid-1980s on) (2011, p. 51).  
 
Thus, I contend that Germany and the Nordic countries have shared instrumental 
leadership for CLRTAP. This instrumental leadership exerted by several countries must 
have been helpful in developing CLRTAP which had few specific provisions with ample 
room for policy development in the first place and added later more specific protocols. 
Directional Leadership 
In terms of directional or intellectual leadership, Norway has played a major role 
in establishing and implementing CLRTAP. As Siebenhüner has noted, “the complexity 
of ecological systems with their interconnectedness, numerous causal mechanisms, 
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synergies, and accumulation effects between different substances and abrupt system 
changes” meant that rigorous research and monitoring was necessary to cope with limited 
scientific knowledge and great uncertainties (2011, p. 93). As a result, the “weight given 
to enhancing scientific knowledge in the Convention necessitated the establishment of a 
substantial ‘complex’ of scientific and technological working groups,” making Norway, 
which already had “interests and substantial scientific/technical competence in this issue 
area,” the obvious candidate to take a “formal and informal leadership role” in the early 
phase of the CLRTAP (Wettestad, 2004, p. 91). In fact, the Norwegian Institute for Air 
Research took responsibility for coordinating the founding of two international projects: 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Program on 
Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (1972-1977) and the Norwegian research project 
Aid Precipitation – Effects on Forest and Fish (1972-1980).  
Despite this strong Norwegian intellectual leadership, the member countries of 
CLRTAP seem to have shared intellectual leadership through international bodies such as 
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), which developed and 
implemented the RAINS model (Siebenhüner, 2011). As discussed in the following 
section, the RAINS model gained prominence quickly, and other alternative models were 
unable to keep pace with its advancements, leading to its adoption in much of the 
CLRTAP research. 
Thus, this study’s analysis of the three modes of political leadership finds that 
Hypothesis 1 is proven. Strong leadership has been provided by participating countries, 
allowing the CLRTAP to deal successfully with transboundary air pollution issues in 
Europe. From CLRTAP’s founding, European countries have shared leadership 
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responsibilities rather allowing one country to dominate the leadership, unlike the 
Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms examined in this study, in which one country, 
usually the initiator, has dominated the leadership. This analysis confirms Hypothesis 1, 
which predicts that the stronger the political leadership that one participating country or a 
group of countries in the region exert, the more formal and the more concrete the 
collective action in the region will be. Furthermore, it is not strong leadership alone but 
shared leadership among participating countries that most enhances regional 
environmental cooperation. 
 
Knowledge 
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that the greater the commonly 
shared knowledge among participating countries in regional environmental cooperation 
efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action found in the 
region. After Europe launched various research projects in the early 1970s, it took only a 
decade for the participating European countries to agree on a framework convention and 
another decade to agree on a series of regulatory protocols. In contrast, Northeast Asia 
has not reached any conclusive scientific findings although it has undertaken a variety of 
research efforts since the early 1990s. The rest of the section reviews the status of 
scientific knowledge in Europe.  
Although Robert Smith’s 1872 Air and Rain: The Beginnings of a Chemical 
Climatology had introduced research on acid rain as early as the mid-19th century, acid 
rain did not become a policy concern until the 1930s and 1950s, when European 
researchers first launched studies on aquatic ecosystems and the relationships between 
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the loss of alkalinity in surface waters, precipitation acidity, and fossil fuel emissions. In 
the 1960s, Svante Odén, a soil scientist working at Sweden’s Agricultural College, 
synthesized diverse strands of research and concluded (a) that acid rain was a large-scale 
phenomenon across Europe, (b) that many areas were indeed experiencing the increasing 
acidity of precipitation, and (c) that this increase would cause detrimental effects on fish, 
forests, and materials (Clark et al., 2000). These hypotheses were pursued by scientists 
sponsored by the Swedish government, which led to the presentation of a case study on 
“Air Pollution across National Boundaries: The Impact of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation” 
at the 1972 Stockholm U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.  
Following these early Scandinavian efforts, two research projects shaped 
scientific discussions in the earlier phases of CLRTAP: the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Program on Long-Range Transport of Air 
Pollutants (1972-1977) and the Norwegian research project on Aid Precipitation – Effects 
on Forest and Fish (1972-1980). The results of the OECD study, published in 1977, 
confirmed that the air quality in every European country was affected by the emissions of 
other European countries and that air pollutants were transported long distances. It further 
concluded that “if countries find it desirable to reduce substantially the total deposition of 
sulphur within their borders individual national control programmes can achieve only a 
limited success” (OECD, 1977, quoted in Semb, Eliassen & Dutchak, 2004, p. 9). 
CLRTAP participants and analysts agreed with and supported these findings. According 
to VanDeveer, 
The OECD research constituted an important contribution to awareness raising 
among many Western European policymakers and publics. Importantly, it helped 
to de-legitimize flat denials of the occurrence of transboundary pollution 
transport, such as those previously voiced by British and West German officials. . 
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. . In this way, the OECD study altered the foreign policy of some opponents of 
air pollution cooperation, establishing the understanding that pollutants were 
being transported across borders and shifting the debate toward issues of 
assessing damages and policy proposals. (2006, p. 29) 
 
Following the OECD reports and growing public and media attention, in 1977 a 
number of European states began negotiating an international convention to deal with the 
long-range transboundary transport of air pollutants. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) was selected as the appropriate forum “because of the 
perception that it was the only existing organization with both environmental and 
economic interests that also included national members from both East and West” 
(VanDeveer, 2006, p. 30).  
These initial negotiations and took place largely between highly committed 
Nordic states, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and other, more reluctant 
Western European parties, including West Germany and the United Kingdom. Even 
though the Soviets had begun an initiative to promote cooperation in nonmilitary spheres 
for détente at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European nations played a minor role in the 
negotiations for a monitoring and regulatory program regarding transboundary air 
pollutants pushed by Sweden and Norway.  
As noted earlier, the initial CLRTAP expressed only “an intent of the signatories 
to limit and gradually decrease transboundary air pollution to the extent that technologies 
and economics allowed” (Clark et al., 2000, p. 33) and did not spell out any specific or 
binding commitments for pollution control or reduction, “leaving all specifics of 
multilateral environmental policy development for subsequent international agreements” 
(VanDeveer, 2006, p. 30). Even so, Clark et al. argue that CLRTAP successfully brought 
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major players to the table and “enhanced the foundations of monitoring and assessment 
on which alter action would build, expanding EMEP to include all of Europe, 
establishing a number of ongoing multilateral assessment processes, and providing an 
institutional home for subsequent international efforts” (Clark et al., 2000, p. 33).  
In this process, shared scientific knowledge on transboundary air pollutants 
played a key role. Especially crucial was the additional scientific knowledge produced 
from cooperative monitoring results by EMEP. EMEP led the discussions about emission 
reductions based on “yearly calculated blame matrices, from which the overall 
export/import budgets for all countries in Europe could be considered” and “formed a 
platform for negotiations on emission reductions” (Erisman et al., 2004, p. 160). Through 
“the large participation and commitment from the European countries to the EMEP 
programme” and the participation of both scientists and policymakers, European 
countries were able to “reach a common understanding of the problems and solutions 
(ibid.). 
EMEP was this effective because it combined monitoring and modeling and 
established source-receptor relationships for acidic substances across the member 
countries. The EMEP network monitoring acidic gas and the wet deposition of acidic 
species has quantified the patterns of acid deposition and compared them to its adverse 
effect measures (e.g., critical loads). This has enabled EMEP to quantify both the extent 
of the acidification problem and trends in improvement. In addition to the notable success 
of this monitoring, the construction of emission inventories has provided an “extremely 
important building block of the modelling work” (Williams, 1999, p. 777). Although the 
individual parties to the convention carried out a large amount of the work in their own 
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countries, the EMEP program provided an important coordination function and quality 
assurance, including acquiring data in a consistent form that made cross-country 
comparisons possible. As a result, the EMEP emission inventories for various air 
pollutants, including SO2 and NOx, “have found wide use and application not just in the 
CLRTAP area, but amongst scientists and researchers in many other areas in Europe and 
elsewhere” (ibid.). Through all these efforts, EMEP provided the shared scientific 
knowledge on which the specific and regulatory protocols developed in the early years of 
the CLRTAP were based. 
 As mentioned above, it took less than a decade for Europe to transform this 
shared scientific knowledge into regulatory protocols, unlike the slow development of 
shared scientific knowledge through the efforts of Northeast Asian environmental 
cooperative mechanisms. This was facilitated in part by European scientists’ 
development of the critical-loads approach in response to criticism of the flat-rate 
reduction protocols (both 1985 First Sulfur Protocol and 1988 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol). 
Europe has taken a significant step toward “differentiated commitments” and away from 
the “common cuts” called for in the 1994 Second Sulfur Protocol by employing the 
critical loads concept.   
This process of knowledge development was facilitated by the Regional 
Acidification Information System (RAINS), an integrated assessment model. It was 
developed by IIASA in 1983 as a “scenario-generating device” for the reduction of 
acidification and other damaging effects on a regional scale. In Europe, the yearly 
calculated source-receptor matrix (the so-called “blame matrix”) buttressed scientific 
discussions and negotiations, making it possible for European participants to build a 
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common understanding of the transboundary pollution problems and to formulate 
solutions. The RAINS team attempted to facilitate understanding among policymakers by 
presenting model results clearly and simply. In doing so, the team rejected the EMEP 
atmospheric transfer model (ATM), which is complex and demanding in terms of time to 
collect data, and instead designed the blame matrix to help others visualize and identify 
pollution emitters and receivers. The RAINS model has also been improved through 
competition with alternative models such as the Abatement Strategies Assessment Model 
developed by the Imperial College London and the Coordinated Abatement Strategy 
Model developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute, which forced the RAINS team 
to clarify the model’s differences and merits and thereby made it “more relevant and 
acceptable to the policymakers” (Ishii, 2011, p. 184) than other models. As a result, the 
“RAINS model was finally chosen as the guiding model, and other models were used for 
checking (or relativizing) its runs and outputs” (ibid.).  
In short, European countries reached a scientific consensus about their 
vulnerability to and the extent of transboundary air pollution in Europe before agreeing 
on a framework convention. Despite initial opposition to these findings from a few 
countries, including the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany, European 
countries agreed to adopt specific protocols to regulate air pollutants for the following 
decade. This analysis thereby confirms Hypothesis 2, which posits that a region will 
develop more formal and more concrete forms of collective action if the participating 
countries in its environmental cooperation efforts develop greater shared scientific 
knowledge. 
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Socialization 
This study defined socialization as the internalization of the values, roles, and 
understandings. This study examines adaption and learning as the two different processes 
of the internalization of norms that operate within these regional cooperative mechanisms. 
While, according to Haas (1990) and Johnston (1996), the adaptation process refers to the 
acceptance and adoption of preexisting, external norms and behaviors without changing 
the broad goals of countries, the learning process refers to a more transformative process 
which brings behavioral changes because actors question and examine fundamental and 
original values.   
This section examines Hypothesis 3, which asserts that participating countries in 
regional environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete 
collective action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than 
adaptation as a process of socialization. To examine which of these two processes of 
socialization the participating countries have engaged in, this section qualitatively 
measures the participation patterns of member countries through navigating two 
questions: whether the participation of countries in the region has been prompted by 
indirect, rather than intrinsic, concerns about particular transboundary air pollution issues; 
and whether delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation process of 
socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings for only a 
short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning process of 
socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an extended 
period in a consistent manner. It is found that European countries have engaged in both 
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the learning and adaptation processes of socialization while committing to the CLRTAP 
activities. 
Regarding the question of the political motivations for European countries to 
participate in the CLRTAP, I argue that there were two groups of European countries 
engaged in different processes of socialization. The countries which had varying political 
motivations and reasons to participate in implementing the CLRTAP can be argued to 
have engaged in the adaptation process. According to Levy (1993), Denmark, the Soviet 
Union, and the United Kingdom had all different non-environmental reasons for making 
the reductions associated with the participation in the CLRTAP: Demark because of its 
membership in the Nordic Council, which was also participating; the Soviet Union 
because it perceived CLRTAP as an important political issue for advancing détente; and 
the United Kingdom so as to change its image from the “dirty man of Europe” and in 
response to “political pressure from a wide variety of sources” (pp. 123-124). Other 
countries which were highly motivated to solve the problem of acid rain internationally 
can be argued to have been engaged in the learning process of socialization. Norway, 
Sweden, and later Germany are good example countries for this process in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
For the NOx protocol, Germany also seemed to have political motivations. 
Reducing NOx emissions by any significant magnitude “would require strict automobile 
emission standards” because nitrogen oxides are emitted both from power plants and 
automobiles (Levy, 1993, p. 95). For Germany, which had already required catalytic 
converters in automobiles through 1983 legislation, reductions in nitrogen oxides would 
not particularly difficult, and thus it  supported the Scandinavians’ efforts to add a 
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nitrogen oxides protocol immediately following the adoption of the sulfur protocol in 
1985. But the United Kingdom, France, and Italy did not support a protocol to reduce 
nitrous oxides, as their automakers argued that emission standards would place them at a 
comparative disadvantage with Germany, which was already able to produce “much of 
the equipment needed to meet strict standards, such as fuel injectors and catalytic 
converters” (Levy, 1993, p. 95). Likewise, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union opposed 
nitrous oxide reductions because their automobile manufacturing industries were rapidly 
expanding and they foresaw that reducing automobile emissions would have negative 
economic consequences in the near future.129 These varying political motivations of 
many European countries show that they have engaged in the adaptation process of 
socialization to some extent. 
Regarding the second measurement of the participation patterns, unlike the 
inconsistent participation of governmental official delegates to international meetings in 
the Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms examined in this study, the 
patterns of delegates’ participation in Europe’s CLRTAP can be described as 
significantly consistent. This section analyzes the participation of delegates to the EMEP 
Steering Body between 2008 and 2011 because of its role as the organization’s governing 
body. As it shows, most of the European countries have sent the same delegates to these 
meetings for a number of years (Appendix VI). Many delegates have been dispatched by 
                                                          
129 Since reaching the 1988 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, the average European reductions in NOx 
emissions have reached around 25%, while Eastern Europe, Germany, and Switzerland have 
achieved a nearly 50% reduction. According to European Environment Agency, the reduction in 
NOx mainly resulted from technical measures within the transport and industrial sectors, 
including the installation of catalytic converters in gasoline-fueled cars, the introduction of motor 
modifications in diesel-fueled cars, and “the introduction of combustion modification 
technologies (such as use of low NOX burners), implementation of flue-gas abatement techniques 
(e.g., NOX scrubbers and selective…and non-selective…catalytic reduction techniques) and fuel-
switching from coal to gas” (2012b).  
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their ministers of environment or similar institutions, and most hold a high rank, such as 
heads of departments, within their organizations. Through continuous participation by 
delegates who have remained the same for a long period of time and who hold decision-
making power within the organizations with which they are affiliated, member countries 
have imbued the organization’s proceedings and decisions with considerable credibility. 
Moreover, delegates have been able to build and expand their own understandings of 
EMEP activities and issues through accumulated experiences with the EMEP.  
Appendix VI shows the recent participation patterns of participants in the annual 
meetings of EMEP Steering Body, which are also similar to those exhibited during the 
first decade of the CLRTAP. As Siebenhüner argues, “one of the main success factors for 
the CLRTAP and its assessments has been the continuity of a large percentage of its 
personnel, especially in the first decade of its existence,”  and that “[n]ewly acquired 
technical and procedural knowledge could thereby be kept inside the process and passed 
on through individuals” (2011, p. 105). Given this continuity, participating members have 
been able to engage in learning as a socialization process, which can change the 
behaviors of international actors through allowing them to question fundamental theories 
and their values.  
At the same time, it should be noted that there were considerable discrepancies in 
the participation in international meetings by major Western countries, such as Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and by the Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. Whereas early scientific interest in environmental issues 
in the West was spurred by identifiable and observable environmental effects, scientists 
in CEE countries had developed little interest in these issues because they had “little 
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access to mass media or domestic public policymaking” (VanDeveer, 2006, p. 40). Only 
a small number of delegates from the CEE participated in the two major international 
conferences on acidification research and policies that were sponsored by the Dutch 
government in cooperation with UNECE. In fact, only 10 delegates from five CEE 
countries—around 4.3% of all the delegates attending —participated in the 1986 
conference, and only three delegates from Eastern Europe participated in the 1991 
conference.130  
In contrast, conference delegates from the five big player countries in CLRTAP 
made up 60% and 85% of attendees in 1986 and 1991, respectively. Most European states 
sent national representatives to meetings of CLRTAP’s high-level bodies, such as the 
Executive Body, Working Group Strategies, and EMEP Steering Body. Whereas 
attendance of delegates from some transition states “has been generally less frequent and 
more sporadic,” 14 out of the 16 states with perfect attendance at mid-1990s working 
group meetings were from Western Europe (VanDeveer, 2006, pp. 41-42). Despite these 
discrepancies in the delegation size between the big player countries and CEE countries 
at international CLRTAP meetings, delegates from the CEE countries might have had 
enough time to develop personal relationships with national and governance-level 
delegates from other countries if they had been able to participate consistently and to gain 
scientific knowledge through iterative communication with various scientists.  
The positive effect of continuity among a large percentage of national delegates 
and personnel for the implementation of CLRTAP has been reinforced by the learning 
process of socialization among scientists and political negotiators. The “continuous, 
                                                          
130 These 10 delegates included one participant from Czechoslovakia, two from Hungary, three 
from Poland, two from the Soviet Union, and two from Yugoslavia. 
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iterative communication among scientists and negotiators” has been recognized by other 
scholars as “one of the crucial preconditions for the successes of the convention process” 
(Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 104). Through formal and informal communication and 
relationships among the working groups and the Executive Body, which are mostly 
mediated through the Working Group on Strategies and Review, scientific and technical 
information has flowed into the negotiation processes.  
Political decision makers as well as scientists have engaged in the learning 
process of socialization. For instance, in the negotiations for the Second Sulfur Protocol, 
the political decision makers were able to learn “all the possible scenarios for emission 
reductions and their likely outcomes” from the scientists, and the scientists urged the 
negotiators to agree on a clear emission target for the protocol (Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 
104). According to Siebenhüner, this case “demonstrates the strong impact that scientists 
had on the actual decision making, which became possible through the good informal 
communication networks and the trust that negotiators had in the scientists” (2011, p. 
105).  
In an examination of how advisory scientists to the CLRTAP regime have learned 
collectively throughout the process of scientific assessment, Atsushi Ishii (2011) argues 
that the scientists similarly learned diplomacy as well as science. For instance, throughout 
the process of developing the critical loads approach and the RAINS model, advisory 
scientists “abandoned their positivistic paradigm and shifted to a more diplomacy-
oriented paradigm that would hold them accountable to country parties, which is a 
prerequisite in diplomatic settings and makes scientists adhere to the overall norm of 
usefulness in the diplomatic context” (Ishii, 2011, p. 184). 
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The process of defining the critical loads also shows how participants have 
reconciled scientific understandings with political applicability. Given the criticism of the 
flat-rate reduction protocols, Scandinavian scientists and 30 experts gathered for a 
workshop in Oslo sponsored by the Nordic Council of Ministers and adopted a scientific 
definition of critical loads for sulfur and nitrogen: “the highest load that will not cause 
chemical changes leading to long-term harmful effect on the most sensitive ecosystems” 
(Ishii, 2011, p. 177). However, the last part of this definition, “most sensitive ecosystems,” 
was changed to “significant harmful effects” and the phrase “according to present 
knowledge” was added to the final definition by a workshop held by the CLRTAP’s 
Working Group on Effects in 1988, a change that, Ishii argues, “broadened the political 
applicability and strengthened the robustness of the scientific assessments” of the critical 
loads concept (2011, p. 178). This change followed “the definition agreed upon by the 
UNECE Working Group on Nitrogen Oxides in February 1988 in a deliberation in which 
both negotiators and scientists participated” (ibid.), and Ishii points out that the 
development of the RAINS model also involved communication among a wide range of 
various stakeholders. The “interactive learning among potential users” of the RAINS 
model was one of the key guidelines for its development, and thus “the RAINS team did 
not consider learning from external actors as ‘residual,’ but rather incorporated it into the 
modeling process as an inherent component from the outset to win policymakers’ 
acceptance of the RAINS model” (Ishii, 2011, p. 181). 
In short, the first measurement of participation patterns of the participants in the 
CLRTAP activities through examining the existence of indirect political concerns and 
motivations rather than intrinsic interests in regional cooperation to solve transboundary 
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air pollution problems indicates that some countries have engaged in the learning process 
of socialization and other countries in the adaptation. The second measurement of 
participation patterns through examining the existence of enough consistent participation 
and interactive communication with delegates from other countries shows that both 
governmental officials and scientists alike have engaged in the learning process. 
Accordingly, comparing with the Northeast Asian case studies which have shown only 
the adaptation processes of socialization, it can be argued that the learning process of 
socialization among participants in the CLRTAP have contributed to its development into 
what the UNEP categorizes as the highest level regional entities with an established 
infrastructure and a policy focus. For the first measurement of participation patterns, both 
Northeast Asia and Europe seemed to have been motivated by varying political interests 
in participating in regional environmental cooperation, which showed that they have been 
engaged in the adaptation process of socialization to some extent. However, unlike 
Northeast Asia, Europe has presented consistent participation and interactive 
communication with delegates from other countries, which showed the learning process 
of socialization among European countries. In this sense, European experiences through 
the CLRTAP support Hypothesis 3: If participating countries in regional environmental 
cooperation efforts adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization, 
they are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional 
cooperation.    
 
Conclusions 
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 This study makes two sets of conclusions regarding: (1) the general utility of the 
three hypotheses for explaining regional environmental governance; (2) the specifics of 
Northeast Asian cooperation, with the question of why the driving forces identified in the 
hypotheses have not been as influential there as in Europe. For the first set of conclusions, 
this study contends that shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of 
socialization are key determinants of the development of regulatory regional 
environmental regimes. It means that even given strong political leadership by a 
participating country, a region is unlikely to succeed in creating a legally binding regional 
environmental regime without development of shared scientific knowledge and 
engagement in the learning process of socialization. Table 6.2 summarizes the findings of 
four case studies including EANET, TDGM, and LTP in Northeast Asia, and CLRTAP in 
Europe.   
Table 6.2 
Summary of Findings of Case Studies 
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 Leadership Knowledge  Learning Mode Formal Concrete Legal 
EANET Yes No No Yes Yes No 
TDGM Some No No Yes No No 
LTP Yes No No No No No 
CLRTAP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: As indicated in Table 1.4, the “formal” degree of collective action is measured through 
examining the permanent structures of cooperative mechanisms, such as a secretariat, and the 
division of labor of their entities, such as the secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory 
body, as well as formal financial structures shared by member countries. The “concrete” degree 
of collective action is measured through examining the existence of agreed-upon shared formats 
and guidelines for joint monitoring and modeling activities. The “legal” form of collective action 
is measured through examining the existence of legally binding agreement among participating 
countries. 
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This study argues that Europe has succeeded in reducing air pollution through 
developing better air quality management with regional regulatory regimes, whereas 
Northeast Asia has encountered increasing air pollution due to the rapid growth of energy 
consumption in China. The trends of NOx emissions in Europe and Northeast Asia 
clearly show this contrast in the state of air pollution in the region. A comparative 
analysis between cooperative efforts in Northeast Asia and Europe demonstrates that the 
Northeast Asian cooperative efforts through EANET, TDGM, and LTP have failed to 
generate broader cooperation and produce useful measurement data that could lead to the 
creation of a regional environmental regime with a solid infrastructure and a policy focus 
such as that which European cooperative efforts have achieved through CLRTAP.  
An analysis of these empirical findings indicates that all three independent 
variables are only partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured 
by formal features and concrete collective action in Northeast Asia.  However, political 
leadership is more associated with varying degrees of collective action in terms of formal 
and concrete collective action because none of the three cooperative mechanisms has 
developed shared knowledge and the learning process of socialization. Although the 
ROK’s dominant and significant exercise of political leadership did not explain why the 
LTP exhibited the least amount of formal and concrete collective action, the cases of 
EANET and TDGM provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the stronger the 
leadership by a participating country in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the 
more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action developed in the region,.  
For the second set of conclusion, this study examined whether political leadership 
and shared scientific knowledge are necessary or sufficient factors for the engagement in 
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the learning process of socialization of participating countries in the first place, and 
whether the learning process of socialization can lead the region to achieve more formal 
and concrete collective action. The study’s comparison of the varying degrees of 
collective action in Northeast Asia and Europe and among the three studied Northeast 
Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms focusing on these two questions discovers 
two useful insights.  
First, the analysis supports the hypothesis on social mechanisms among political 
leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization, which asserts that the stronger the 
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely 
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization 
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action. The study finds that 
strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member countries to engage in 
the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared scientific knowledge is 
positively associated with the adaptation process of socialization among participants in 
the cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms.  
Another insight is that the combination of lack of shared knowledge and the 
learning mode of socialization helps explain why all three regional cooperative 
mechanisms have failed to advance to become the legally binding regional environmental 
regimes rather than the comparatively higher degrees of collective action in terms of 
formalization and concreteness among regional entities within the UNEP’s second 
category of regional action. This study argues that knowledge and socialization barriers 
are key determinants of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. 
Without shared scientific knowledge and engagement in the learning process of 
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socialization, even given strong political leadership by a participating country, it is not 
likely for a region to develop a legally binding regional environmental regime. Strong 
political leadership exercised by a participating country itself did not explain the different 
extents of collective action between Northeast Asia and Europe because the three 
Northeast Asian cases have had strong political leadership by initiator countries, as has 
the CLRTAP. 
Based on these findings, this study suggests that if their regional environmental 
cooperative mechanisms are to advance to the next stage of development, Northeast 
Asian countries must build sound infrastructures to ensure consistent participation of the 
same delegates of member countries to international meetings to increase the chance that 
the learning process of socialization will take place, enhancing international cooperation 
and resulting in more fundamental behavioral changes by states in the region. 
Additionally, this infrastructure should also reinforce greater interactive communication 
between the two groups of delegates, political negotiators and scientists, participating in 
international meetings by achieving more consistent participation in international 
meetings. The significance of consistent participation by delegates to the CLRTAP and 
particularly the EMEP is a key lesson that Northeast Asian countries can take from the 
European case, as the consistent attendance of European delegates has created personal 
relationships among delegates that seem to have contributed to their developing common 
understanding on scientific issues and reaching agreements on specific budgetary issues.  
The examination of institutional linkages has proven that the governance and 
actor linkages between CLRTAP and EU air policy have contributed to strengthening 
their regulatory policies in Europe (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011). Thereby it can be 
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suggested that Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms need to develop strategies for 
creating synergistic effects among their existing overlapping research projects. While the 
EMEP focuses on three activities, including collection of emission data, measurements of 
air quality and modeling of atmospheric transport, and deposition of air pollutants, the 
EANET focuses only on measurements of acid deposition and the LTP on measurements 
and modeling of the source-and-receptor relationships of SO2 and NOx emissions, which 
may explain why these two Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms have lacked the 
driving force necessary for moving beyond their current research activities. According to 
Haas and Stevens,  
studies of international environmental assessments and science panels suggest the 
need for fluid bodies that can bring together multiple sources of information and 
are not beholden to one single funder or political sponsor. . . . Studies of national-
level environmental policy processes have convincingly argued against relying on 
individual institutions for research and policy advice because they may bias the 
information flow and control resources (2011, p. 129).  
 
In the CLRTAP, no single source of policy advice dictates the production of 
knowledge; instead, “the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP), the 
working groups, and the Network on Air Pollution and Health (AIRNET) all serve to 
identify research questions and guide science with some degree of autonomy from the 
policy process” (ibid., pp. 129-130). This suggests another lesson for Northeast Asia: 
EANET and LTP are not necessarily competitive with each other. The two should be 
combined into a single organization like EMEP with possessing autonomy from the 
policy process through serving to identify research agendas.  
In addition to the strategies of combining existing cooperative efforts into a more 
efficient entity of regional cooperation, Northeast Asia needs to address concerns about 
the flow of biased information both within a country and with other countries. Chinese 
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participants in the International Experts Workshop on International Framework and Co-
benefits Approach to Promote Air Pollution Control in East Asia, held in January 2011 in 
Japan, argued that studies by international bodies demonstrating the urgency and 
necessity of international cooperation would be most effective in persuading the Chinese 
government to participate in regional environmental cooperation, while scientists from 
other countries argued that more active advocacy for regional cooperation by Chinese 
scientists would be necessary because the Chinese government tends to be suspicious of 
scientific research conducted by scientists from other countries. This kind of ping pong-
style discussion can be counter-productive and suggests that rather than blaming one 
another for the lack of development of shared scientific knowledge, regional scientists 
need to collaborate more efficiently and effectively to produce research outputs. 
In addition to these horizontal institutional linkages, vertical institutional linkages 
also need to be developed in Northeast Asia. Two key comprehensive cooperative 
mechanisms mentioned in chapter 2, the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting 
among the ROK, China, and Japan (TEMM) and the North-East Asia Sub-regional 
Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC), should develop clear objectives 
and strategies for implantation of issue-specific cooperative projects to reduce duplication 
of research projects in different organizations and to create synergistic effects among 
various cooperative mechanisms.  
A delegate to the Korean government stated in an interview that money does not 
matter at this point for regional environmental cooperation as both the Japanese and 
Korean governments have shown their willingness to become key financial resource 
countries through EANET and LTP, respectively. What seems to matter most for 
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environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is to share the leadership among 
participating countries, relaxing the ownership for the cooperative mechanisms that 
countries initiated and to support each other among participating countries. In doing so, it 
is necessary for Northeast Asian countries to develop shared scientific knowledge among 
participating researchers in cooperative programs, and to create bureaucratic supports for 
the learning process of socialization among policy makers and scientists both within each 
country and with other countries.    
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Country Name Interview Date Affiliation 
Japan 
Nobuhiro Kino 05/10/2010 Ministry of Environment 
Katsunori Suzuki 4/23/2010 Kanazawa University 
Shohei Yonemoto 3/1/2010 Tokyo University 
Hajime Akimoto 6/1/2010 ADORC 
Norichika Kanie 8/27/2010 Tokyo Institute of Technology 
Shunji Matsuoka 10/5/2010 Waseda University 
Alice Kim 10/6/2010 Waseda University 
Mark Elder 10/6/2010 Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) 
Xiaofeng Zhou 10/6/2010 IGES 
Asami Miyazaki 10/4/2010 Osaka University 
Atsushi Ishii 10/17/2010 Tohoku University 
Atsushi Shimizu 12/17/2010 National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) 
Nobuo Sugimoto 12/17/2010 NIES 
Ken Yamashita 2/8/2011 Asia Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) 
Hajime Akimoto 2/8/2011 ACAP 
Keiichi Sato 2/8/2011 ACAP 
Tsuyoshi Ohizumi 2/8/2011 ACAP 
Toshimasa Ohara 3/8/2011 NIES 
Masataka 
Nishikawa 3/8/2011 NIES 
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China 
ZHOU Jun 11/23/2010 Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy 
He Youjiang 11/23/2010 Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences 
XIE Shuyan 11/23/2010 China National Environment Monitoring Center 
Haibin ZHANG 01/18/2011 Peking University 
Republic of 
Korea 
LimSeok Jang 8/17/2009, 12/23/2010 
National Institute of Environmental 
Research (NIER) 
Chu Jang Min 12/30/2009, 12/29/2010 Korea Environment Institute 
Il-Soo Park 3/29/2010 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 
Jinseok Han 3/31/2010 NIER 
Seog-Yeon Cho 10/29/2009, 11/22/2010 Inha University 
Su-Hee Hwang 11/22/2010 Ministry of Environment (MOEK) 
Chang-Keun Song 8/17/2009 NIER 
Yong-Seung 
Chung 12/24/2010 KCAER 
Sang-Joon Lee 12/23/2010 MOEK 
Kyu Il Park 12/23/2010 MOEK 
Dong Young Kim 12/28/2010 Korea Development Institute 
Suh-Yong Chung 12/28/2010 Korea University 
Sangwoo Park 12/29/2010 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Indonesia Agus Harya SETYAKI 11/23/2010 Ministry of Environment 
Malaysia Wan Izar Haizan Wan Rosely 11/22/2010 
Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment 
Switzerland Krzysztof Olendrzynski 11/23/2010 UNECE 
 
 
  
 
  
313 
 
APPENDIX II 
LIST OF DELEGATES TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING OF EANET 2001-2010 
  IG3 2001, Thailand 
IG4 2002,   
Thailand 
IG5 2003, 
Thailand  
IG6 2004, 
Cambodia 
IG7 2005,  
Japan  
IG8 2006, 
Vietnam 
IG9  2007, 
Lao PDR 
IG10 2008, 
Thailand 
IG11 2009, 
Thailand  
IG12 2010, 
Japan 
Cambodia 
  Chea Sina / MOE  
Heng 
Nareth / 
MOE 
Hang Dara 
/ MOE 
Khong 
Samnuon 
/ MOE 
Hang Dara 
/ MOE   
Ngoun 
Kong / 
MOE 
same 
Khieu 
Muth / 
MOE 
    
Chrin 
Sokha 
/ MOE 
same 
Heng 
Nareth 
/ MOE 
  
Thiv 
Sophearith 
/ MOE 
Ken 
Choviran / 
MOE 
same 2009 Lonh Heal / MOE 
        
Long 
Rithirak/ 
MOE 
same same     
Ken 
Choviran / 
MOE 
China 
Li Xue / 
MOE / MOE   
Tang 
Dingding 
/ MOE 
Wang 
Ruibin / 
CNEMC 
same 
Tang 
Dingding / 
MOE 
same 2004, 
2005 same 
Lin Jun / 
MOE 
Zhu 
Jianping / 
MOE 
Guo Jing / 
MOE same 
Fang Li 
/ MOE same same 
Xia 
Yingxian 
/ MOE 
same       
        Dong Yao / MOE 
Zhou 
Guomei 
/ MOE 
Xia 
Yingxian / 
MOE 
Liu 
Shusheng / 
MOE 
same 2005 
He 
Youjiang / 
CRAES 
          
Zheng 
Haohao 
/ CNEMC 
Gu Li / 
MOE same   
Xie Shuyan 
/ CNEMC 
            Zhou Jun / MOE same same Same 
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Indonesia  
Sri Kaloka 
Prabotosari / 
National 
Institute of 
Aeronauties 
and Space 
(LAPAN) 
Gunardi / 
MOE 
Liana 
Bratasida 
/ MOE 
0 
Sulisty-
owati / 
MOE 
Halimah 
Syafrul/ 
MOE 
same same 
Nixson F. 
Silalahi / 
MOE 
Agus 
Harya 
Setyaki / 
MOE 
Sigit Sadiono 
/ Indoneshian 
Embassy 
  
Tjang 
Mushadji 
Sutami-
hardja / 
Professor   
  
Kusmu-
lyani 
Sugiarto 
/ MOE 
same same 2003 same 2005-2006 same   
Ina Binari 
Pranoto / 
MOE  
            
Ratnasari 
Anwar / 
MOE 
    
Japan 
Hideki 
Okumura 
/ Embassy of 
Japan, 
Thailand 
Kenichi 
Kamae / 
Embassy of 
Japan 
Shinichi 
Arai 
/ MOE 
same 
Yuriko 
Koike and 
8 officials 
/ MOE 
Hiroyasu 
Tokuda 
/ MOE 
Yasuhiro 
Shimizu / 
MOE 
Satoshi 
Tanaka / 
MOE 
Toshiro 
Segawa / 
MOE 
Shintaro 
Fujii / 
MOE 
Hajime 
Endo/ MOE 
Tokuya 
Wada/ 
MOE 
same 
Keiko 
Segawa 
/ MOE 
same 
Reiko 
Sodeno /  
MOE 
same same 
Nobuhiro 
Kino / 
MOE 
Tetsunori 
Hatta with 
8 more / 
MOE 
Chieko 
Tatsumi / 
MOFA 
same 
Yoshiko 
Endo 
/ MOFA 
Taira 
Iwasaki 
/ MOFA 
Takaaki 
Kato/ 
MOFA 
same 
Toshihisa 
Kato / 
MOFA 
same same Same 
            Norichika Kanie / TIT same same Same 
            
Yukari 
Takamura, 
Ryukoku 
University 
same   Same 
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Lao PDR 
0 0 
Mone-
many 
Nhoybou-
akong 
/ MOE 
same same 
Phakka-
vanh 
Phissamay 
/ MOE 
same 2003 
Bounthanh 
Bounvilay / 
MOE 
Setouvanh 
Phantha-
vongsa / 
MOE 
Same 
    
Sisoup-
hanh 
Luangrath 
/ MOE 
same same same same 
Darounny 
Vilaythong 
/ MOE 
same 2003-
2007 same 2008 
        
Sakhone 
Chaleu-
nvong 
/ MOE 
          
Malaysia 
Letchumanan 
Al Ramatha / 
MOE 
      
Muhamad 
Bin 
Awang / 
Professor  
Lian Kok 
Fei/ MOE 
Che Kodir 
Baharum / 
MOE 
Danial Lee 
Abdullah / 
MOE 
Engku 
Mustaffa / 
MOE 
Wan 
Rosely / 
MOE 
Chow Peng 
Leong 
 / Meteorolo-
gical Service 
same same same same   
Maznorizan 
Mohamad / 
Malaysian 
Meteorolo-
gical 
Department 
Siniarovina 
Urban / 
Malaysian 
Meteorolo-
gical 
Department  
Olivia Chin 
Su Fung / 
Attorney 
General's 
Chambers 
Nik 
Myhamad 
Majid / 
University 
Putra 
Malaysia  
Che Asmah 
Ibrahim 
/ Dep. of 
Environment 
      
Wong 
Fook Lian 
 / Dep. of 
Chemistry 
same         
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Mongolia 
Zamba 
Batjargal / 
Ambassador  
Enebish 
Dugerjav 
/ MOE  
Ministry of 
Nature and 
Environme
nt 
Enkhtuv-
shin 
Gombo-
suren 
/ MOE 
Erdenebul-
gan Davaa 
/ MOE 
Erdene-
baatar 
Enkhmen
d 
/ MOE 
Enkhtuv-
shin Sevjid 
 / 
NAMHEM 
same 
Tseesodrol-
tsoo 
Dashdorj / 
NAMHEM 
Bayarsaik-
han 
Purevjav / 
NAMHEM 
Uranchi-
meg 
Ochirbat / 
MOE 
Lamjav 
Batnyam/ 
NAMHEM 
Bulgan 
Tumen-
demberel / 
Central 
Laboratory 
of Environ-
mental 
Monitoring 
Batbayar 
Tsemeen-
myadar 
/Ministry 
of Nature 
and 
Environ-
ment 
Dugarsuren 
Enkhtuul /  
MOE 
  
Erdenebat 
Eldev-
Ochir/ 
NAMHEM 
same same same Same 
Myanmar 
          
Maung 
Maung 
Tun / 
MOT 
Tin Ngwe / 
MOT 
Sein Maw 
Oo / MOT 
Tin Hla / 
MOT Same 
          
Kyaw Moe 
Oo 
 / MOT 
Tun Thein / 
MOT   
Htwe Htwe 
Win / MOT Same 
Philippines 
Erlinda A. 
Gonzalez/ 
MOE 
Pio 
Lofamia 
Tejada 
/ MOFA 
Fernan-
dino Y. 
Concep-
cion 
/ MOE 
  
Alan 
Benito de 
Gala/ 
MOE 
Samuel R. 
Penafiel 
/ MOE 
Julian D. 
Amador / 
MOE 
Letecia R. 
Maceda / 
MOE 
same 2007 Same 
Ella S. 
Deocadiz/ 
MOE 
same 
Adrian 
B.C. 
Candolada
/ 
Embassy  
Regina 
Perol/ 
Embassay 
Corazon 
C. Davis 
/MOE 
  
Cesar 
Siador, Jr. / 
MOE 
Jean N. 
Rosete / 
MOE 
same Same 
                  
Demetrio 
L. 
Iganacio, 
JR / MOE 
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ROK  
Seog-Yeon 
Cho / 
Professor 
same same same same 
Yeonsoon 
Ahn / 
MOE 
Park 
Kwang-Suk 
/ MOE 
Lee Seung 
Han / MOE 
same 2001-
2005 Same 
Jin-Seok Han 
/ NIER same same same 
Park Ju 
Young / 
MOFA  
Jin-Seok 
Han / 
NIER 
Park Jeong-
Su / MOE 
Kang Seuk 
Woo / 
MOE 
Kim Jeong-
Soo / NIER 
Chang 
Lim-Seok / 
NIER 
Se Chang 
Ahn/ MOE 
Soo Yun 
Ma/MOE 
Lee Suk-
Jo /NIER 
Lee Jae-
Hyun/MOE 
Kim 
Kyung-
Sik 
/MOE 
Beom-Sik 
Yoo/MOE   
Oh Heum 
Jin / MOE   same 2004 
    
Yang Jae-
Moon 
/MOE 
same same     
Ahn Joon 
Young / 
NIER 
  
Hwang 
Suhee / 
MOE 
Russia 
Valery V. 
Chelukanov 
/ RFSHEM  
Dzhumshid 
Dzhangirov 
/  
Environ-
ment 
Pollution 
Monitoring 
Department 
same 
2001 same same 
Marina 
Kotlya-
kova / 
RFSHEM 
same 2001, 
2003-2005 same same 
Yuri 
Peshkov / 
RFSHEM 
Serguei A. 
Gromov 
/Institute of 
Global 
Climate and 
Ecology 
Veronika 
Ginzburg / 
RFSHEM  
same same same same same 2001  same same Same 
Tamara V. 
Khodjer / 
research 
institute  
                  
Thailand 
Suvit 
Yodmani/Asi
an Disaster 
Preparedness 
Center 
  
Mingquan 
Wichayar
angsaridh/
MOE 
same 
Monthip 
Sriratana 
Tabuca-
non/MOE 
Mingquan 
Wichaya-
rangsa 
Phunsak 
Thera-
mongkol / 
MOE 
Nisakorn 
Kositratna / 
MOE 
same 2007   
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Sirithan 
Pairoj-
boriboon / 
MOE 
      
Pichaid 
Atipakya/ 
MOE 
Unnop 
Buranasate
/ MOFA 
Chatri 
Archjana-
nun / 
MOFA 
Wijarn 
Simachaya 
/ MOE 
same 
Pornsook 
Chongpra-
sith / MOE 
Supat 
Wangwongw
atana /MOE 
same same same same same Same same same Same 
        
Seksan 
Sangdow 
/ MOE 
    
Chavanart 
Thang-
sumphant / 
MOFA 
Alisa 
Chobisara / 
MOFA 
  
                
Pichaid 
Atipakya/ 
MOE  
Same 
Vietnam 
Vu Van Tuan 
/Hydromete-
orological 
Service 
Nguyen 
Van Tue/ 
Hydrome-
teorological 
Service 
Vu Van 
Tuan 
Deputy / 
Hydrome-
teorolo-
gical 
Service 
same 
Duong 
Hong Son 
/ MOE 
Tran Thuc 
General / 
MOE 
Ngo Thi 
Hang / 
National 
Institute of 
Meteroloy
Hydrology 
and 
Environ-
ment 
Dinh Thai 
Hung / 
National 
Institute of 
Meterology
Hydrology 
and 
Environ-
ment 
  same 2006 
Hang Thu 
Pham 
/Hydrome-
teorological 
Service  
Hoang 
Manh Hoa 
/ Hydrome-
teorological 
Service 
Tran Van 
Sap/Hy-
dromete-
orological 
Service 
Le Nguyen 
Tuong/ 
MOE 
Be Thi 
Nguyen 
/ MOE 
Nguyen 
Khac Hieu 
/ MOE 
  same 2003   
Duong 
Hong Son 
/ MOE 
(same 
2005) 
          
Nguyen Le 
Tam 
/ MOE 
    same 2006   
          
Duong 
Hong Son 
/MOE 
Same   same 2006-2007   
UNEP/ 
ROAP 
            Ahn Moon-Soo   
Wanhua 
Yang 
Young-
Woo Park 
            Manjit Iqbal       
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UNECE             Keith Bull same Catherine S. Masson 
Krzysztof 
Olendrzyn-
ski 
UN ESCAP               Sangmin Nam     
UNEP head-
quarters                 
M.Iynga-
rarasan Same 
ScandEnvi-
ronment                 
Lars 
Nordberg   
Note: China National Environmental Monitoring Center (CNEMC); For Lao PDR, MOE is Science 
Technology and Environment Agency; For Malaysia, MOE is Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment; For Mongolia, MOE is Ministry of Nature and Environment; NAMHEM: National Agency 
for Meteorology, Hydrology and Environment Monitoring of Mongolia; MOT: Ministry of Transport; 
HMS: Hydrometeorological Service; RFSHEM: Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and 
Environmental Monitoring, a service in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; For 
Thailand, MOE is Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment; UNEP/ROAP: UNEP Regional 
Office For Asia and the Pacific 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
320 
 
APPENDIX III 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF TDGM MEETINGS 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 
 
Steering 
Committee WG II WG I WG I WG I WG I 
Steering 
Committee WG I 
China 
Yingxian Xia / 
MEP 
Fahe Chai / 
CRAES 
Ruibin Wang / 
CNEMC 
Ruibin Wang / 
CNEMC 
Xiaochun Zhang 
(CMA) 
Jianjun Li / 
CNEMC 
Xuefeng Sun / 
MEP 
Benfeng Pan / 
CNEMC 
Yanchao Tong 
/ CNEMC 
Yunjiang Yu / 
CRAES 
Yanchao Tong / 
CNEMC 
Haohao Zheng / 
CNEMC 
Haohao Zheng / 
CNEMC 
Dandan Cui / 
MEP 
Yao Dong / 
MEP 
Wei Wang / 
CNEMC 
Qingxin Zhang 
/ Liaoning 
Environment 
Monitoring 
Centre 
Wei Wang / 
CRAES 
Qingxin Zhang / 
Liaoning 
Environmental 
Monitoring 
Center 
Feng Shi / 
CNEMC 
Feng Shi / 
CNEMC 
Deqian Fu / 
CNEMC Jun Lin / MEP  
 
Shihai Lv / 
CRAES  
Xiaochun Zhang 
/ China 
Meteorological 
Administration 
(CMA) 
 
Xiaochun 
Zhang (CMA) Jun Yu / MEP  
      
Shihai Lv / 
CRAES  
     
Wei Wang / 
CNEMC 
Wei Wang / 
CNEMC  
      
Xia Li / China-
ASEAN 
Environmental 
Cooperation 
Center 
 
Japan 
Satoshi Tanaka 
/ MOEJ 
Ken 
Yoshikawa / 
Okayama 
University 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Hana Otsuka / 
MOEJ  
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Toshiya Okuro 
/ University of 
Tokyo 
Nobuo Sugimoto 
/ NIES 
Nobuo Sugimoto 
/ NIES 
Nobuo Sugimoto 
/ NIES 
Nobuo 
Sugimoto / 
NIES 
 
Hidemasa 
Yamamoto / 
Hidemasa 
Yamamoto / 
MOEJ 
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MOEJ 
Ken 
Yoshikawa / 
Okayama 
University 
Norikazu 
Yamanaka / 
Tottori 
Univeristy 
Itsushi Uno / 
Kyusyu 
University 
Shintaro Fujii / 
MOE 
Shintaro Fujii / 
MOE 
Hitoshi 
Yoshizaki / 
MOEJ 
Hitoshi 
Yoshizaki / 
MOEJ 
Hitoshi 
Yoshizaki / 
MOEJ 
  
Takashi Maki / 
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency 
Takashi Maki / 
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency (JESC) 
Takashi Maki / 
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency 
Takashi Maki / 
Meterological 
Research 
Institute 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
Masataka 
Nishikawa / 
NIES 
  
Masao Mikami / 
Meteorological 
Research 
Institute  
Katsuyuki 
Takahashi / 
Japan 
Environmental 
Sanitation Center 
(JESC)  
  
Toshiya Okuro / 
University of 
Tokyo 
Nobuo 
Sugimoto / 
NIES 
   
Masakazu 
Kusakabe 
(JESC)    
Takashi Maki / 
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency 
   
Aya Horiuchi / 
Overseas 
Environmental 
Cooperation 
Center 
   
Itsushi Uno / 
Kyusyu 
University 
       
Masao Mikami / 
Meteorological 
Research 
Institute 
       
Ken Yoshikawa 
/ Okayama 
University 
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Yukari Hara / 
Kyusyu 
University 
ROK 
Youngjin Kim / 
MOEK 
Byung-Ho Yoo 
/ NIER 
Seungbum Kim / 
KMA 
Youngsin Chun 
/KMA 
Youngsin Chun 
/KMA 
Sumin Kim / 
NIMR 
Sanghoon Kim / 
MOEK 
Sumin Kim / 
NIMR 
Yong-Ho Jeong 
/ Korea Forest 
Research 
Institute 
Yong-Ho Jeong 
/ Korea Forest 
Research 
Institute 
Jeong-Soo Kim / 
NIER 
Seungbum Kim / 
KMA 
Seungbum Kim / 
KMA 
Eun-Hee Lee / 
NIMR 
Bongwoo Shin / 
MOEK 
Bongwoo Shin / 
MOEK 
Seungbum Kim 
(KMA) 
Jang-Min Chu / 
Korea 
Environment 
Institute 
Hee-Jin In / 
KMA 
Sumin Kim / 
KMA 
Sumin Kim / 
KMA 
Youngsin Chun 
/ National 
Institute of 
Meteorological 
Research 
(NIMR) 
Youngsin Chun / 
NIMR 
Youngsin Chun 
/ (NIMR 
 
Ji-Youn Im 
(Korea Forest 
Service) 
Mee-Hye Lee / 
Korea University 
Mee-Hye Lee / 
Korea University 
Mee-Hye Lee / 
Korea 
University  
Young-San Park 
/ NIMR 
Jong-Chul Ha / 
NIMR 
 
Chang-Seok 
Lee / Seoul 
Women's 
University 
 
Soo Yeon Park 
/KMA 
Soo Yeon Park 
/KMA  
Jaebok Lee / 
NIMR 
Sang-Sam Lee / 
NIMR 
   
Eun-Hee Lee / 
KMA 
Eun-Hee Lee / 
KMA  
Kyong ha Kim / 
Korea Forest 
Research 
Institute 
 
   13 participants
131    
Yowhan Son / 
Korea University 
Yowhan Son / 
Korea 
University 
      
Suh-Yong 
Chung / Korea 
University 
Hye Jun Shin / 
NIMR 
                                                          
131 They are from KMA, Center for Atmospheric and Environmental Modeling, Korea, Korea University, Pusan National University, Environment Energy 
Engineering. 
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Mongolia 
   
Jugder Dulam / 
National Agency 
for Meteorology 
and Environment 
Monitoring 
Jugder Dulam / 
National Agency 
for Meteorology 
and 
Environment 
Monitoring 
  
Munkhtsetseg 
Erdenebayar / 
National 
University of 
Mongolia 
   
Munkhtsetseg 
Erdenebayar / 
National Agency 
for Meteorology 
and Environment 
Monitoring 
(NAMEM) & 4 
researchers from 
NAMEM 
Munkhtsetseg 
Erdenebayar / 
NAMEM    
   
Munkhtsetseg 
Tungalag / 
Omnogobi 
Province 
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APPENDIX IV 
HISTORICAL EMISSIONS AND STATUS OF SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION 
 
Note:Adapted from “The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: the Great Leap Forward?” Journal 
of Public Economics, by Finus & Tjøtta, 2003, p. 2035. Emissions (columns 2–4) are expressed 
in 1,000 tons SO2 / year. Reductions (columns 5–6) are expressed as percentage reduction with 
respect to 1980 annual emissions. Parentheses means that a country is a signatory but has not 
ratified the agreement yet; reverse parentheses indicate that a country was a non-signatory but 
succeeded later. Ge=1979 Geneva Framework Convention; H=1985 Helsinki Protocol; O=1994 
Oslo Protocol; and Go=1999 Gothenburg Protocol. “Other countries” includes Africa, Albania, 
Bosnia, Cyprus, Georgia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, and the FYR Macedonia. Natural 
sources include the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, the remaining N.E. 
Atlantic, Natural Oceanic, and Volcanic. It is notable that even the non-signatories such as 
Ireland and Spain had reduced their annual sulfur emissions by more than 30% by 1985.  
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APPENDIX V 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FINANCING OF THE EMEP PROGRAMME 
BETWEEN 1988 AND 1998 
 
Note: UNESC, 1999, p. 5. 
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APPENDIX VI 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANNUAL MEETINGS OF EMEP STEERING BODY 2008-
2011 
 
  2008  2009 2010 2011 
Armenia  A. Turlikyan Same Same  Same 
Austria 
M. Ritter Same Same C. Nagl    
J. Schneider        
Azerbaijan R. Guliyev  Same 0 Same 
Belarus A. Pilipchuk  Same Same Same 
Belgium M.-R. V. D. Hende  Same Same 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  0 0 R. Radic   0 
Bulgaria I. Angelov   0 0 0 
Canada  P. Blanchard   0 C. Banic   0 
Croatia  S. Vidic  Same Same Same 
Cyprus S. K.   Same Same Same 
Czech 
Republic 
 J. Macoun   Same Same Same 
J. Santroch       
Denmark 
T. Ellermann  Same Same Same 
C.L. Fogh   Same   
O. K. Nielsen        
Estonia 0  T. Pauklin   0 0 
Finland H. Hakola  0 Y. Viisanen   Same 
France J. P. Chang        
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L. Rouil   Same Same Same 
Georgia M. Tushishvili   0 0 0 
Germany 
 E. Bieber   Same Same Same 
M. W. Fiebig        
Greece A. Papastamou   0 Same 0 
Hungary P. Z. Ferenczi   Same 0 Same 
Italy 
S. Doytchinov   Same   0 
  N. Pirrone   Same   
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 A. Syrgakova    
Montenegro 
0 0 P. Djuraskovic   0 
  Nicola Pirrone   Same   
Netherlands 
P. Ruyssenaars  Same Same Same 
  R. Maas   Same Same 
      J.-P. Hettelingh  
Norway 
T. Johannessen   Same Same Same 
  V. Vestreng     B. Kvaeven 
      B.L.S. Monsen   
Poland G. Mitosek   A. Degorska   Same G. Mitosek   
Portugal 0 0 P. Torres   0 
Republic of 
Moldova V. Balan  0 0 V. Balan   
Serbia D. Djordjevic   Same Same Same 
Slovakia M. Mitosinkova   Same Same Same 
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Slovenia M. Logar   Same Same Same 
Spain 
A. G. Ortiz   Same Same Same 
X. Querol   Same Same Same 
Sweden 
P. Grennfelt  Same Same Same 
K. Kindbom     M. Ullerstam    
Switzerland 
R. Ballaman         
R. Gehrig   Same Same Same 
R. Weber   Same Same Same 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
0 0 A. Stefanovska   Same 
Ukraine L. Kozak   Same Same Same 
United 
Kingdom 
P. Cassanelli   C. Dore   Same Same 
    P. Coleman   Same 
      H. Harmens  
USA  R. Dennis   T. Keating   Same Same 
      S. Anenberg     
Note: UNECE, 2008; 2008; 2010; 2011. “Same” denotes same participants to previous 
years, and “0” denotes no delegations. 
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